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ABSTRACT 
 
No one would question that firm reputation is a quality commonly ascribed to 
successful firms in the market.  However, the premise of the relationship between firm 
reputation (FR) and firm performance (FP) has not been investigated systematically.  
The three essays aim to expand the theoretical understanding of firm reputation by 
investigating the relationships between (1) organizational strategies, (2) the different 
levels of reputation based on the perspectives of different stakeholder groups, and (3) 
firm performance.   
Essay 1 reviews the antecedents and consequents of FR over the last three 
decades using a meta-analytic framework.  The meta-analysis aims to provide insights 
into the following three key research questions: (1) Which antecedents are most 
influential for enhancing FR?, (2) Which consequents are most affected by FR?, (3) 
Which comes first, FR or FP?  Moreover, different types of FR (internal versus 
external), different reputation measures (primary dataset versus secondary dataset), and 
different definitions of FR (assessment versus asset) are employed as moderators to 
provide more nuanced meta-analytical results and to identify the limitations of previous 
studies in FR.  Essay 1 synthesizes the contradictory findings from the FR literature and 
helps reveal the true relationship between FR and FP (both financial and non-financial 
performance). 
In essay 2, FR in two different markets (i.e., the B2B market and the B2C 
market) that deal with multiple stakeholder groups is defined.  Using institutional 
theory, the study investigates the carry-over effects of FR between two different 
stakeholder groups (i.e., franchisees and consumers) and pinpoints how the opinions of 
xi 
one stakeholder group matter to the opinions of the other stakeholder group.  In 
franchise systems, the value of goods and services is not only created by the firm that 
manufactures and supplies them, but also franchisees that bridge the link between the 
firm (franchisor) and consumers in the marketplace (Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey 
1999).  By examining the reciprocal carry-over effects of the two types of FR, essay 2 
evaluates the relative merits of push and pulls strategies in a franchising context.   
Essay 3 examines the linkages among firm strategies, firm reputation, and firm 
performance by integrating both agency theory and stakeholder theory.  Essay 3 
empirically tests whether franchisors’ strategies of Standardization, Innovativeness, and 
Communication influence stakeholders’ perceptions of performance of focal firms.  
Firm performance is conceptualized in terms of Satisfaction, Commitment, Word-of-
Mouth (WOM) Intention, and Purchasing Intention between franchisors and their 
stakeholders.  This study broadens the understanding of the roles of firm strategies and 
firm reputation in firm-stakeholder relationships.  This broached the topic of how firms 
can maximize the welfare level of two distinct stakeholder groups through strategies 
focused on one particular stakeholder group.  An investigation of the dynamics of firm 
strategies, firm reputation, and performance in the firm-stakeholder relationships can 
shed welcome light on our understanding of stakeholder management.  
Three essays will further the theoretical understanding of FR by using a multi-
level investigation approach to understanding firm reputation, and expanding our 
knowledge of the role of firm strategies in fostering reputation.  This can also bridge the 
great divide that separates B2B and B2C scholarship by holistically encompassing the 
perspectives of franchisors, their franchisees, and the end consumers.   
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ASSESSMENT OF THE ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENTS  
OF FIRM REPUTATION: A META-ANALYSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Firm reputation (FR) provides the referential barometer to evaluate the standing 
of a firm’s performance in the eyes of stakeholders (Fombrun 1997; Podolny 1993).  FR 
is one of the most important drivers for firms striving to obtain a sustainable competitive 
advantage over competitors (Carmeli and Tishler 2004; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Roberts 
and Dowling 2002; Weigelt and Camerer 1988).  Not only does FR reward firms with 
positive financial firm performance (FP) (McGuire et al., 1990), but it also lessens the 
damaging effects of negative incidents (e.g., product recall announcements, 
environmental disasters, and fraudulent conduct) in the market (Chen, Ganesan and Liu 
2009; Davidson and Worrell 2006; Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Jarrell and Peltzman 
1985; Rhee and Haunschild 2006).  The implementation of firm strategies focused on 
developing, enhancing, and maintaining FR is critical since FR represents the 
accumulated impression formed in stakeholders’ minds resulting from interactions with 
the firm (Brown et al., 2006; Fombrun 1996; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Lange, Lee, 
and Dai 2011; MacMillan et al., 2005). Increased scrutiny on the topic of FR over the last 
thirty years in many different fields including economics, management, marketing, 
finance, and accounting has continually shown substantial links between FR and FP 
(Argarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis 2009; Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty 2006; Bello 2005; 
Brown et al., 2006; Rindova et al., 2005; Shrum and Wuthnow 1988; Weigelt and 
Camerer 1988).  The principal purpose of this paper is to quantitatively integrate the 
extant studies on FR in various disciplines and analyze the antecedents and consequents 
of FR using a meta-analytic approach.   
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Based upon a consensus of scholars, FR is one of the most important intangible 
resources. FR is difficult to accumulate, imitate, substitute, or transfer (Rao 1994; 
Surroca, Tribo, and Waddock 2010).  Nevertheless, scholars have continued measuring 
FR and evaluating the impact of FR over the last thirty years, but the empirical findings 
vary considerably.  The research has not reached a definitive consensus regarding the true 
effects of FR on overall firm performance and there are still open questions whether 
endeavors to enhance FR should be attempted.  Some have argued that the positive 
buffering effects of FR reduce the consequences of a negative incident such as a product 
recall, accounting fraud, and unethical conduct of organizations (e.g., Godfrey, Merrill, 
and Hansen 2009; Jones, Jones, and Little 2000; Schnietz and Epstein 2005).  Others 
have shown that FR can be a “double-edged sword,” exacerbating the consequences of 
the negative incident (Brooks et al., 2003; Rhee and Haunschild 2006; Sutton and 
Galunic 1996; Wade et al., 2006).  This disagreement over the functions of FR has 
intensified due to the contradictory findings regarding the relationship between FR and 
FP which varies across empirical studies.  For example, McGuire, Sundgren, and 
Schneeweiss (1988) concluded that FR has no effect on various measures of FP.  
Correspondingly, others suggested that the financial impact of FR is biased, and FR has a 
neutral impact on FP if key variables are controlled (McWilliams and Siegel 2000).  
Whereas some researchers have found evidence of positive links between FR and FP 
(Brown and Perry 1994; Fombrun and Shanley 1990), others have demonstrated the 
market’s negative reaction to misconduct by firms (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Jarrell 
and Peltzman 1985; Pruitt and Peterson 2005).  Meanwhile, Waddock and Graves (1997) 
argued that there is a simultaneous relationship between FR and FP, suggesting that FR is 
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positively associated with prior FP, while also positively associated with future FP.  As 
evidenced in the literature, discrepancies over FR abound. Thus, it is hoped that 
synthesizing the seemingly contradictory findings from the FR literature over the last 
three decades using a meta-analytic approach will help reveal the true relationship 
between FR and FP. 
FR can be defined as the “collective judgment of a firm based on the assessment 
of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the firm over time” 
(Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty 2006, p. 34).  Stakeholders evaluate a focal firm’s 
reputation through their past interactions with the firm, and since firm reputation is 
multidimensional, its effects on FP vary depending on the operationalization employed 
by a particular researcher.  Additionally, how these relationships vary in the Business-to-
Business (B2B) market or the Business-to-Consumer (B2C) market can help the field in 
further disaggregating FR and its effects on different stakeholder groups. Furthermore, 
such disaggregation of FR is necessary to better understand the relationship between FR 
and FP  (Hillman and Keim 2001).  This paper hopes to provide insights to marketing 
managers and top management by disentangling the above issues using an extensive 
quantitative integrative review of the antecedents and consequents to FR.  This study will 
also suggest directions for future research to scholars working on this important construct. 
In this meta-analytic study, I systematically review and analyze the literature on 
antecedents and consequences of FR (Figure 1-1) to provide insight into the following 
seven research questions:  
(1) Which antecedents are most influential for enhancing FR?  
(2) Which consequents are most affected by FR?  
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(3) Which comes first, FR or FP? 
(4) Which dimensions of FR are most linked to its antecedents and consequents: 
FR, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), or Others (i.e., firm legitimacy, 
identity, image, and status)? 
(5) Do studies based on secondary data sources of FR or CSR yield different 
effects than the ones based on primary data?  
(6) Do the relationships between FR and FP in B2B versus B2C contexts yield 
different effects? and finally,  
(7) Which definition of FR is most supported?   
This quantitative review on FR contributes to the field in numerous ways.  The 
links to FR and FP are examined holistically by including both financial and non-
financial variables.  Prior FR studies have employed a wide spectrum of theories and 
terminologies from a variety of disciplines.  The meta-analytical model is thus framed in 
terms of academic disciplines to further the understanding of the relationship between FR 
and the overall performance from various perspectives (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).   
Previous studies on the topic of firm legitimacy, identity, image, and status are 
included since several researchers have used these constructs almost interchangeably 
without thoroughly and clearly explicating the domains of the constructs and their 
definitions. This paper also compares the magnitude of observed effects associated with 
FR, CSR, and “Others” (e.g., firm legitimacy, image, identity, and status).   
I begin by describing the theoretical framework (Figure 1-1) to be employed in 
this meta-analysis.   Next, the  process employed in  collecting  the  effects  from  the  last 
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three decades of FR literature is described.  This will be followed by the actual meta-
analysis where the effect sizes of the manifold relationships of antecedents-FR-
consequents are presented.  Finally, the conclusion and the contribution of the study are 
discussed.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
According to signaling theory, firms’ actions provide key information about 
firms’ characteristics and signal behavioral intentions of firms in the marketplace (Spence 
1973; Turban and Greening 1997).  In a perfect market where information is equally 
distributed across stakeholders, information should not impact economic value in any 
transaction.  However, information signals play important roles in our actual imperfect 
market where information asymmetry exists between a firm and its stakeholders.  In his 
seminal work on information economies, Spence (1973) explains the signaling function 
of education in the labor market and demonstrates how the unobservable characteristics 
and abilities of a job candidate can be presumed by their educational background (Weiss 
1995; Connelly et al., 2011).  Certainly information asymmetry is important in the labor 
market since firms cannot be fully aware of the characteristics and behavioral intentions 
of job candidates (e.g., Stiglitz 2000; Elitzur and Gavious 2003).  Accordingly, job 
candidates signal their characteristics and behavioral intentions through their educational 
background, and distinguish themselves from other competitors using these signals.  
Even though managers may not have perfect information about each job candidate, 
managers must make a decision based on what is available to them.  Just as a firm 
assesses the abilities of job candidates using signals provided by their educational 
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background, stakeholders, who possess less information than a firm, evaluate the value 
and behavioral intentions of the firm based on signals that are available.  Thus, managers 
can strategize to signal pertinent information to the market through various means in 
order to distinguish themselves from competitors.   
Stakeholders’ perceptions of firms are established with information signals 
provided by the accumulated previous interactions with firms.  As signals about firms’ 
activities, achievements and prospects diffuse, individuals aggregate their interpretations 
of firms into collective judgments that crystallize into FR (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
Hence, FR sets the level of expectation in stakeholders’ minds as they compare and 
evaluate different firms in the market (Jones and Murrell 2001).  Simply put, firms can 
use the signaling and the informational content of their signals to correctly indicate their 
standing in the marketplace.  The firms with a strong reputation may also use FR as the 
signals to differentiate themselves from their market competitors and achieve competitive 
advantages in the marketplace (Barney 1991).  Various firm performances inferred from 
FR are likely to have financial, social, and environmental impacts in the marketplace.  
For example, a “good” FR signals the competence and goodwill of the firm to various 
stakeholders (Campbell 1999).  
Over the last three decades scholars from several disciplines such as management, 
economics, sociology, and marketing have given notable attention to the topic of FR.  
They share the same interest in the influences of information signals on FR creation, and 
the roles of FR as a signal in the marketplace.  However, their opinions and interests on 
what specifically signals FR diverge since previous studies have been conducted based on 
informational signals emanating from disparate disciplinary lenses.  Scholars in the field 
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of accounting, economics, and finance are focused on the relationship between financial 
signals and FR, while scholars in management and marketing are rather interested in the 
non-financial elements that influence (or are influenced by) FR (See Figure 1-1).  
 
Signaling Factors in Accounting, Economics, and Finance 
Researchers in Accounting, Economics, and Finance have investigated the 
relationship between FR and four core financial market signals: (1) Accounting FP (e.g., 
ROA, ROE, and ROS) (Doh et al. 2010; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Ingram and Frazier 
1983), (2) Market FP (e.g., positive and negative surprises in the financial market and 
changes of stock prices) (Brown 1997; Gunthorpe 1997; Hill et al. 2007; Karpoff, Lee, 
and Vendrzyk 1999), (3) Liability (Houston and Johnson 2000; Jensen and Roy 2008; 
McGuire, Schneeweis, and Branch 1990), and (4) Risk (Aupperle et al. 1985; Claycomb 
and Frankwick 2010; Hull and Rothenberg 2008).   
Accounting FP and Market FP. It is no surprise that the linkage between FR and 
financial FP has become an important topic (Walsh, Weber, and Margolis 2003).  Indeed, 
some believe that examining the relationship between non-financial FP and FR can only 
be considered as an ancillary finding if linkages to financial FP are not clearly established 
(e.g., Sabate and Puente 2003).  A firm’s economic value is not determined only by the 
sum of its tangible assets, but by the value of its intangible assets (Barth and Clinch 
1998).  Just as an accountant has to quantitatively translate corporations’ goodwill in 
order to generate financial statements, so too do academic researchers find credibility and 
practical relevance of FR through its link to FP.  In this meta-analysis, Accounting ratios 
(e.g., ROA, ROE, and ROS) that are often used in accounting to evaluate the overall 
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financial condition of firms are categorized as Accounting FP.  The responses of an 
equity market (e.g., positive and negative surges in the financial market and changes in 
stock prices) are categorized as Market FP.  Good examples of such categorizations of 
financial FP in meta-analytic studies are Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) and 
Orltizky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003).   
Capital market signals present information to stakeholders about firms’ current 
activities, financial stability, and prospects of market sustainability.  Among various 
stakeholder groups, external analysts, creditors, and investors are particularly attuned to 
financial FP and routinely integrate capital market signals in their trading decisions 
(Fama 1970).  Through informal networks and formally prepared financial statements, 
stakeholders assess the overall value of firms and diffuse information in the capital 
markets to other stakeholders (Shrum and Wuthnow 1988).  Reputable firms experience 
greater market rewards for positive surprises and smaller market penalties for negative 
surprises than firms with weak FR (Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova 2010).  Stockholders 
and institutional investors tend to reward firms with better FR for social performance 
through their investments.  The positive linkage between FR and FP (e.g., Aupperle et al., 
1985; Cochran and Wood 1984; McGuire et al., 1988, 1990; Waddock and Graves 1997) 
shows that firms spend their resources strategically by “doing good by doing well.”  
McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) found that the prior return on assets was 
highly correlated with a firm’s reputation for social responsibility, which suggests that 
economic performance serves an important signaling function when the public constructs 
reputational rankings of firms.  Barnett and Salomon (2006) found the FP of socially 
responsible mutual funds varies depending on the dimensions of FR and the types of 
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social screening procedures.  Reputation can minimize market uncertainty due to 
information asymmetry that exists between a principle (e.g., stockholders and 
institutional or pension investors) and an agent (e.g., a corporate manager).  Good 
managers recognize benefits by maintaining a good reputation and avoiding criticism 
from different stakeholder groups.   
Risk and Liability. Risk refers to the uncertainty of an expected return and the 
potential for loss (McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts 2005).  Liabilities are defined as the 
financial obligations of a firm.  Examples of firms’ liabilities are capitalized leases, 
secured debt, ordinary debt, subordinated debt, preferred stock, and common stock 
(Barclay and Smith 1995). Firms that report high performance and low risk convey 
information to the capital markets and other constituencies about the proven merits of 
their strategic trajectories and future prospects.  Optimistic projections increase the 
public’s interest to purchase those firms’ equity offerings, thereby increasing market 
value.  It also signals that those firms have the inherent potential to fulfill (at least some 
of) their economic objectives.  The market value and market risk of firms provides 
stakeholders such as stockholders and competing firms with both firm-specific and 
comparative information (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  A broad range of economic 
signals emanating from firms helps stakeholders determine FR and reputational orderings 
within each industry.  For instance, firm debt can provide signals of firm quality (Ross 
1973).  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) found assessment of reputation has a negative 
relationship with prior performance adjusted risk.  A firm’s prior performance has a 
major impact on its image, as does the firm’s risk profile (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  
Constituents expect a high level of return from firms whose strategies demonstrate high 
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levels of risk (Bettis and Mahajan 1985).  Ergo, if two firms engage in similar levels of 
profitability, then the public’ assessment on the firm with the greater risk will be lower.  
Public documents such as financial statements indicate both the results of prior activities 
and the current resource allocations that the firms’ managers have made.  With such 
signals, firms can enhance their access to capital markets (Beatty and Ritter 1986) and 
attract investors (Milgrom and Roberts 1986).   
 
Signaling Factors in Management   
Although it has traditionally been assumed that financial FP is the key signal to 
determine FR, stakeholders are beginning to put more emphasis on non-financial factors.  
The collective FR as valued by stakeholders signals the market’s expectations and 
responses from firms’ current standing and managerial trajectories for the future.  In 
Management, scholars have investigated how firms signal information through three key 
metrics: (1) Ownership structure (David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Galaskiewicz 1997; 
Jensen and Roy 2008), (2) Networking (Carson, Madhok, and Wu 2006; Combs and 
Ketchen 1999; Deephouse and Carter 2005) and (3) Human Resources (Boyd, Bergh, and 
Ketchen 2009; Carmeli and Tishler 2004; Collins 2007) to strengthen their FR in the 
marketplace.  The goal is to understand firms’ transactional decisions by weighing 
potential gains between either being opportunistic or being ethical and relationship-
minded.   
Ownership. In meta-analysis, ownership refers to the concentration of the internal 
management team (Amihud and Lev 1999).  Patterns of institutional ownership are 
known to affect the behavior of the firms’ managers.  Amihud and Lev (1999) argued that 
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ownership can be used as a proxy to estimate the value of the firm.  For instance, when 
institutions hold more of a firm’s stock than do individuals, managers invest less in R&D 
(Graves 1988).  The composition of investors in firms’ shares arguably sends a strong 
signal to other constituents.  The more institutional investors there are, the more likely 
some in the public are to view firms favorably, taking for granted that careful screening 
by well-informed portfolio analysts led to the institutional purchase decision.  In other 
words, more institutional ownership of a firm can signal FR and firms can strategize their 
image to enhance FR, so more institutional investors hold more shares of the firm.  
Networking. Networking refers to a focal firm’s collection of interorganizational 
ties with other firms in the business market (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001).  It is 
further argued that FR influences firms’ decisions regarding networking development 
(Garvey 1995; Hennart 1993; Kogut 1988; Saxton 1997).  FR and integration of the 
channel distribution system can be seen as substitutes (Garvey 1995).  The cost 
associated with behavioral uncertainty of a partner with low FR would affect the total 
expected payoff in any given transaction (Saxton 1997).  As FR improves, networking 
expansion is said to be better than integration of the channel distribution system since 
networking is more economical if all other conditions of transactions are identical 
(Hennart 1993; Kogut 1988).  Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton (1997) argue that reputable 
firms have an advantage in joint venture formation.  Thus, reputable firms will continue 
to develop their networks.  
FR also serves as an effective entry barrier in the marketplace (Kreps and Wilson 
1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982).  The initial offering of a firm can be influenced by the 
FR of auditors who evaluate the value of firms.  Moreover, since a firm assumedly gains 
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more by developing partnerships with firms that have different organizational 
characteristics, competencies, and internal resources (Jemison and Sitkin 1986; Pennings, 
Barkema and Douma 1994; Saxton 1997), FR can be a key driver to finding such partners.  
When a firm develops a relationship with a reputable partner it can expect a reputation 
carry-over effect.
1
  However, by the same token, FR can be damaged by a partner’s poor 
performance in the market. As one potent example, after the publicity of the Enron audit 
failure Arthur Andersen’s other clients suffered from the negative market reaction 
(Chaney and Philipich 2002).  Particularly, the clients of Arthur Andersen’s Houston 
office, where Enron’s audit was performed, experienced severely negative market 
reactions.  FR seemingly behaves like a commodity that can be traded in the marketplace 
(Hill 1990).   
Certainly, a firm can use FR as a mechanism to encourage cooperation and even 
to shield itself from the behavioral uncertainty of its supply chain members 
(Bhattacharya, Rao, and Glynn 1995; Daughety and Frosythe 1987; Dutton, Dukerich, 
and Harquil 1994; Martin and Justis, 1993; Shane 1996).  When a focal firm looks for 
transaction partners, reputable firms are more attractive since it is costly to monitor and 
to protect against a partner’s opportunistic behavior (Dyer 1996).  From an economic 
viewpoint, a firm would engage in opportunistic behavior if the payoff from such conduct 
                                                 
1
 A reputation carry-over effect refers to the degree to which the reputation of a supply chain member 
affects the market visibility and FR of the focal firm. (Kang, Mahoney, and Tan 2009; Rindova, et al., 
2005; Stuart 2000). The relationship specific investment of OEM suppliers in Taiwan signals positive FR 
spillovers in the market and the enhanced FR of Taiwanese OEM suppliers (Kang, et al., 2009).  A firm 
gains direct and indirect benefits from such network participation, shared decision making, and partner 
reputation (Granovetter 1985; Hill 1990; Saxton 1997).  In accounting literature, the choice of an auditor 
is used as a barometer to determine FR in the industry (Jensen and Roy 2008). The uncertainty of the 
initial public offering (IPO) investors can be reduced by reputable auditors who evaluate the values of 
IPO firms, since the FR of the auditors is in jeopardy if the IPO firms are incorrectly appraised (Beatty 
1989).   
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is higher than the benefits of gaining trust from the partner and establishing FR in the 
industry.  However, if the expenses of being opportunistic in the market are too costly, 
firms would have an incentive to enhance their FR (Akerlof 1970; Fombrun and Shanley 
1990; Williamson 1991). The threats of potentially losing FR in the market, then, force 
firms to cooperate with their partners and enhance FR in the B2B market (Houston and 
Johnson 2000).  Managers set the associations that form exchange partners to ensure that 
they benefit from the network transmission of organizational reputation or status 
(Podolny 1993; 1994). 
Human Resources. In this meta-analysis, Human Resources refers to the value of 
individuals who work in a firm (Barney 1991).  A similar effect exists in the labor 
market.  Adequate human resources can work as a positive signal to FR.  When highly 
qualified individuals are affiliated with a firm, FR in the marketplace will be enhanced 
(Boyd, Bergh, and Ketchen 2010; Rindova et al., 2005).  Reputable firms are more 
preferable and more attractive in the labor market (Turban and Cable 2003) and job 
candidates tend to apply to firms that are known by their families and friends (Collins 
2007).  
 
Signaling Factors in Marketing   
Marketing literature identifies five key signals related to FR: (1) Price Premium 
(Balvers, McDonald, and Miller 1988; Beatty 1989), (2) Cost (Khurana and Raman 2004; 
Weiss, Anderson, and MacInnis 1999), (3) Product Strategy (Benjamin and Podolnu 
1999; Berens, van Riel, and van Bruggen 2005; Capraro and Srivastava 1997), (4) 
Visibility (Basdeo et al. 2006; David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Russo and Fouts 1997), 
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and (5) Brand Equity (Ahearne, Bhattacharya, and Gruen 2005; Brown and Dacin 1997; 
Helm 2007).   
Price Premium. Price premium is defined as “the excess price paid, over and 
above the “fair” price that is justified by the “true” value of the product (Rao and Bergen 
1992).  Firms use various signaling factors in marketing to cue desired quality 
information to stakeholders, and firms can engage in explicit reputation-building 
activities to improve their FR (Fombrun 1996).  Examples of such signaling factors in 
marketing are pricing power, consumer loyalty and product awareness, and the 
knowledge of flexible and high-quality production processes.  In addition, favorable FR 
allows a firm to create demand in the market and develop its marketing strategies as FR 
reduces individuals’ uncertainty about the value of future transactions (Balvers, 
McDonald, and Miller 1988; Benjamin and Podolnu 1999; Brown 1997; Rao and Monroe 
1996; Rindova et al., 2005; Shapiro 1983; Standifird 2001).   
Price is defined as the amount of money charged for goods and services, or more 
broadly, the value that consumers exchange for the benefits of having goods and services 
(Kotler and Armstrong 2012, p. 290). Often, price is used as a proxy to determine the 
quality of goods and services (Dodds, Monroe, and Grewal 1991).  In signaling 
equilibrium, stakeholders (especially stockholders, institutional investors, and consumers) 
evaluate the quality of firms and formulate a transactional value, i.e., price, that they are 
willing to exchange in the marketplace.  Stakeholders are content to pay a higher price for 
goods and services from more reputable firms (Connelly et al., 2011; Shapiro 1983).  
They presume that signals are reliable because less reputable firms would not be able to 
sustain false signals in the long term.  For instance, consumers are willing to pay a 
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premium price for the goods and services of reputable firms since a favorable FR can 
enhance individuals’ self-image (Podolny 1994).  Keh and Xie (2009) also found that a 
positive FR enhanced consumers’ willingness to pay a price premium, mediated by 
consumers’ trust in the focal firm.  Benjamin and Podolny (1999) demonstrated that 
investments in quality made by California wineries experienced a higher pay-off if the 
winery in question had a better reputation.  By signaling information about product 
quality, a favorable reputation may enable firms to charge premium prices (Klein and 
Leffler 1981; Milgrom and Roberts 1986).  
Cost. In addition, reputable firms are able to reduce costs when they negotiate and 
develop transactional contracts with their suppliers.  Suppliers can minimize risk from a 
breach of contract when they sell their products to a reliable partner with a good 
reputation.  Thus, they are willing to offer a discounted price to their partners.  In other 
words, reputation lowers risk and increases the discounted amount from suppliers’ 
perspectives.  Thus, firms with good FR can lower their costs. 
Product Strategy. Product strategy refers to firms’ activities undertaken to 
differentiate their market offerings (Kotler and Keller 2009).  Although FR and status are 
typically aligned, high status does not always imply positive FR on all attributes (Jensen 
and Roy 2008).  Positive FR on specific attributes may imply high status; a more specific 
signal of FR acts as a stronger assessment of the quality of firms.  Firms’ signals about 
their products and strategies for future products, therefore, can have different effects on 
FR.  When a firm is in an industry where product differentiation among competitors is 
small and firms are less likely to be involved in innovations, then establishing a favorable 
FR in the market is a key driver to strong FP (Russo and Fouts 1997).  Product 
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differentiation and the level of differentiation in the industry allow firms to occupy 
distinguishable and recognizable positions.  Product strategies signal positive messages to 
stakeholders in the market since stakeholders can evaluate the future uncertainty of the 
firm through its commitments to produce superior products.  In this vein, greater use of 
R&D contracts and licenses is associated with favorable FR for possessing expertise in 
biotechnology (Nicholls-Nixon and Woo 2003).  A firm undertakes a review of its 
product strategies when a discrepancy between firm identity and FR is identified.  If the 
firm realizes that its strategic impact is too small to change the perspectives of third 
parties who review FR, then the firm may be more motivated to develop quality 
assurance and product strategies (Martins 2005).  Dowling (2001) suggested that a good 
reputation supports and enhances sales force effectiveness, new product introductions, 
and recovery strategies in negative incidents. 
Visibility. Visibility refers to firms’ state of being able to be seen by its 
stakeholders.  The visibility of firms can be enhanced when firms’ spend on advertising 
and when firms receive publicity from third-parties (e. g., Kotler and Keller 2009).  
Stakeholders’ perceptions of a firm are not only influenced by the firm’s current 
practices, but also by its visibility through the mass media or third-parties.  For instance, 
the inclusion in Fortune’s annual survey of “America’s Most Admired Firms,” a third-
party evaluation on FR, provides tremendous positive publicity for the focal firm (Love 
and Kraatz 2009; Philinne and Durand 2011).  Goldberg and Hartwick (1990) suggest 
that potential consumers receive (especially extreme) advertising claims more favorably 
if the reputation of the firm making those claims is more positive.   
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Brand Equity.  Brand Equity is defined as “the differential effect of brand 
knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand” (Keller 1993, p.2).  
Favorable FR should lead to increases in demand in the market and become a basis for 
repeat business (Beatty and Ritter 1986; Hall 1993).  When firms’ brand equity in the 
marketplace is sound and good, the overall perception of firms would be positively 
influenced by their brand equity.  FR has positive effects on the emotional predisposition 
of individual stakeholders in the financial market since an existing perceptual association 
with the firms can be extended to a secondary association for the brand (Keller 1993).  As 
Helm (2007) has determined that the level of satisfaction positively mediates FR and 
brand equity, brand equity would also be an important consequence of FR.   
 
Control Variables   
Age, Size, Competitiveness, Prior FR, and Prior CSR have been employed as 
control variables in many FR studies (Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis 2009; Benjamin and 
Podolnu 1999; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006).   
Age and Size. An older, larger, and leading firm in an industry tends to receive 
significant public scrutiny.  But the availability of information may benefit older and 
larger firms disproportionally by inflating stakeholders’ familiarity with their activities 
(McCorkindale 2008). For example, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) found a positive 
relationship between FR and size.  Firm size is directly related to FR, as larger firms 
enjoy greater name recognition than smaller firms (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Garbett 
1988). Chen and Metcalf (1980) also stated that CSR and firm size are positively related 
because larger firms have greater visibility and engage in more and better social 
19 
 
performance initiatives than smaller firms with relatively lower visibility. An expanding 
firm attracts more attention from various stakeholder groups whereas a large firm needs 
to respond more attentively (Burke et al., 1986; Waddock and Graves 1997).  At the same 
time, firm size may lead to net economies of scale in manufacturing operations (Black, 
Noel, and Wang 1999), greater control over external stakeholders and resources (Aldrich 
and Pfeffer 1976; Salancik and Pfeffer 1980; Stanwick and Stanwick 1998) and increased 
promotional opportunities resulting in the attraction and retention of better employees 
(Davies et al., 2004; Turban and Cable 2003).   
Competitiveness. Additionally, the nature of industry is important as well.  
Favorable FR can generate excess returns for firms by inhibiting the mobility of rivals in 
an industry (Caves and Porter 1977; Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  Francis, Reichelt, and 
Wang (2005) did not find the price premium for the national leaders in the auditing 
industry, but found the price premium for city-specific industry leaders.  Depending on 
the competitiveness, the role of FR would vary and some firms may keep new entrants 
out of the market by establishing a strong reputation in the marketplace.  Obloj and 
Capron (2011) found that the advantages for a reputable firm are positively related to the 
size of the reputation gap between the reputable firm and its competitors in the industry.   
Prior FR and Prior CSR. Firms can enhance their desired altruistic FR and 
perpetuate that identity in the marketplace through prior FR and CSR signals.  Consumers 
who find their own societal concerns aligned with those of focal firms express their 
identities by patronizing these firms (Ahearne, Bhattacharya, and Gruen 2005; 
Bhattacharya and Sen 2003).  The overall perspectives of stakeholders toward firms that 
are actively engaged in CSR practices are positive (Brown and Dacin 1997; Lichtenstein, 
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Drumwright, and Braig 2004); CSR is positively related to FR.  Not surprisingly, Dooley 
and Lerner (1994) state that more successful and reputable firms are under greater 
pressure to perform CSR initiatives since governmental agencies carefully monitor 
leading firms.   
 
Controversial Issues over Operationalization of FR studies  
Even though the idea that FR is a valuable intangible asset of firms seems 
intuitive, the meaning of FR has been interpreted in different ways in the literature 
(Brown et al., 2006; Fombrun 1996; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Lange, Lee, and Dai 
2011; MacMillan et al., 2005).  However, the variations in the operalization of FR have 
not been carefully documented in the extant empirical studies.  Wood and Jones (1995) 
argued that the inconsistent statistical findings on the relationship between FR and FP are 
due to “market participant mismatching.”  They stated that accounting measures of 
profitability that are often employed in FR studies only indicate managers’ self evaluation 
of a firm’s standing in the marketplace rather than the overall perceptions of stakeholders.  
This has apparently occurred because previous empirical studies have often employed 
well-known and easily available secondary datasets (e.g., Fortune’s dataset and Kinder 
Lydenberg Domini’s Socrates (KLD) dataset).   
Different dimensions of FR.  In this meta-analysis FR is estimated using three 
dimensions: (1) firm reputation, (2) CSR, and (3) other proxies employed in the literature 
including firm legitimacy, identity, image, and status.  The number of studies that 
investigate the relationship between CSR and FP has been growing.  The concerns for the 
working conditions, community, and environment are key dimensions of FR that 
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contribute to stakeholders’ perceptions on FR; however, these concerns are identical to 
societal concerns that CSR activities represent.  Thus, CSR related studies are included in 
this meta-analysis. 
A succinct definition of FR is provided by Fombrun (1996) as “a perceptual 
representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s 
overall appeal to all of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals” ( 
p.72).  However, confusion exists regarding analogous constructs like firm identity, 
image, legitimacy, status, and reputation (Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty 2006; Brown et 
al., 2006; Highhouse, Brooks, and Gregarus 2009).  Recently, Brown et al. (2006) 
defined the differences among firm identity, firm image, and distinguished the domain of 
each construct that have often been used interchangeably.  Table 1-1 documents this 
discussion where FR related constructs, such as legitimacy, identity, image, and status, 
are introduced together with their definitions and intellectual grounding for each 
construct to showcase the differences among these constructs.  Finally, how these 
constructs were defined and used in previous FR literature is listed together with their 
representative references.  Even Fombrun and van Riel (1997) subsume image and 
identity within FR by stating “FR gauges a firm’s relative standing both internally with 
employees and externally with its stakeholders (p.10).”  Thus, it was necessary for me to 
include studies that used FR related constructs in this meta-analysis.  Also, it is important 
to understand the domain of each construct better to move the field forward. 
Different types of datasets. The weakness of datasets magnifies the problems 
arising from the operationlization of studies.  Primary datasets may be more suitable and 
provide  more  accurate  information  about  the  linkages of  antecedents-FR-consequents  
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since the measures are specifically applied to the context and the data is collected from 
the correct target populations.  However, these advantages of primary datasets can be 
troublesome if correlations of each variable are inflated (Brown and Perry 1994; Capraro 
and Srivastava 1997).  Secondary datasets have their strengths, but are not without 
limitations.  Brown  and  Perry (1994)  argue   that  Fortune’s  most admired  companies’ 
ranking, one of the most commonly used datasets for FR, is strongly driven by prior 
financial performance.  They warned scholars to remove the financial FP halo on 
Fortune’s dataset by utilizing a halo removal technique.2  Roberts and Dowling (2002) 
decompose “left over” profits that cannot be forecasted from previous financial FP by 
examining fifteen years of Fortune’s dataset (from 1984 to 1998) to precisely extract 
above-average profits from overall FR.  The field can gain useful insights into the issue 
of operationalization of future FR studies through the comparison of results based on the 
types of datasets (i.e., Fortune’s and KLD) from the findings of this meta-analysis.   
Fortune’s dataset contains reflective measures for each dimension, and each item 
is based on 11-point Likert scales.  (i.e., 0 - poor and 10 – excellent).3  Fortune’s annual 
America’s Most Admired Companies survey is composed of eight attributes: 
innovativeness; quality of management; quality of products/services offered; long-term 
investment value; financial soundness; ability to attract/keep talented people; 
                                                 
2
 Brown and Perry (1994) created the halo index using a number of financial and operational performance 
measures that are highly correlated to the Fortune ratings (Fomburn and Shanley 1990; McGuire et al., 
1990).  Five financial and operating variables that are employed by Brown and Perry (1994) are the 
following: Average return on assets (ROA) = (ROAit + ROAit-1+ROAit-2)/3, relative market to book value 
= market value/book valuefirm over market value/book valueindustry, sales = logarithm of salesit, growth = 
(percent change in salest + …+ percent change in salest-2)/3, and risk = debtit/equityit. 
3
 The America’s Most Admired Corporations survey consists of the 15 leading firms in each international 
industry and the 10 largest firms for each U.S. industry from the Fortune 1000 lists (see CNNMoney, 
May 4, 2012).  Approximately 12,000 senior executives, outside directors, and financial analysts, from 
both buy-side and sell-side, participate in the survey and the response rate is about fifty percent (Roberts 
and Dowling 2002). 
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community/environmental responsibility; and use of corporate assets.  Kinder Lydenberg 
Domini’s Socrates (KLD) dataset provides nine relevant factors for firms: the 
environment, military contracting, employee relations, community involvement, product 
safety, quality programs, excessive compensation of executives, diversity, and nuclear 
power.  These nine dimensions of CSR are measured and scored as firms’ strength (i.e., a 
moderate strength as 1 and a strong strength as 2) or their concern (i.e., a moderate 
concern as -1 and a strong concern as -2) from the perspectives of firms (Bello 2005; 
Berman et al., 1999; David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Doh et al., 2010; Hillman and 
Keim 2001; Hull and Rothenberg 2008; Johnson and Greening 1994; Muller and Kraussl 
2011; Turban and Greening 1997).  Even though CSR studies use the KLD database, the 
measures of CSR vary widely even using the same KLD dataset as dimensions can be 
selected depending on the nature of the CSR studied.  However, Fortune’s dataset has 
been well accepted in many FR related studies including Carmeli and Tishler (2004), 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990), Luo and Bhattacharya (2009), McGuire, et al., (1988), and 
Roberts and Dowling (2002).  Even though the studies are conducted in the same context 
to investigate links to FR, the correlations range widely.  Thus, there is a possibility that 
some of the significant findings in previous studies may have been caused by the 
differentials in the datasets.   
Different types of market. Firms serve multiple stakeholders, each of whom 
applies distinct criteria in evaluating corporate performance (Freeman 1983).  There are 
two different types of markets being tapped in FR studies: (1) the Business-to-Consumer 
(B2C) market and (2) the Business-to-Business (B2B) market.  In the B2C market, the 
end consumers are the main stakeholder group which respond to market signals (e.g., 
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Brown and Dacin 1997; Kang and Yang 2010; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001).  In the B2B 
market, the business partners such as suppliers, alliances and industrial investors have 
interests in a focal firm’s activities (e.g., Grewal, Charkravarty, and Saini 2010; Hansen, 
Samuelsen, and Silseth 2008; Helm 2007; Houston and Johnson 2000).  FR plays an 
important role in both markets by reducing stakeholders’ uncertainty.  However, it is 
uncertain if the magnitude of linkages between antecedents and consequents of FR are 
the same since some attributes are more important to one particular group than the other.        
Different definitions of FR.  Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty (2006) reviewed 
previous FR related studies and identified three distinct clusters of meaning in the FR 
definitional statements: FR as a state of awareness, FR as an assessment, and FR as an 
asset.  Awareness refers to stakeholders’ general awareness of a firm without making a 
judgment of the firm’s standing in the marketplace.  Assessment indicates the 
stakeholders’ use of FR to evaluate the status of a firm.  Asset refers to FR as a resource 
with an intangible, financial, or economic value.  Through a careful review of previous 
empirical studies on FR, most studies used FR as either an assessment (51 out of 138 
studies) or as an asset (66 out of 138 studies).  Only 21 studies used FR as a state of 
awareness.  In this meta-analysis, FR studies are coded into two different definitions of 
FR: FR as an assessment and FR as an asset.  It is interesting to note that studies that 
identify FR as an asset have typically used a resource-based view for their framework 
whereas studies that employ FR as an assessment have typically used stakeholder theory, 
FR theory, or social identity theory.   
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METHODOLOGY 
Meta-analysis is a quantitative method of research integration (Cooper, Hedges, 
and Valentine 2009).  Increasingly, it has replaced the narrative literature review as a 
technique of summarizing a research area. This study relied on the meta-analytic 
guidelines provided by Hunter and Schmidt (2004).  Their techniques correct the 
observed sample statistics for methodological study artifacts and distortions due to 
sampling error and measurement error. Effect-size estimated by Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient (r) calculates population parameter estimates by correcting for the 
aforementioned artifacts.
4
  The effect of the sampling error correction is particularly 
important because sample sizes that are smaller than the population cause observed 
sample correlation statistics to vary randomly from the population parameter, i.e., the 
true-score correlation.  The recognition and subsequent control of these artifacts allow for 
a better estimate of the true variability around the population correlation (e.g., Hunter and 
Schmidt 2004; Nunally and Bernstein 1994). 
First, to ensure the representativeness and completeness of the database used in 
the meta-analysis, I searched the ABI/Informs Global (proQuest), EBSCO (Business 
Source Premier), and JSTOR (Business) for studies published from 1980 to 2011, using 
the keywords: “firm reputation,” “corporate reputation,” “corporate social performance 
                                                 
4
 Most empirical studies utilized in this quantitative integration provided their correlation tables.  However, 
when this was not true (i.e., results of t-test, F-test, Z-test, or distances were presented instead), the 
reported effects were transformed into the equivalent of an effect size r using conversion formulae 
developed by Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) and Hunter and Schmidt (2004).  I used the following 
formula:    
  
      
 for t-test statistics,     
 
     
  for F-test statistics,    
  
 
  for Z-test statistics, 
and    
 
     
 for distances. 
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(CSP),
5” “corporate social responsibility (CSR),” “firm legitimacy,” “firm identity,” and 
“corporate image” in author-supplied abstracts.  The search browsers were restricted for 
articles that are full-text, references available and in scholarly/academic (peer reviewed) 
journals only.  A total of 13,424 scholarly journal articles were identified from various 
disciplines. Second, to increase the scope of the search, cross-citations from previous 
qualitative and quantitative reviews were explored (e.g., Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 
2009; McGuire et al., 1988; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; Wood and Jones 1995).  
Third, I manually reviewed the content of top ranking academic journals in various 
disciplines.
6
 Fourth, a request for unpublished and working papers regarding the topic 
was posted on the American Marketing Association’s Electronic Marketing site 
(ELMAR) in an effort to address the “file-drawer” problem (Rosenthal 1995).  This 
resulted in 138 empirical studies that yielded 1,010 independent effects.
7
  A summary of 
                                                 
5  Since CSR is one of the dimensions of FR, studies that use CSR or CSP were also considered as 
reputation studies.  However, Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) use FR as a moderator to the 
relationship between CSR and their financial FP.  Thus, CSR and CSP are considered as an 
antecedent/consequence to firm reputation, if the focal study contained both FR and CSR measures.  
6 The articles were selected from a total of 23 different academic journals encompassing the years 1980 to 
2011: (1) the top four marketing journals (Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, 
Marketing Science, and Journal of Consumer Psychology), (2) the top six management journals 
(Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, 
Journal of Management, Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal), (3) the top three 
accounting journals (Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, and Journal of Accounting 
and Economics), (4) the top three finance journals (Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, 
and Review of Financial Studies), (5) the top three economics journals (The American Economic Review, 
Journal of Political Economy, and Journal of Law and Economics), (6) two interdisciplinary journals 
(Journal of Business Research and Journal of International Business Studies), and (7) two scholarly 
journals that are dedicated to the themes of corporate reputation and ethics, Corporate Reputation Review 
and Journal of Business Ethics. 
7
  The large drop from 13,424 to 138 is caused by (1) exclusion of non-empirical studies, and (2) articles 
that appeared in minor and marginal journals. 
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these studies is presented in Table 1-2 and Appendix C provides detailed coding of these 
studies.
8
   
Each linkage between a variable and FR is considered as a single effect.  The first 
correction on measurement error was made by adjusting simple correlations for variables’ 
reliability scores (Hunter and Schmidt 2004).  Second, the reliability-adjusted correlation 
was corrected for sampling error arising from differences of sample sizes.  Sample-
weighted reliability adjusted r’s were then subjected to a chi-square test (d.f. =1) for 
association.  Also calculated were the 95% confidence intervals of the sample-weighted, 
reliability-adjusted correlations, the file-drawer sample size, the classical measure of 
homogeneity (Cochran’s Q-statistic test), and the I2 index (Higgins and Thompson 2002; 
Huedo-Medina et al. 2006).  These values are reported using two frameworks: one based 
on the causality of the proposed linkage between a variable and FR (i.e., as an antecedent 
to FR or as a consequence of FR) and the other based on the dimensions of FR (i.e., 
overall FR, CSR, and firm image, identity, and legitimacy).  The results of this meta-
analysis are interpreted following Cohen (1977)’s rule of thumb for interpreting effect 
sizes: (1) small (r = .10), (2) moderate (r = .30), and (3) large (r = .50).  File drawer N 
represents the number of unpublished studies that would have to exist before the overall 
observed results could be attributed to sampling bias (Csada, James, and Espie 1996; 
Rosenthal 1979). Hence, in general, the larger the N, the more robust is the observed 
effect.  The Q-statistic test of homogeneity is calculated as the weighted sum of squared 
                                                 
8
  The linkage between identified variables and FR is first identified as an antecedent, a concurrent, and a 
consequence (See Appendix C). In order to be consistent with the framework adopted for this study 
(Figure 1-1), the concurrent linkages were collapsed as antecedents.  
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differences between individual effects and the combined effects with the weights being 
those used in the pooling method.   
 
RESULTS 
Which antecedents are most influential for enhancing FR?  
There were fifteen antecedents in four categories identified: antecedents in Accounting, 
Economics, and Finance (i.e., Accounting FP, Market FP, Liability, and Risk); 
antecedents in Management (i.e., Ownership, Networking, and Human Resources); 
antecedents in Marketing (i. e., Product Strategy, Visibility, and Brand Equity); and 
control variables (i.e., Age, Size, Competitiveness, Prior FR, and Prior CSR).
9
  The 
summary of studies included in the assessment of antecedents of FR is presented in Table 
1-3, and the summaries of the descriptive statistics and the results of combined effect of 
each antecedent are presented in Table 1-4.  The number of linkages from antecedents 
and FR vary, ranging from 12 for Market FP and Liability to 165 for Accounting FP (See 
Table 1-3).  As shown in Table 1-4, not all antecedents are equally influential in 
enhancing FR and the effects ranged from average sample-weighted, reliability-adjusted 
correlations from the smallest effect of .01 for the Age  Overall FR effect, to the largest 
effect of .44 for the Brand Equity  Overall FR effect.  Thirteen of the fifteen effects 
were supported and were robust to file drawer problem and Q-Statistic test for 
                                                 
9
 Linkages with < 5 effects are omitted from the analysis, in effect reducing the number of antecedents 
actually analyzed to shrink.  Price Premium and Cost antecedents in Marketing are omitted in Table 3 
and 4 due to the small number of effects.   
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homogeneity; the exceptions were the Age  Overall FR linkage, and the 
Competitiveness  Overall FR linkage.10  
TABLE 1-2
11
 
SUMMARY OF STUDIES INCLUDED IN META-ANALYSIS 
 
Signaling Factors 
Number  
of Studies
12
 
Total  
Sample Size 
Number  
of Effects 
Signaling Factors in Accounting, Economics, & Finance  
Accounting FP 69 72,530 280 
Market FP 40 26,743 113 
Liability 11 3,996 12 
Risk 19 12,150 41 
Signaling Factors in Management  
Ownership 7 8,562 25 
Networking 25 12,634 51 
Human Resources 18 15,107 57 
Signaling Factors in Marketing  
Price Premium 9 29,701 19 
Cost 2 20,129 10 
Product Strategy 49 46,446 124 
Visibility 18 18,819 43 
Brand Equity 31 19,909 65 
Control Variables 
Age     6 11,003 14 
Size    31 22,422 57 
Competitiveness   18 6,784 38 
Prior Reputation    
     Prior FR      9 29133 31 
     Prior CSR     7 5,108 15 
 
                                                 
10
 Based on the Q-Statistic test for homogeneity, two control variables (i.e., Age and Competitiveness) 
yielded heterogeneous results.  In order to fully verify whether these heterogeneities are caused by the 
sampling bias or the true variance, the I
2
 index values are calculated for these three variable effects.  The 
I
2
 index measures the extent of true heterogeneity by dividing the difference between the result of the Q-
statistic test and its degrees of freedom by the Q-value itself, and multiplying the result by 100 (Higgins 
and Thompson 2002).   The I
2
 index is interpreted as followes: values below 25% are supported to 
indicate that heterogeneity is due to the true differences in variance (Huedo-Medina et al. 2006).  Based 
on these computations, the effect of the Age  Overall FR linkage was found to be heterogeneous.  
However, the heterogeneity of Competitiveness appears to be based on true differences in variance as its 
I
2
 index was negligible.   
 
11
 The detailed information about these studies is listed in Appendix C. 
12
 When studies included more than one factor each effect was counted separately.  Hence, the total counts 
do not add up to 138. 
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Several insights can be drawn from the evaluation of the relative impact of 
different signaling factors that are frequently investigated in each academic discipline for 
enhancing FR.  Brand Equity (r =.44) has the largest impact on FR of all the fifteen 
antecedents (Table 1-4).  The results show the importance of building and retaining a 
strong consumer relationship, especially with the consumers who have affective bonding 
toward the firm.  This finding also emphasizes that the perceived value of the firm and its 
brands is the key influencer that shapes the firm’s overall perceptual representation in the 
minds of stakeholders.  Other signals, often studied in the marketing discipline, have 
small positive effects on FR: Product Strategy (r = .14) and Visibility (r = .13). Results 
support the notion that investment in tangible resources and R&D toward innovativeness 
and quality improvement enhances firms’ effectiveness and responsiveness.  
Furthermore, firms’ product strategies may augment FR by signaling unobservable 
capabilities of firms.  In addition, Visibility (r = .13) has a positive influence on FR, 
suggesting that firms may benefit by signaling internal information to their stakeholders. 
Firms need to estimate their advertising and promotion budget more realistically and find 
effective ways to communicate with stakeholders.   
Accounting FP (r = .14) is found to be the strongest influencer to FR among 
information signals often studied in the Accounting, Economics, and Finance disciplines.  
The result shows that financial FP plays an important role when stakeholders assess their 
collective judgment on FR.  Risk (r = - .06) is a negatively related antecedent.  
Stakeholders (e.g., stockholders and institutional investors) can be skeptical toward the  
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level of risk even though a certain level of risk is unavoidable for firms to be sustainable 
in the marketplace.
13
 Both Ownership (r = .10) and Networking (r = .14), the two main 
signaling factors in Management, have small positive effects toward building a strong 
FR.  Particularly, this finding suggests that if a firm can develop a well-established 
network with their partners and alliances.  It signals its potential to excel in the 
marketplace, and stakeholders will benefit.  This result not only shows that the focal 
firm’s ability to maintain successful business relationships signals high effectiveness and  
efficiency,  but  also  FR  of  a partnering firm can spill over to the focal firm.  Thus, 
firms should understand that value is created by management strategies (i.e., Ownership 
and Networking). 
14
 
Among control variables, the effects of Prior FR  Overall FR linkage (r = .35) 
and Prior CSR  Overall FR linkage (r = .26) are found to be moderate per Cohen 
(1977)’s yardstick.  As FR is defined as “the perceptual representation of a company’s 
past actions and future prospects” (Fombrun 1996, p.72), the current status of firms is 
influenced  by  the  previous  standing  and  the  overall  appeal.  This  shows  why  FR  is  
considered as a key intangible asset of a firm; the accumulation of FR through firms’ past 
actions and future prospects cannot be easily imitated or substituted (Rao 1994).  The 
Competitiveness variable has a small effect on enhancing FR (r =.10); however, this 
effect was found to be heterogeneous. 
The remaining five antecedents – Market FP (r = .03), Liability (r = .03), Human 
Resources (r = .07), Age (r = .01), and Size (r = .07) – all have moderately small effects 
                                                 
13
  
14
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on FR by Cohen (1977)’s yardstick.  The FR  Liability linkage (r = .12) is greater than 
the Liability  Overall FR linkage (r = .03) (Table 1-4).  In summary, the findings 
suggest the following conclusions: (1) The effect of Accounting FP  Overall FR is 
small (r = .14), but is the greatest among the four antecedents Accounting, Economics, 
and Finance; (2) The Networking  Overall FR linkage has a small effect (r = .14) but 
the greatest among three Management antecedents; (3) Among Marketing antecedents, 
Product Strategy (r = .14) and Visibility (r = .13) have small effects to FR, but the effect 
of Brand Equity (r = .44) is moderate, and it is the most impactful antecedents of FR 
among all fifteen antecedents; and (4) Both the Prior FR  Overall FR (r = .35) and the 
Prior CSR  Overall FR (r = .26) effects are found to be moderate. 
Which consequents are most affected by FR?  
Figure 1-1 identifies nine consequents in three disciplinary categories with five 
or more effects that are identified: consequents in Accounting, Economics, and Finance 
(i.e., Accounting FP, Market FP, and Risk), consequents in Management (i.e., 
Networking and Human Resources), and consequents in Marketing (i.e., Price Premium, 
Cost, Product Strategy, and Brand Equity).
15
  The summary of studies included in 
consequents of FR is presented in Table 1-5, and the summaries of the descriptive 
statistics and the results of combined effect of consequents are presented in Table 1-6.  
The number of linkages from FR to consequents varies, ranging from 10 for Cost to the 
largest of 115 for Accounting FP (See Table 1-5).  Not all consequents are equally 
influenced by FR (See Table 1-6).  The sample-weighted reliability-adjusted correlation r 
                                                 
15
 There is no study that reports the linkage between FR and Visibility; thus, Visibility under the Marketing 
discipline is dropped.  In addition, two linkages with < 5 effects (i.e., Liability under Accounting, 
Economics, and Finance consequents, Ownership under Management consequents) are omitted from the 
analysis, in effect reducing the number of consequents analyzed to shrink (See Figure 1-2).   
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ranges from - .001 for Market FP to the largest effect of .46 for Brand Equity.  These 
findings appear to be robust given that the lowest N for file drawer problem is 1,010.  
The results of the Q-Statistic test for homogeneity are found to be significant, excluding 
the overall FR Market FP linkage.16   
Interestingly, the most influenced consequence of FR is also found to be the most 
influencing antecedent: Brand Equity (r =.46).  Brand equity not only influences FR but 
also is influenced by FR.  To a great extent, brand equity helps stakeholders perceive the 
overall presentation of a firm more positively and simultaneously high FR reinforces 
brand equity.  The cyclical relationship between FR and brand equity consolidates the 
relationship between consumers and firms; this chain effect plays a pivotal role in 
solidifying their relationship.  Compared to the Brand Equity  Overall FR linkage (r = 
.44), the Overall FR  Brand Equity (r =.46) linkage has a stronger link to FR.  The 
contribution of FR on brand equity is greater than the contribution of brand equity on FR, 
and the effects toward establishing strong reputation in the marketplace is likely to lead to 
strong brand equity in consumers’ minds.   Besides the Overall FR  Brand Equity 
linkage, the effect between FR and Price Premium is small and positive (r = .11) among 
Marketing consequents.  Based on the signaling equilibrium, this finding is not 
surprising. However, how a firm decides on a reasonable amount for Price Premium to 
charge for its reputation remains an unanswered question.  
Under the management discipline, the Human Resources  Overall FR (r = .31) 
linkage yielded a moderate effect and the Networking  Overall FR (r = .21) a small
                                                 
16
 Based on the I
2
 index calculation, the result shows that the heterogeneity of Market FP effects is based on 
true variations among the pooled effects. 
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effect.  More reputable firms are able to attract and recruit more qualified employees than 
their competitors in the labor market.  A highly motivated workforce in reputable firms is 
likely to create a more enjoyable working environment that eventually leads to success.  
Like the FR  Human Resources linkage, a reputable firm would be more attractive in 
the B2B market when the firm develops a relationship within its supply chain system, and 
certainly FR can play a role as a source of power (French and Raven 1959).   Also, more 
reputable firms are likely to be found more attractive by institutional investors and thus 
the ownership structure of reputable firms can be expected to be more diversified.   
Among consequents in Accounting, Economics, and Finance, the effects of FR on 
Accounting FP (r = .21) is notable.  The FR  Accounting FP linkage (r = .21) is greater 
than the Accounting FP  FR linkage (r = .14) (Table 1-4).  This finding shows how 
today’s FR can be particularly influential to tomorrow’s Accounting FP of a firm.   
Finally, four remaining consequents (i.e., Market FP (r = - .001), Risk (r = .03), 
Cost (r = .02), and Product Strategy (r = .07)) were associated with moderately small 
effects.  In sum, the Overall FR  Brand Equity linkage (r = .46) is the most impactful 
consequents of FR, and the effect size is slightly greater than the Brand Equity  Overall 
FR linkage (r = .44) (Table 1-4).  The Overall FR  Human Resources effect is moderate 
(r = .31), and two signaling factors (i.e., Networking (r =.21), and Price Premium (r = 
.11)) have small effects as consequents of FR. 
Which comes first?: FR or FP 
This controversial chicken or egg debate over the relationship between FR and 
financial FP can be informed based on the cumulative findings over the last three decades 
presented in this study.  The causal relationship of Overall FR  Accounting FP (r = .21) 
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is found to be greater than Accounting FP  Overall FR (r = .14). Meanwhile, the 
linkage between FR and Market FP tends to be much smaller: Market FP  Overall FR 
(r = .03) and Overall FR  Market FP (r = -.001).  There is not one particular causal 
linkage that dominates the results. This result may be caused by the nature of FR and 
financial FP studies.  Previous investigations on the FR and Accounting FP linkage 
focused on the long-term, and were based on annual datasets.  However, previous 
investigations on the linkage between FR and market FP often employ event studies to 
examine abnormal stock returns after positive or negative announcements are made in the 
marketplace.  Since the event study method tends to be more short-term oriented, the time 
window of observing market FP may only be able to show the magnitude of stock returns 
during the short-observed periods.  Additionally, the small effect between FR and market 
FP may have been caused due to the accumulation of the positive correlation between FR 
and market FP, canceling out the accumulation of negative correlations between FR and 
Market FP.  Thus, Market FP is more likely to be an antecedent of FR, while Accounting 
FR is more likely to be a consequence of FR. 
Which dimensions of FR are most linked to antecedents and consequents: FR, CSR, or 
Others? 
Depending on the operationalization of FR, previous empirical studies can be 
decomposed into three different types: (1) Reputation studies, (2) CSR studies, and (3) 
Other studies that employed firm legitimacy, identity, image, and status.  The results of 
all three different types of FR are presented in Appendix A and Appendix B.  The links to 
FR range widely from .004 for the Market FP  Reputation linkage, to .63 for the Others 
 Brand Equity linkage.  Among fifteen antecedents of FR (Figure 1-2), six antecedents 
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have the highest effects of their paths to “Reputation” (i.e., Liability (r = .03), Risk (r = - 
.06), Ownership (r = - .18), Brand Equity (r = .47), Competitiveness (r = .16), and Prior 
FR (r = .30)).  Five linkages of antecedents to “CSR” have the highest effects (i.e., 
Market FP (r = .06), Human Resources (r = .54), Age (r = .06), and Size (r = .12), and 
Prior CSR (r = .29)), and three antecedents to “Other” are the highest effects (i.e., 
Accounting FP (r = .18), Networking (r = .25), Visibility (r = - .17)) compared to these 
three antecedents linkages to other types of FR (Appendix A).  Both the Product Strategy 
 Reputation linkage and the Product Strategy  CSR linkage have the same effect of r 
= .15 (Appendix A).  Among nine consequents of FR, six antecedents have the highest 
effects to “Reputation” (i.e., Accounting FP (r = .38), Risk (r = .07), Networking (r = 
.21), Human Resources (r = .32), Cost (r = .02), and Product Strategy (r = .16)).  One 
linkage of antecedents to “CSR” has the highest effects (i.e., Market FP (r = - .05)), and 
two antecedents to “other” are the highest effects (i.e., Price Premium (r = .42) and Brand 
Equity (r = .63)) (Appendix B).  
The magnitude of the effects between each dimension of FR and factors also 
varies.  For example, all three FR measures enhance brand equity (i.e., the Reputation  
Brand Equity linkage (r = .53), the CSR  Brand Equity linkage (r = .28), and the Others 
 Brand Equity linkage (r = .63)), and brand equity is a key signal to create strong FR 
(i.e., the Brand Equity  Reputation linkage (r = .47), the Brand Equity  CSR linkage 
(r = .32), and the Brand Equity  Others linkage (r = .08)).  However, the magnitude of 
the Others  Brand Equity linkage (r = .08) is much smaller than the magnitude of the 
Reputation  Brand Equity linkage (r = .47).  This result demonstrates that the mismatch 
of the study context and the execution of the research can cause serious flaws in many 
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empirical findings.  The future empirical studies on FR should carefully select which 
dimensions of FR are most appropriate to employ in the context of the study and the 
distinction between FR, and the domains of other related constructs should be thoroughly 
made.  In short, among three dimensions of FR the linkage to signaling factors to 
“Reputation” is stronger than the linkages between signaling factors and the other two 
dimensions of FR.  It should be noted that the linkages between signaling factors and the 
three different types vary, and carefully defined construct and measures for FR should be 
employed. 
Do the studies based on secondary data sources of FR or CSR yield different effects 
than the ones based on primary data?  
The availability of secondary datasets influenced the design of several empirical 
studies and the correlation between antecedents/consequents to FR.  Table 1-7 shows 
influences of moderators in the relationship between antecedents and FR, and Table 1-8 
shows their influences in the relationship between FR and its consequents.  Results varied 
significantly across the studies. Using the primary dataset, the smallest effects are the 
FR’s linkages to Risk consequent (rp= - .01) and the largest effect is the Human 
Resources consequent of FR (rp = .49) (See Table 1-8).  Using the secondary dataset, the 
smallest effect of the FR is Product Strategy consequent linkage (rs = .001) and the 
largest effect is the Brand Equity consequent of FR (rs =.53) (See Table 1-7).  Seven out 
of fifteen investigated relationships between antecedents and FR (i.e., Ownership (rp = - 
.41; rs = .08), Networking (rp = .19; rs = .11), Human Resources (rp = .04; rs = .16), 
Visibility (rp = .09; rs = .14), Brand Equity (rp = .17; rs = .37), Size (rp = .11; rs = .05), and 
Competitiveness (rp = .28; rs = .06)) are significantly moderated by the dataset source 
46 
 
utilized. Five comparisons between two different types of datasets could not be 
completed due to the small number of effects (i.e., Market FP, Liability, Age, Prior FR, 
and Prior CSR), and the rest of the effects were not significantly different across the types 
of dataset used (Table 1-7).   
Four out of the nine investigated relationships between FR and its consequents 
(i.e., Market FP (rp = - .29; rs = - .05), Networking (rp = .39; rs = .09), Human Resources 
(rp = .49; rs = .05), and Product Strategy (rp = .08; rs = .001)) are significantly moderated 
by the dataset source utilized. Two comparisons between two different types of datasets 
could not be completed due to the small number of effects (i.e., Price Premium and Cost), 
and three comparisons were not significantly different across the types of dataset used 
(i.e., Accounting FP, Risk, and Brand Equity) (Table 1-8).   
In general, the correlations using primary datasets were larger than the secondary 
datasets (e.g., Fortune’s, KLD).  These results are likely attributable to the fact that the 
surveys are designed and tailored for the purpose of a particular study and survey 
participants represent the population that is relevant to the study.  The effects themselves 
range widely depending on the nature of the dataset employed.  In particular, the 
Ownership antecedent has the largest difference of effects depending on the types of 
dataset used (i.e., rp = -  .41; rs = .08).  Although the pattern of effects seems to suggest 
that data type matters, none of the datasets are perfect and all different types of datasets 
have their own unique strengths and weaknesses.  Scholars must emphasize caution and 
care when designing research methods and measures for FR studies.  In short, seven 
antecedents  (i.e., Ownership,  Networking,  Human Resources, Visibility,  Brand Equity,  
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Size, and Competitiveness) yielded significantly different results depending on the types 
of dataset employed.  Four consequents (i.e., Market FP, Networking, Human Resources, 
and Product Strategy) are significantly moderated by the dataset used. The Ownership’s 
effect difference between primary and secondary dataset is the largest among seven 
significant effects. 
Do the relationships between FR and FP in B2B versus B2C contexts yield different 
effects?   
The range of the link to FR in the B2B market varies from .01 (Overall FR  
Risk) to .52 (Overall FR  Brand Equity), and the range of the link to FR in the B2C 
market varies from .001 (Overall FR  Product Strategy) to .39 (Overall FR  Brand 
Equity).  The moderating effects of two different types of markets in the relationship 
between antecedents and FR are presented in Table 1-7, and the influence of the 
moderator in the relationship between FR and its consequents is shown in Table 1-8.  
Only six out of fifteen linkages between antecedents and FR are investigated (i.e., 
Accounting FP (rB2B = .07; rB2C = .15), Human Resources (rB2B = .13; rB2C = .03), Product 
Strategy (rB2B = .08; rB2C = .14), Visibility (rB2B = .07; rB2C = .15), Brand Equity (rB2B = .42; 
rB2C = .38), and Size (rB2B = .12; rB2C = .06)) have significantly different effects across two 
types of markets (Table 1-7).  In the relationship between antecedents and FR, 
Accounting FP, Product Strategy, and Visibility yielded much stronger effects in the B2C 
market whereas Human Resources, Brand Equity, and Size are shown to be a more 
influential effect in the B2B market.  The largest effect difference between two markets is 
Market FP.  Four effects (i.e., Market FP, Liability, Prior FR, and Prior CSR) could not 
be compared between two markets due to the small number of effects.  Five antecedents 
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(i.e., Risk, Ownership, Networking, Age, and Competitiveness) do not have significant 
differences between the B2B market and the B2C market.   
Only four out of nine relationships between FR and its consequents investigated 
(i.e., Market FP (rB2B = .12; rB2C = - .04), Human Resources (rB2B = .03; rB2C = .17), Price 
Premium (rB2B = .07; rB2C = .17), and Brand Equity (rB2B = .52; rB2C = .39)) have 
significantly different effects across two types of markets (Table 1-8).  In the relationship 
between FR and its consequents, Human Resources and Price Premium yielded much 
stronger effects in the B2C market whereas Market FP and Brand Equity were shown to 
be a more influential effect in the B2B market.  The largest effect difference between two 
markets is Market FP.  Two effects (i.e., Networking and Cost) could not be compared 
across two types of markets due to the small number of effects.  Three consequents (i.e., 
Accounting FP, Risk, and Product Strategy) did not yield significant differences between 
the B2B market and the B2C market.  The largest effects moderating linkage to FR is 
between Brand Equity  Overall FR are rB2B = .42; rB2C = .38 (as antecedents), and 
Overall FR  Brand Equity: rB2B = .52; rB2C = .39 (as consequents).  However, the largest 
difference between two markets is found when Market FP is used as a consequent (See 
Table 1-7 and 1-8).  In sum, only six antecedents (i.e., Accounting FP, Human Resources, 
Product Strategy, Visibility, Brand Equity, and Size) and four consequents (i.e., Market 
FP, Human Resources, Price Premium, and Brand Equity) have different effects based on 
the different types of market.   Market FP consequent has the largest difference between 
the B2B market and the B2C market.
17181920
 
Which definition of FR is most supported? 
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18  
19  
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The moderating effects of two different operationalizations of FR (i.e., 
Assessment and Asset) in the relationship between antecedents and FR are presented in 
Table 1-7, and its influence in the relationship between FR and its consequents are shown 
in Table 1-8.  The largest effect that used FR operationalized as an assessment was Prior 
FR (rassessment= .89) and, as an asset, was Brand Equity and Prior CSR (rasset = .28).  
Stakeholders tend to make judgments on goods and services of a firm while considering 
FR as a valuable asset for the firm.  Seven out of fifteen investigated effects in the 
relationship between antecedents and FR were significantly moderated by the 
operationalization of FR.  These effects are: (1) Accounting FP (rassessment= .18; rasset = .12), 
(2) Ownership (rassessment= .09; rasset = .02), (3) Human Resources (rassessment= - .01; rasset = .13), 
(4) Product Strategy (rassessment= .09; rasset = .11), (5) Visibility (rassessment= .18; rasset = .14), (6) 
Size (rassessment= .03; rasset = .09), (7) Competitiveness (rassessment= - .09; rasset = .12).  Four 
effects (Risk, Networking, Brand Equity, and Age) did not yield significant differences 
depending on the definition FR employed.  In the relationship between FR and its 
consequents, five out of nine investigated effects were significantly moderated by the 
operationalization of FR.  These effects are: (1) Accounting FP (rassessment= .31; rasset = .05), 
(2) Market FP (rassessment= - .17; rasset = .15), (3) Risk (rassessment= - .18; rasset = .23), (4) Price 
Premium (rassessment= .16; rasset = .07), and (5) Brand Equity (rassessment= .47; rasset = .14).  
Product Strategy consequent did not yield significant differences depending on the 
definition FR employed, and the differences for three effects (i.e., Networking, Human 
Resources, and Cost) in the relationship between FR and its consequents were not 
investigated due to the small number of effects.    
52 
 
The linkage between FR and Accounting FP is more impactful when FR is used 
as an Assessment (Accounting FP  FR: rassessment = .18 and FR  Accounting FP: rassessment 
= .31) rather than as an Asset (Accounting FP  FR: rasset = .12 and FR  Accounting 
FP: rasset = .05).  This informative finding shows that Accounting FP is used as a 
barometer to determine the value of a firm and FR.  Another considerably interesting 
finding concerns the Risk effect.  The FR  Risk linkage as an Assessment (rassessment = -
.18) is negative, but the FR  Risk linkage as an Asset (rasset = .23) is positive.  It would 
seem that a certain level of risk acts as a positive signal in the marketplace as 
stakeholders consider risk-taking a requirement for success.  However, when FR is used 
as a tool to assess the value of a firm, the risk that the firm is currently engaged in can 
damage its FR, decreasing the value of the firm.  Managing these two opposing 
influences of risk is a provocative balancing act.  In conclusion, six antecedents (i.e., 
Accounting FP, Market FP, Risk, Visibility, Age, and Competitiveness) and five 
consequents (i.e., Accounting FP, Market FP, Risk, Price Premium, and Brand Equity) 
yielded significantly different results due to the operationalization of FR employed.  Risk 
has the largest effect difference between the two groups.  A comprehensive summary of 
this meta-analysis is pictorially presented in Figure 1-2. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Over the last three decades, scholars have made significant progress toward better 
understanding FR, strategies linked to FR, and the value it creates.  By overcoming what 
at times may have seemed daunting obstacles, FR research has matured. In particular, 
salient advances that have been made include defining FR, developing theoretical  
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frameworks emerging from various disciplines, employing adequate ways to quantify and 
measure FR, and the effectiveness of strategies linked to FR.  However, despite the 
advances in this field, the review suggests remaining gaps pose questions and 
opportunities for the avenues of future FR research. The summary of key findings and 
implications of this meta-analysis is shown in Table 1-9. 
First, this meta-analysis supports the idea that non-financial FP, especially Brand 
Equity, Human Resources, and Product Strategy, has superior impact on FR over 
financial FP.  Factors from the Accounting, Economics, and Finance disciplines (e.g., 
Accounting FP, Market FP, Liability, and Risk) show mixed findings, whereas Marketing 
and Management strategies seem to be more effective cues to assess FR.  Despite myriad 
challenges involved in quantifying intangible assets like FR and measuring FR’s effects 
on value creation, both managers and scholars need to understand that FR’s financial 
impact is created through various non-financial means.  Since the spectrum of effects 
between various non-financial FP on FR varies considerably across disciplines, strategic 
planning for reputation building should espouse a broad scope with the understanding of 
the entire supply chain.  Embracing the idea that non-financial information factors, 
created by various academic disciplines, can be converted to financial FP can help a firm 
identify FR and its impact.  From a research perspective, integrating theories and research 
questions from several disciplines is required to truly comprehend FR and its antecedents 
and consequents.  The complex linkages among various strategies to FR that reflect 
business practices ought to be investigated rigorously.   
21
 
Second, this quantitative review investigates effective antecedents and
                                                 
21  
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TABLE 1-9 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Key Findings Research and Managerial Implications 
 
Which antecedents are most influential for enhancing FR?  
 
 Antecedents have a wide range of effects on FR.  
Brand equity is most effective, followed by Prior FR, 
Prior CSR, Accounting FP, Product Strategy, 
Networking, Visibility, Ownership, and 
Competitiveness in that order. Market FP, Liability, 
Risk, Human Resources, Age, and Size yielded 
moderately small effects. 
Institutionalizing the value of FR and CSR in an 
organization may be essential to successfully 
manage FR in the long term.  The strategic 
allocation of resources can be attributed to a better 
public image of a firm.  FR’s financial impact is 
created through various non-financial means; 
thus, firms need to analyze how the market 
responds to non-financial factors. 
Which consequents are most affected by FR?  
 
 Consequents also have a wide range of effects in 
terms of their influence by FR.  Brand Equity is most 
impacted, followed by Human Resources, 
Accounting FP, Networking, and Price Premium in 
that order.  Market FP, risk, cost, and product 
strategy yielded moderately small effects. 
 
The effect between FR and Brand Equity consequent 
is greater than the effect between Brand Equity 
antecedent and FR. 
 
The effect between FR and Networking consequent 
is greater than the effect between Networking 
antecedent and FR. 
Firms’ decisions for their strategic moves also 
depend on FR. Future researchers should employ 
adequate techniques to handle endogeneity 
issues. 
 
 
 
Firms with strong FR have market advantages to 
create brands and consumer-based brand equity 
(Keller 1993). 
 
Firms with a strong reputation are able to attract 
and retain more accomplished employees, 
suppliers, and alliances. 
 
Which comes first, FR or FP? 
 
 Market FP is more likely to be an antecedent of FR, 
while Accounting FR is more likely to be a 
consequent of FR. 
Positive market surprises and stock returns 
enhance FR whereas a strong FR is likely to be 
realized in some of the Accounting FP figures 
like ROA, ROI, and ROS.  Data sources of 
financial FP may determine the causal 
relationship between FR and financial FP.   
 
Which dimensions of FR are most linked to its antecedents and consequents: FR, Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), or Others (i.e., firm legitimacy, identity, image, and status)? 
 
 The magnitude of the effects between each 
dimension of FR and factors varies.  Among three 
dimensions of FR the linkage to signaling factors to 
“Reputation” is stronger than the linkages between 
signaling factors and the other two dimensions of 
FR.   
Researchers need to clarify the domain of 
constructs that they use, and appropriate scales 
and datasets should be carefully selected. 
Do studies based on secondary data sources of FR or CSR yield different effects than the ones based on 
primary data?  
 
 Depending on the types of datasets employed, 
Human Resources yielded significantly different 
results as an antecedent as well as a consequent. 
The sources of datasets are critical when the 
relationship between Human Resource and FR is 
investigated.  Especially, Researchers in I/O 
psychology and management fields should be 
cautious when they conduct their research related 
to these antecedents. 
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TABLE 1-9 (CONT.) 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Key Findings Research and Managerial Implications 
 
Do the relationships between FR and FP in B2B versus B2C contexts yield different effects? 
 
 Brand Equity yielded significantly different results 
as an antecedent as well as a consequent in B2B and 
B2C contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect between FR and Market FP consequent 
has the largest difference in B2B versus B2C 
contexts. 
Researchers must take care when extending 
findings across contexts when the relationship 
between FR and FP like Brand Equity is 
investigated.  The FR importance may vary 
based on the study contexts. Future studies 
should further investigate how information 
signals have different impacts when different 
stakeholder groups evaluated FR. 
 
Managers can expect a greater impact of FR to 
enhance Market FP in the business market rather 
than in the consumer market. 
 
Which definition of FR is most supported?   
 
 Depending on the definition of FR, Accounting FP, 
Market FP, Risk yielded significantly different 
results as antecedents as well as consequents. 
 
Accounting FP consequent has the largest difference 
of the two different operationlizations of FR (i.e., 
Assessment and Asset). 
Researchers need to clarify the definition of FR 
so that a more appropriate theoretical framework 
can be selected to derive tested hypotheses. 
 
 
consequents of FR by suggesting causal linkages between FR and strategic factors.  Some 
appear to be more impactful as antecedents, while others seem to be more influenced by 
FR as consequents.  On the one hand, the relationship between FR and its antecedents 
propose that the strategic allocations of resources would attribute to a better public image 
of a firm.  In this meta-analysis, firms’ information signals such as Prior FR, Prior CSR, 
Accounting FP, Product Strategy, Visibility, Ownership, and Competitiveness are found 
to be influential antecedents for stakeholders’ determinants of FR.  The findings suggest 
that institutionalizing the value of FR and CSR in a firm may be essential to successful 
management of FR in the long term.  A firm that treats its own FR as a valuable resource 
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may create institutional environments to realize its intention to maintain strong FR for its 
stakeholders.    
On the other hand, the relationship between FR and its consequents suggests that 
firms’ decisions on their strategic moves also depend on FR.  Based on the findings of 
this study, Brand Equity, Human Resources, Accounting FP, Networking, and Price 
Premium are more appropriate as consequents rather than antecedents (Compare Tables 
1-3 and 1-5).  Especially, the effect between FR and Brand Equity consequent is greater 
than the effect between Brand Equity antecedent and FR. Keller (1993) argued that 
“establishing a connection with a company may cause an existing association for that 
company to become a secondary association for the brand (e.g., perceptions of company 
reputation and credibility)” (p.11).  Firms with strong FR have market advantages to 
create brands and consumer-based brand equity compared to firms with weak FR.  
Similarly, the FR-Networking consequent linkage is greater than the Networking 
antecedent-FR.  Firms with a strong reputation are able to attract and retain more 
accomplished employees, suppliers, and alliances.  Reputable firms have more liberty to 
design the pricing structure of their goods and services and enhance their brand equity 
among consumers.   
Third, the disagreement over the causality between FR and financial FP is 
addressed using the synthesis of FR and financial FP studies.  When Accounting FP (e.g., 
ROA, ROI, and ROS) is used to empirically test the linkage between FR and financial FP, 
Accounting FP is more influenced by FR as opposed to Accounting FP influencing FR.  
However, the reverse causality seems to be more impactful when Market FP (e.g., 
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positive or negative market surprises and stock returns) is used in empirical studies 
between FR and financial FP.   
Fourth, this review addresses the state of current problems in FR research.  
Scholars’ efforts may need to shift from verifying the contribution of FR on financial FP 
to identifying how information signals are internalized differently by different 
stakeholder groups.  Wood and Jones (1995) have already stated their concerns 
associated with stakeholder mismatching issues on theoretical problems in empirical 
research on corporate social performance.  Many FR related studies over-simplify and 
generalize the arguments by mismatching the appropriate stakeholder groups and using a 
dataset that measures FR.   For example, the product dimension of FR is more closely 
related to product strategies, and suppliers, consumers, and governments are the key 
stakeholder groups that are interested in the product dimension of FR.  The working 
environment dimension of FR is more directly related to the human resources strategies 
of a firm and the main stakeholder group interested in this dimension of FR would be the 
employees.  And the same time, these issues should be based on the theoretical 
frameworks that are most suitable for their arguments.  Future FR studies may further our 
understanding of stakeholder management by employing perspectives of various 
stakeholder groups to fully understand the collective FR in the marketplace.   
In addition, scholars need to be more cautious and make improvements to the 
utilization of currently available FR datasets.  Different sources of FR datasets have 
significant differences regarding how to manage and evaluate those datasets.  For 
example, the KLD dataset is typically handled by simply summing the dimensions of the 
KLD rating criteria, which ranges from -2 to +2, even though each value can be canceled 
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out through this simple summation procedure (e.g., Divid, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; 
Hillman and Keim 2001).  The KLD dataset should be employed as a formative scale
 
since KLD rating criteria for each measure represent different dimensions of corporate 
social responsibility.
22
  While a reflective scale consists of all items measured from the 
perspective of an unobserved latent construct that have high covariance among items 
within the same construct (Bagozzi 1994), a formative scale is used when all items are 
needed to form and construct the estimate of the latent construct (Fornell 1982).  
Otherwise, scholars can use each measure separately following Berman and his 
colleagues (1999) that carried out their empirical study using the five dimensions of the 
KLD dataset individually.  For example, Human Resources yielded significantly different 
results as an antecedent as well as a consequent depending on the type of dataset 
employed.  The sources of datasets are critical especially when the relationships between 
Human Resources and FR are investigated.  In particular, researchers in industrial 
organizational, psychology, and management should be cautious when they conduct their 
research.  Thus, it is important for future scholars to fully understand the nature of 
measures and to employ appropriate analytical tools in future studies.  
 
Managerial Implication 
This meta-analysis provides insights into the most effective signaling factors 
among firms’ strategies as antecedents and consequents of FR.  These insights allow 
managers to employ various signals to strengthen FR and to enlarge its value creation.  
Marketers have not only been puzzled over what combines to influence FR but also how 
                                                 
22
 Out of 13 studies using KLD data only four studies have correctly used it as formative measures (or 
analyzed its constructs as individual separately); however, nine studies have used it incorrectly as 
reflective scale (or by simply summing the individual dimensions of the KLD dataset). 
60 
 
budgets should be allocated to maximize the effects of FR (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  
Intuitively, FR should be considered an important concept for the marketing discipline to 
study; yet, since the 1960s the intended and constructed “image” of a firm has tended to 
be the focal point of marketers.  Hall (1993) stated that managers viewed product image 
and FR as two distinct intangible assets, and Rindova and her colleagues (2005) showed 
that the FR effect on the quality of products and the overall FR have distinct implications 
for performance outcomes.  Hence, to gain greater insights into the mechanisms through 
which intangible assets provide competitive advantages to firms, it is important for 
scholars and managers to precisely specify and capture the type of intangible asset being 
studied and the context within which its effects are investigated.  This study is offered as 
a first step in this direction toward a more comprehensive understanding of the FR 
phenomenon. 
In today’s business world, managers continually encounter demands from 
multiple stakeholder groups (e.g., consumers, employees, suppliers, alliances, community 
groups, governments, and stockholders, especially institutional investors) to devote firm 
resources to support divergent interests and goals.  These pressures from diverse 
stakeholders are likely to influence the goals and objectives of firms.  Unfortunately, 
managers are tasked with maximizing profits while satisfying the demand for FR from 
multiple stakeholders.  For example, even though managers may acknowledge the 
interests of institutional investors as profit maximization, managers should not ignore the 
demand of CSR from consumers and community groups.  Managers must evaluate the 
possibility of differentiation using FR.  If there is little ability to differentiate the goods 
and services, FR can be an important intangible asset to distinguish a firm from its 
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competitors.  Managers should treat decisions regarding FR as carefully as they treat all 
investment decisions. 
 
Limitation and Future Research 
This study investigated the most influential antecedents and consequents 
associated with FR, and explored the direction of the causal connections between FR and 
strategic information signals. Despite some notable findings, this empirical study has 
some limitations that raise opportunities for future research. The proposed meta-analytic 
model in this study is driven by cumulating previous empirical studies.  Using signaling 
theory, this study attempted to combine the exact causal relationships and effects from 
previous findings.  The precise causal directions of some antecedents and consequents are 
arguable depending on which theoretical framework is used to derive the causal 
relationships between antecedents and FR or FR and consequents.   Thus, future studies 
should utilize theoretically sound meta-analytic models based on various theoretical 
frameworks to propose more focused causal relationships between 
antecedents/consequents and FR.   
This study represents merely the tip of the iceberg. It is important to understand 
that the lack of consistency in empirical studies of FR may be driven by a lack of theory 
that connects strategic factors and FR.  Thus, a strong theoretical foundation better 
strengthens the studies by gaining reliability, validity, and consistency of empirical 
studies. Continued empirical investigations could attend to this shortcoming. I believe 
institutional theory, signaling theory, and stakeholder theory are the most appropriate 
theoretical frameworks that future researchers can ground their reasoning and arguments 
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from.  Institutional theory explains how the foundative philosophy, and culture are 
institutionalized in a firm to make strategic decisions.  The linkages between firms’ 
strategies and FR can be explained by their institutionalized decision making process that 
can lead firms in certain directions.  Using signaling theory as a main theoretical 
framework, researchers can explain how firms’ actions can signal the behavioral 
intentions of firms in the marketplace.  Stakeholder theory can demonstrate how firms’ 
decisions influence and are influenced by various stakeholders groups and how firms 
develop stakeholder management to meet various interests of many stakeholder groups.  
This theory appropriately explains why firms’ interests are greater than the generation of 
wealth and are closely connected to more socially cautious behavior of firms.  These 
frameworks would help us better understand why firms behave in a certain way in the 
marketplace, why each firm has a different agenda to create value in the marketplace, and 
why some firms are more highly respected by various stakeholders than others.  As such, 
future research could proceed in a number of directions.  First, the sample of FR research 
could be broadened.  Most studies appear to be based on the leading firms in the industry, 
country, and world.  These firms tend to be older and larger, and receive more 
stakeholders’ attention.  However, many things are unknown for the relatively new and 
smaller firms: (1) whether the function of FR is equally applicable for those firms, (2) 
how FR can be established in different growth stages, and (3) whether managers’ 
perspectives on FR and the implications of strategies for those firms are as important as 
those of the market leaders.  Clemens (2006) suggests that even small firms are rewarded 
by the market for strong FR, but more research is needed to support this finding.  Second, 
many studies have investigated the relationship between FR and FP from the reputable 
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firms’ perspective.  However, previous studies used the skewed dataset by examining 
solely reputable and famous firms and their performance in the marketplace.  Thus, how 
disreputable and infamous firms signal their internal information and whether various 
signals influenced their FR as compared to analogous effects of reputable and famous 
firms.  The field can gain more insights into FR by studying how firms with weak 
reputations can enhance their FR.  Third, the credibility of the signal represents the 
signaling equilibrium.  Stakeholders believe that highly reputable firms have advantages 
in efficiently using signaling mechanisms which are too costly for firms with a low 
reputation to use.  Thus, future work in FR can expand the scope of the current state of 
the studies by understanding how different stakeholder groups respond differently to 
signals and how firms strategize their stakeholder management by using signaling 
mechanisms in the marketplace.  
As the concern of the mismatch between the theoretical framework and dataset is 
discussed, future studies can address specific concerns of FR that are related to particular 
stakeholder groups by employing more appropriate research designs including secondary 
datasets that are from the target stakeholder group and appropriate FR measures.   
 
 
  
64 
 
REFERENCE 
Aaker, David A. (1991), Managing Brand Equity. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Agarwal, Rajshree, Martin Ganco, & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis (2009), "Reputations for 
Toughness in patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge Spillovers via 
Inventor Mobility," Strategic Management Journal, 30 (13), 1349-1374. 
 
Ahearne, Michael, C.B. Bhattacharya, Thomas Gruen (2005), "Antecedents and 
Consequences of Customer-Company Identification: Expanding the Role of 
Relationship Marketing," Journal of Applied Psychology, 90 (3), 574-585. 
 
Akerlof, George A. (1970), “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality under Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 448-500. 
 
Albert, S. and D A. Whetten (1985), “Organizational Identity,” Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 7, 263-295. 
 
Aldrich, Howard E. and C. Marlene Fiol (1994), “Fools Rush In? The Institutional 
Context of Industry Creation,” Academy of Management Review, 19 (4), 645-670. 
 
Aldrich, Howard E. and Jeffrey Pfeffer (1976), “Environments of Organizations,” Annual 
Review of Sociology, 2, 79-105. 
 
Amihud, Yakov and Baruch Lev (1999), “Does Corporate Ownership Structure Affect Its 
Strategy Towards Diversification?” Strategic Management Journal, 20 (11), 
1063-1069. 
 
Anderson, Erin and Barton Weitz (1989), "Determinants of Continuity in Conventional 
Industrial Channel Dyads," Marketing Science, 8 (4), 310-323. 
 
Anderson, J. C., & Frankle, A. W. (1980), “Voluntary Social Reporting: An Isobeta 
Portfolio Analysis,” Accounting Review, 55 (3), 467–479. 
 
Aupperle, Kenneth E., Archie B. Carroll, and John D. Hatfield (1985), “An Empirical 
Examination of the Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Profitability,” Academy of Management Journal, 28 (2), 446–463. 
 
Azelrod, Robert (1986), “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” American Political 
Science Review, 80 (4), 1095-1111. 
 
Balvers, Ronald J., Bill McDonald, and Robert E. Miller (1988), "Underpricing of New 
Issues and the Choice of Auditor as a Signal of Investment Banker Reputation," 
Accounting Review, 63 (4), 605-622. 
65 
 
Barclay, Michael J. and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1995), “The Priority Structure of 
Corporate Liability,” Journal of Finance, 50 (3), 899-916. 
 
Barnett, Michael L. and Robert M. Salomon (2006), “Beyond Dichotomy: The 
Curvilinear Relationship Between Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, 27 (11), 1101–1122. 
 
Barnett, Michael L., John M. Jermier, and Barbara A. Lafferty (2006), “Corporate 
Reputation: The Definitional Landscape,” Corporate Reputation Review, 9 (1), 
26-38. 
 
Barney, Jay (1991), “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” Journal of 
Management, 17 (1), 99-120. 
 
Barth, Mary E. and Greg Clinch (1998), “Revalued Financial, Tangible, and Intangible 
Assets: Associations with Share Prices and Non-Market-Based Value Estimates,” 
Journal of Accounting Research, 36, 199-233. 
 
Barth, Mary E. and Maureen F. McNichols (1995), “Estimation and Market Valuation of 
Environmental Liabilities Relating to Superfund Sites,” Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32, 177–209. 
 
Basdeo, Dax K., Ken G. Smith, Curtis M. Crimm, Violina P. Rindova, and Pamela J. 
Derfus (2006), "The Impact of Market Actions on Firm Reputation," Strategic 
Management Journal, 27, 1205-19. 
 
Bauer, R., Derwall, J., & Otten, R. (2007), “The Ethical Mutual Fund Performance 
Debate: New Evidence from Canada,” Journal of Business Ethics, 70, 111–124. 
 
Beatty, Randolph P. (1989), "Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings," Accounting Review, 64 (4), 693-709. 
 
Beatty, Randolph P. and Jay R. Ritter (1986), “Investment Banking, Reputation, and 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings,” Journal of Financial Economics, 15 
(1/2), 213-232. 
 
Bello, Zakri Y. (2005), “Socially Responsible Investing and Portfolio Diversification,” 
Journal of Financial Research, 28 (1), 41–57. 
 
Benjamin, Beth A. and Joel M. Podolny (1999), "Status, Quality, and Social Order in the 
California Wine Industry," Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (3), 563-589. 
 
Berens, Guido, Cees B.M. van Riel, and Gerrit H. van Bruggen (2005), "Corporate 
Associations and Consumer Product Responeses: The Moderating Role of 
Corporate Brand Dominance," Journal of Marketing, 69 (July), 35-48. 
66 
 
Berman, Shawn L., Andrew C. Wicks, Suresh Kotha, and Thomas M. Jones (1999), 
“Does Stakeholder Orientation Matter? The Relationship Between Stakeholder 
Management Models and Firm Financial Performance,” Academy of Management 
Journal, 42 (5), 488–506. 
 
Bettis, Richard A. and Vijay Mahajan (1985), “Risk/Return Performance of Diversified 
Firms,” Management Science, 31 (7), 785-799. 
 
Bhattacharya, C. B., Hayagreeva Rao, and Mary Ann Glynn (1995), “Understanding the 
Bond of Identification: An Investigation of Its Correlates Among Art Museum 
Members,” Journal of Marketing, 59 (4), 46-57. 
 
Bhattacharya, C. B. and Sankar Sen (2003), “Consumer-Company Identification: A 
Framework for Understanding Consumers’ Relationships with Companies,” 
Journal of Marketing, 67 (2), 76-88. 
 
Blacconiere, Walter G. and Dennis M. Patten (1994), “Environmental Disclosures and 
Regulatory Costs, and Changes in Firm Value,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 18 (3), 149–178. 
 
Black, Dan A., Brett J. Noel, and Zheng Wang (1999), “On-the-Job Training, 
Establishment Size, and Firm Size: Evidence for Economies of Scale in the 
Production of Human Capital,” Southern Economic Journal, 66 (1), 82-100. 
 
Boyd, Brian K., Donald D. Bergh, & David J. Ketchen, Jr. (2010), "Reconsidering the 
Reputation-Performance Relationship: A Resource-Based View," Journal of 
Management, 38 (2), 588-609. 
 
Burke, Raymond R., Wayne S. Desarbo, Richard Oliver, and Thomas S. Robertson 
(1988), “Deception by Implication: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 14 (March), 483-494. 
 
Bromley, Dennis B. (2001), “Relationships Between Personal and Corporate 
Reputation,” European Journal of Marketing, 35 (3/4), 316-334. 
 
Brooks, Margaret E., Scott Highhouse, Steven S. Russell, and David C. Mohr (2003), 
“Familiarity, Ambivalence, and Firm Reputation: Is Corporate Fame a Double-
Edged Sword?” Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (5), 904-914. 
 
Brown, B. (1998), “Do Stock Market Investors Reward Reputation for Corporate Social 
Performance?,” Corporate Reputation Review, 1, 271–282. 
 
Brown, Brad and  Susan Perry (1994), “Removing the Financial Performance Halo from 
Fortune’s ‘Most Admired’ Companies,” Academy of Management Journal, 37 (5), 
1347–1359. 
67 
 
Brown, Brad (1997), "Stock Market Valuation of Reputation for Corporate Social 
Performance", Corporate Reputation Review, 1 (1/2), 76-80. 
 
Brown, Tom J. and Peter A. Dacin (1997), "The Company and the Product: Corporate 
Associations and Consumer Product Responses," Journal of Marketing, 61 
(January), 68-84. 
 
Brown, Tom J., Peter A. Dacin, Michael G. Pratt, and David A. Whetten (2006), 
“Identity, Intended Image, Construed Image, and Reputation: An Interdisciplinary 
Framework and Suggested Terminology,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 34, 99-106. 
 
Campbell, Margaret C. and Kevin lane Keller (2003), “Brand Familiarity and Adverting 
Repetition Effects,” Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (2), 292-304. 
 
Capraro, Anthony J.  and Rajendra K. Srivastava (1997), "Has the Influence of Financial 
Performance on Reputation Measures Been Overstated?", Corporate Reputation 
Review, 1 (1/2), 86-92. 
 
Carmeli, Abraham and Ashler Tishler (2004), "The Relationships Between Intangible 
Organizational Elements and Organizational Performance," Strategic 
Management Journal, 25 (13), 1257-1278. 
 
Carson, Stephen J., Anoop Madhok, & Tao Wu (2006), "Uncertainty, Opportunism, and 
Governance: The Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational 
Contracting," Academy of management Journal, 49 (5), 1058-77. 
 
Caves, R. E. and M. E. Porter (1977), “From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91 (2), 421-434. 
 
Certo, S. Trevis (2003), “Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: 
Signaling with Board Structures,” Academy of Management Review, 28 (3), 432-
46. 
 
Chaney, Paul K. and Kirk L. Philipich (2002), "Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit 
Failure," Journal of Accounting Research, 40 (4), 1221-45. 
 
Chaudhuri, Ananish and Lata Gangadharan (2007), “An Experimental Analysis of Trust 
and Trustworthiness,” Southern Economic Journal, 73 (4), 959-985. 
 
Chauvin, Keith W. and Mark Hirschey (2002), “Goodwill, Profitability, and the Market 
Value of the Firm,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13 (2), 159-180. 
 
68 
 
Chen, Kung H. and Richard W. Metcalf (1980), “The Relationship Between Pollution 
Control Record and Financial Indicators Revisited,” Accounting Review, 55 (1), 
168–177. 
 
Chen, Yubo, Shankar Ganesan, and Yong Liu (2009), "Does a Firm's Product-Recall 
Strategy Affect Its Financial Value? An Examination of Strategic Alternatives 
During Product-Harm Crises," Journal of Marketing, 73 (November), 214-26. 
 
Chun, Rosa and Gary Davies (2010), "The Effect of Merger on Employee Views of 
Corporate Reputation: Time and Space Dependent Theory," Industrial Marketing 
Management, 39, 721-27. 
 
Claycomb, Cindy and Gary L. Frankwick (2010), "Buyers' Perspectives of Buyer-Seller 
Relationship Development," Industrial Marketing Management, 39, 252-263. 
 
Clemens, Bruce(2006), “Economic Incentives and Small Firms: Does It Pay to Be 
Green?” Journal of Business Research, 59 (4), 492–500. 
 
CNN Money (2012), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/most-admired/2012/faq/ 
(May 4, 2012; 11:37AM). 
 
Cochran, Philip L. and Robert A. Wood (1984), “Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Financial Performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 27 (1), 42-56. 
 
Cohen, Jacob (1977), Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (Revised 
Edition). New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc.   
 
Collins, Christopher J. (2007), "The Interactive Effects of Recruitment Practices and 
Product Awareness on Job Seekers' Employer Knowledge and Application 
Behaviors," Journal of Applied Psychology, 92 (1), 180-90. 
 
Combs, James G. and David J. Ketchen, Jr. (1999), "Explaining Interfirm Cooperation 
and Performance: Toward a Reconciliation of Predictions from the Resource-
Based View and Organizational Economics," Strategic Management Journal, 20 
(9), 867-888. 
 
Connelly, Brian L., Trevis Certo, R. Duane Ireland, and Christopher R. Reutzel (2011), 
“Signaling Theory: A review and Assessment,” Journal of Management, 37, 39- 
67. 
 
Cooper, Harris M., Larry V. Hedges, and Jeffrey C. Valentine (2009), The Handbook of 
Research Synthesis and Meta-analysis. New York, NY. 
 
Cornell, Bradford and Alan C. Shapiro (1987), “Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate 
Finance,” Financial Management, 16 (1), 5-14. 
69 
 
Cretu, Anca E. and Roderick J. Brodie (2007), "The Influence of Brand Image and 
Company Reputation where Manufacturers Market to Small Firms: A Customer 
Value Perspective," Industrial Marketing Management, 36, 230-240. 
 
Csada, Ryan D., Paul C. James, and Richard H. M. Espie (1996), “The “File Drawer 
Problem” of Non-Significant Results: Does It Apply to biological Research?” 
Oikos, 76 (3), 591-593. 
 
Daughety, Andrew F. and Robert Forsythe (1987), “The Effects of Industry-Wide Price 
Regulation on Industrial Organization,” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 3 (2), 397-434. 
 
David, Pathiban, Matt Bloom, and Amy J. Hillman (2007), "Investor Activism, 
Managerial Responsiveness, and Corporate Social Performance," Strategic 
Management Journal, 28 (1), 91-100. 
 
Davidson, Wallace N., III, and Dan L. Worrell (1988), “The impact of announcements of 
corporate illegalities on shareholder returns,” Academy of Management Journal, 
31 (1), 195–200. 
 
Davidson, Wallace N., III, and Dan L. Worrell (1992), “The Effect of Product Recall 
Announcements on Shareholder Wealth,” Strategic Management Journal, 3 (6), 
467–473. 
 
Davies, Gray, Rosa Chun, Rui Vinhas de Silva, and Stuart Roper (2004), “A Corporate 
Character Scale to Assess Employee and Customer Views of Organization 
Reputation,” Corporate Reputation Review, 7 (2), 125-146. 
 
Davies, Gray, Rosa Chun, and Michael A. Kamins (2010), "Reputation Gaps and the 
Performance of Service Organizations," Strategic Management Journal, 31, 530-
546. 
 
Davis, Donna F., Susan L. Golicic, and Adam J. Marquardt (2008), "Branding a B2B 
Service: Does a Brand Differentiate a Logistics Service Providers?" Industrial 
Marketing Managmeent, 37, 218-227. 
 
Deephouse, David L. (1997), "The Effect of Financial and Media Reputations on 
Performance," Corporate Reputation Review, 1 (1/2), 68-72. 
 
Deephouse, David L. (2000), "Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration 
of Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories," Journal of Management, 
26 (6), 1091-1112. 
 
70 
 
Deephouse, David L. and Suzanne M. Carter (2005), "An Examination of Differences 
Between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation," Journal of 
Management Studies, 42 (2), 329-360. 
 
Dierickx, Ingemar and Karel Cook (1989), “Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage,” Management Science, 35 (12), 1504-1511. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (1983), “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomophism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American 
Sociological Review, 48 (2), 147-160. 
 
Dimov, Dimo, Dean A. Shepherd, and Kethleen M. Sutcliffe (2007), "Requisite 
Expertise, Firm Reputation, and Status in Venture Capital Investment Allocation 
Decisions," Journal of Business Venturing, 22, 481-502. 
 
Dodds, William B., Kent B Monroe, and Dhruv Grewal (1991), “Effects of Price, Brand, 
and Store Information on Buyers’ Product Evaluation,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 15 (1), 307-319. 
 
Doh, Jonathan P. Shawn D. Howton, Shelly W. Howton, & Donald S. Siegel (2010), 
"Does the Market Respond to an Endorsement of Social Responsibility? The Role 
of Institutions, Information, and Legitimacy," Journal of Management, 36 (6), 
1461-85. 
 
Dollinger, Marc J., Peggy A. Golden, and Todd Saxton (1997), “The Effect of Reputation 
on the Decision to Joint Venture,” Strategic Management Journal, 18 (2), 127-
140. 
 
Dooley, Robert S. and Linda D. Lerner (1994), “Pollution, Profits, and Stake-Holders: 
The Constraining Effect of Economic Performance on CEO Concern with 
Stakeholder Expectations,” Journal of Business Ethics, 13 (9), 701–711. 
 
Dowling, Grahame R. (2001), Creating Corporate Reputations. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
 
Dowling, John and Jeffrey Pfeffer (1975),”Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and 
Organizational Behavior,” Pacific Sociological Review, 18 (1), 122-136. 
 
Dowell, Glen, Stuart Hart, and Bernard Yeung (2000), “Do Corporate Global 
Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value?” Management 
Science, 46 (8), 1059–1074. 
 
Dubin, Jeffery A. (1998), “The Demand for Branded and Unbranded Products: An 
Econometric Method for Valuing Intangible Assets,” Chapter 3 in Studies in 
71 
 
Consumer Deman: Econometric Methods Applied to Market Data. Norwell. MA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 77-127. 
 
Dutton, Jane E., Janet M. Dukerich, and Celia V. Harquail (1994), “Organizational 
Images and Member Identification,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 39 (2), 
239-263. 
 
Dyer, Jeffrey H. (1996), “Does Governance matter? Keiretsu Alliances and Asset 
Specificity As Sources of Japanese Competitive Advantage,” Organization 
Science, 7 (6), 649-666. 
 
Elitzur, Ramy and Arieh Gavious (2003), “Contracting, Signaling, and Moral Hazard: A 
Model of Entrepreneurs, ‘Angels,’ and Venture Capitalists,” Journal of Business 
Venturing, 18 (6), 709-725. 
 
Elsbach, Kimberly D. (2006), Organizational Perception Management. Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Falkenreck, Christine and Ralkf Wagner (2010), "Impact of Direct Marketing Activities 
on Company Reputation Transfer Success: Empirical Evidence from Five 
Different Cultures," Corporate Reputation Review, 13 (1), 20-37. 
 
Fama, Eugene F. (1970), “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work,” Journal of Finance, 25 (2), 383-417. 
 
Farquhar, Peter H (1989), “Managing Brand Equity,” Marketing Research, 1 
(September), 24-33. 
 
Fombrun, Charles (1996), Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image. 
Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
 
Fombrun, Charles and Cees van Riel (1997), “The Reputational Landscape,” Corporate 
Reputation Review, 1 (1/2), 5-13. 
 
Fombrun, Charles and Shanley, Mark (1990), “What’s in a Name? Reputation Building 
and Corporate Strategy,” Academy of Management Journal, 33 (2), 233–258. 
 
Francis, Jere R., Kenneth Reichelt, and Dechun Wang (2005), "The Pricing of national 
and City-Specific Reputations for Industry Expertise in the U.S. Audit Market," 
Accounting Review, 80 (1), 113-136. 
 
Frankel, Richard and Charles M. C. Lee (1998) “Accounting Valuation, Market 
Expectation, and Cross-Sectional Stock Returns,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 25 (3), 282-319. 
 
72 
 
Freeman, John (1984), Strategic management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: Pitman. 
 
French, John R. P. and Bertram Raven (1959), “Bases of Social Power,” Studies in Social 
Power. Ed. Dorwin Cartwright. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph (1997), “An Urban Grants Economy Revisited: Corporate 
Charitable Contributions in the Twin Cities, 1979–81, 1987–89,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 42 (3), 445–471. 
 
Garbett, Thomas F. (1988), How to Build a Corporation’s Identity and Project Its Image. 
Lexington Books, Lexington, MA. 
 
Garvey, Gerald T. (1995), “Why Reputation Favors Joint Ventures Over Vertical and 
Horizontal Integration A Simple Model,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 28 (3), 387-397. 
 
Gary, Edmund R. and John M. T. Balmer (1998), “Managing Corporate Image and 
Corporate Reputation,” Long Range Planning, 31 (5), 695-702. 
 
Godfrey, Paul C., Craig B. Merrill, and Jared M. Hansen (2009), "The Relationship 
between Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Value: An Empirical 
Test of the Risk Management Hypothesis," Strategic Management Journal, 30 
(4), 425-445. 
 
Golant, Benjamin D. and John A. Sillince (2007), “The Constitution of Organizational 
Legitimacy: A Narrative Perspective,” Organization Studies, 28 (8), 1149-1167. 
 
Goldberg, Marvin E. and Jon Hartwick (1990), “The Effects of Advertiser Reputation 
and Extremity of Advertising Claim on Advertising Effectiveness,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17 (2), 172-179. 
 
Goll, Irene. And Abdul A. Rasheed (2004), “The Moderating Effect of Environmental 
Munificence and Dynamism on the Relationship Between Discretionary Social 
Responsibility and Firm Performance,” Journal of Business Ethics, 49 (1), 41–54. 
 
Granovetter, Mark (1985), “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology, 91 (3), 481-510. 
 
Graves, Samuel B. (1988), “Institutional Ownership and Corporate R&D in the Computer 
Industry,” Academy of Management Journal, 31 (2), 417-428. 
 
Graves, Samuel B. and Sendra A. Waddock (1994), “Institutional Owners and Corporate 
Social Performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 37 (4), 1034–1046. 
 
73 
 
Gray, Wayne B. (1987), "The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA and the Productivity 
Slowdown", American Economic Review, 77(5), 998-1006. 
 
Grewal, Rajdeep, Anindita Chakravarty, and Amit Saini (2010), "Governance 
Mechanisms in Business-to-Business Electronic Markets," Journal of Marketing, 
74 (July), 45-62. 
 
Gunthorpe, Deborah L. (1997), “Business Ethics: A Quantitative Analysis of the Impact 
of Unethical Behavior on Publicly Traded Corporations,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 16 (5), 537–543. 
 
Hall, Richard (1993), “A Framework Linking Intangible Resources and Capabilities to 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage,” Strategic Management Journal, 14 (8), 
607-618. 
 
Hanna, Michael T., Glenn R. Carroll, Elizabeth A. Dundon, and John C. Torres (1995), 
“Organizational Evolution in a Multinational Context: Entries of Automobile 
Manufacturers in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy,” American 
Sociological Review, 60, 509-528. 
 
Hansen, Gary S. and Birger Wernerfelt (1989), “Determinants of Firm Performance: The 
Relative Importance of Economic and Organizational Factors,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 10 (5), 399–411. 
 
Hansen, Havard, Bendik M. Samuelsen, and Pal R. Silseth (2008), "Customer Perceived 
Value in B-to-B Service Relationships: Investigating the Importance of Corporate 
Reputation," Industrial Marketing Management, 37 (2), 206-217. 
 
Helm, Sabrina (2007), "The Role of Corporate Reputation in Determining Investor 
Satisfaction and Loyalty," Corporate Reputation Review, 10 (1), 22-37. 
 
Hennart, Jean-Francois (1993), “Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most Transactions 
Are a Mix of “Market” and “Hierarchy”,” Organization Science, 4 (4), 529-547. 
 
Higgins, Julian P. T. and Simon G. Thompson (2002), “Quantifying Heterogeneity in a 
Meta-Analysis,” Statistics in Medicine, 21, 1539-1558. 
 
Highhouse, Scott, Margaret E. Brooks, and Gary Gregarus (2009), “An Organizational 
Impression Management Perspective on the Formation of Corporate Reputations,” 
Journal of Management, 35 (6), 1481-1493. 
 
Hill, Charles W. (1990), “Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: 
Implications for Transaction Cost Theory,” Academy of Management Review, 15 
(3), 500-513. 
74 
 
Hill, Ronal P., Thomas Ainscough, Todd Shank, and Daryl Manullang (2007), 
“Corporate Social Responsibility and Socially Responsible Investing: A Global 
Perspective,” Journal of Business Ethics, 70 (2), 165–174. 
 
Hillman, Amy J. and Gerald D. Keim (2001), “Shareholder Value, Stakeholder 
Management, and Social Issues: What’s the Bottom Line?” Strategic 
Management Journal, 22 (2), 125–139. 
 
Hoffer, George E., Stephen W. Pruitt, and Robert J. Reilly (1988), “The Impact of 
Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers: A Reexamination,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 96 (3), 663–670. 
 
Houston, Mark B. and Shane A. Johnson (2000), "Buyer-Supplier Contracts Versus Joint 
Ventures: Determinants and Consequences of Transaction Structure," Journal of 
Marketing Research, 37 (February), 1-15. 
 
Huedo-Medina, Tania, Julio Sanchez-Meca, Fulgencio Marin-Martinez, and Juan Botella 
(2006), “Assessing Heterogeneity in Meta-Analysis: Q-Statistic or I2 index?,” 
Center for Health, Intervention, and Prevention (CHIP) Documents, University of 
Connecticut. 
 
Hull, Clyde Eirikur and Sandra Rothenberg (2008), "Firm Performance: The Interactions 
of Corporate Social Performance with Innovation and Industry Differentiation," 
Strategic Management Journal, 29 (7), 781-789. 
 
Hunter, John E. and Frank L. Schmidt (2004), Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting 
Error and Bias in Research Findings. 2
nd
 edition, Saga Publications. 
 
Ingram, Robert W. and Katherine B. Frazier (1983), “Narrative Disclosures in Annual 
Reports,” Journal of Business Research, 11 (1), 49–60. 
 
Jarrell, Gregg and Sam Peltzman (1985), “The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth 
of Sellers,” Journal of Political Economy, 93 (3), 512–536. 
 
Jemison, David B. and Sim B. Sitkin (1986), “Corporate Acquisitions: A Process 
Perspective,” Academy of Management Review, 11(1), 145-163. 
 
Jensen, Michael and Aradhana Roy (2008), "Staging Exchange Partner Choices: When 
Do Status and Reputation Matter?," Academy of Management Journal, 51 (3), 
495-516. 
 
Johnson, Richard A. and Daniel W. Greening (1999), “The Effects of Corporate 
Governance and Institutional Ownership Types on Corporate Social 
Performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 42 (5), 564–576. 
75 
 
Johnson, L. Todd and Kimberley R. Petrone (1998), “Is Goodwill an Asset?” Accounting 
Horizons, 12 (3), 293-303. 
 
Jones, Gary H., Beth H. Jones, and Philip Little (2000), "Reputation as Reservoir: 
Buffering Against Loss in Times of Economic Crisis," Corporate Reputation 
Review, 3 (1), 21-29. 
 
Jones, Ray and Audrey J. Murrell (2001), “Signaling Positive Corporate Social 
Performance,” Business & Society, 40, 59-78. 
 
Kang, Minjeong and Sung-Un Yang (2010), "Comparing Effects of Country Reputation 
and the Overall Corporate Reputations of a Country on International Consumers' 
Product Attitudes and Purchase Intentions," Corporate Reputation Review, 13 (1), 
52-62. 
 
Kang, Min-Ping, Joseph T. Mahoney, and Danchi Tan (2009), "Why Firms Make 
Unilateral Investments Specific to Other Firms: The Case of OEM Suppliers," 
Strategic Management Journal, 30, 117-135. 
 
Karpoff, Jonathan M. and John R. Lott (1993), “The reputational penalty firms bear from 
committing criminal fraud,” Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 757–802. 
 
Karpoff, Jonathan M., D. Scott Lee, and Valaria P.Vendrzyk (1999), “Defense 
Procurement Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 107 (4), 809–842. 
 
Karpoff, Jonathan M., John R. Lott and Eric W. Wehrly (2005), “The Reputational 
Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 48, 653–675. 
 
Keh, Hean Tat and Yi Xie (2009), "Corporate Reputation and Customer Behavioral 
Intentions: The Roles of Trust, Identification and Commitment," Industrial 
Marketing Management, 38 (7), 732-742. 
 
Keller, Kevin L. (1993), “Conceptualizing, Measuring, and managing Customer-Based 
Brand Equity,” Journal of Marketing, 57 (January), 1-22. 
 
Kotler, Philip H. and Kevin L. Keller (2009), Marketing Management, 13
th
 ed. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Khurana, Inder K. and K. K. Raman (2004), "Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting 
Credibility of Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Audits: Evidence from Anglo-American 
Countries," Accounting Review, 79 (2), 473-495. 
 
76 
 
Kieso, Donald E., Jerry J. Weygandt, and Terry D. Warfield (2011), Intermediate 
Accounting, 14
th
 edition, Wiley. 
 
Kim, Jeong-Nam, Seung B. Bach, and Iain J. Clelland (2007), "Symbolic or Behavioral 
management? Corporate Reputation in High-Emission Industries," Corporate 
Rpeutation Review, 10 (2), 77-98. 
 
Kim, Ji-Hern and Yong J. Hyun (2011), "A Model to Investigate the Influence of 
Marketing-Mix Efforts and Corrpoate Image on Brand Equity in the IT software 
Sector," Industrial Marketing Management, 40, 424-438. 
 
Kim, Stephen K, Richard G. McFarland, Soongi Kwon, Sanggi Son, and David A. 
Griffith (2011), "Understanding Governance Decisions in a Partially Integrated 
Channel: A Contingent Alignment Framework," Journal of Marketing Research, 
48 (June), 603-616. 
 
Kimberly, J. R. (1976), “Organizational Size and the Structuralist Perspective: A Review, 
Critique, and Proposal,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 571-597. 
 
King, Brayden G. (2008), "A Political Medaition Model of Corporate Response to Social 
Movement Activism," Administrative Science Quarterly, 53, 395-421. 
 
King, Brayden G. (2008), “Rethinking the Relationship Between Reputation and 
Legitimacy: A Social Actor Conceptualization,” Corporate Reputation Review, 
11, 192-207. 
 
Klein, Banjamin and Keith B. Leffler (1981), “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), 615-641.  
 
Kogut, Bruce (2006), “Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 9 (4), 319-332. 
 
Kotler, Philip and Gary Armstrong (2012), Principles of Marketing, 14
th
 edition, Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Kreps, David M. and Robert Wilson (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” 
Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), 253-279. 
 
Lange, Donald, Peggy M. Lee, and Ye Dai (2011), “Organizational Reputation: A 
Review,” Journal of Management, 37 (1), 153-184. 
 
Lai, Chi-Shiun, Chih-Jen Chiu, Chin-Fang Yang, and Da-Chang Pai (2010), "The Effects 
of Corporate Social Responsibility on Brand Performance: The Mediating Effect 
of Industrial Brand Equity and Corporate Reputation," Journal of Business Ethics, 
95, 457-469. 
77 
 
Lee, Charles M. C., James Myers, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan (1999), “What Is the 
Intrinsic Value of the Dow?,” Journal of Finance, 54 (5), 1693-1741. 
 
Lichtenstein, Donald R., Minette E. Drumwright, and Bridgette M. Braig (2004), "The 
Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Customer Donations to Corporate-
Supported Nonprofits," Journal of marketing, 68 (October), 16-32. 
 
Love, E. Geoffrey and Matthew Kraatz (2009), "Character, Conformity, or the Bottom 
Line? How and Why Downsizing Affected Corporate Reputation," Academy of 
Management Journal, 52 (2), 314-335. 
 
Luo, Xueming and C. B. Bhattacharya (2006), “Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Customer Satisfaction, and Market Value.” Journal of Marketing, 70 (4), 1–18. 
 
Luo, Xueming and C. B. Bhattacharya (2009), "The Debate Over Doing Good: Corporate 
Social Performance, Strategic Marketing Levers, and Firm-Idiosyncratic Risk," 
Journal of Marketing, 73 (November), 198-213. 
 
MacMillan, Keith, Money Kevin, Steve Downing, Carola Hillenbrand (2005), 
“Reputation in Relationships: Measuring Experiences, Emotions and Behaviors,” 
Corporate Reputation Review, 8 (3), 214-232.  
 
Margolis, Joshua D., Hillary Anger Elfenbein, and James P. Walsh (2009), “Does it Pay 
to Be Good…And Does it Matter? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Corporate Social and Financial Performance,” Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Markwick, Nigel and Chris Fill (1997), “Towards a Framework for Managing Corporate 
Identity,” European Journal of Marketing, 31 (5/6), 396-409. 
 
Martin, Robert E. and Robert T. Justis (1993), “Franchising, Liquidity Constraints and 
Entry,” Applied Economics, 25 (9), 1269-1277. 
 
Martins, Luis L. (2005), "A Model of the Effects of Reputational Rankings on 
Organizational Change," Organizational Science, 16 (6), 701-720. 
 
Maurer, J. G. (1971), Economic Factors in the Growth of Corporation Giving. New 
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 111. 
 
McCorkindale, Tina (2008), “Does Familiarity Breed Contempt?: Analyses of the 
Relationship Among Company Familiarty, Company Reputation, Company 
Citizenship, and Company Personality on Corporate Equity,” Public Relations 
Review, 34 (4), 392-395. 
 
78 
 
McGuire, Jean B., Alison Sundgren, and Thomas Schneeweis (1988), “Corporate and 
Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance,” Academy of Management 
Journal, 31 (4), 854–872. 
 
McGuire, Jean B., Thomas Schneeweis, and Ben Branch (1990), “Perceptions of Firm 
Quality: A Cause or Result of Firm Performance,” Journal of Management, 16, 
167–180. 
 
McMillan, G. Steven and Maheshkumar P. Joshi (1997), "Sustainable Competitive 
Advantage and Firm Performance: The Role of Intangible Resources", Corporate 
Reputation Review, 1 (1/2), 81-85. 
 
McNeil, Alexander J., Rüdiger Frey, and Paul Embrechts (2005), Quantitative Risk 
Management: Concepts, Techniques, and Tools.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
McWilliams, Abagail and Donald Siegel (1997), “Event Studies in Management 
Research: Theoretical and Empirical Issues,” Academy of Management Journal, 
40 (3), 626–657. 
 
McWilliams, Abagail and Donald Siegel (2000), “Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Financial Performance: Correlation or Misspecification?” Strategic Management 
Journal, 21 (5), 603–609. 
 
McWilliams, Abagail and Donald Siegel (2001), “Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Theory of the Firm Perspective,” Academy of Management Review, 26 (1), 117-
127. 
 
Menguc, Bulent and Lucie K. Ozanne (2005), “Challenges of the ‘Green Imperative’: A 
Natural Resource-Based Approach to the Environmental Orientation-Business 
Performance Relationship,” Journal of Business Research, 58 (4), 430–438. 
 
Meyer, John W. and W. Richard Scott (1983), Organizational Environments: Ritual and 
Rationality. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Miles, Morgan P. and Jeffrey G. Covin (2000), “Environmental Marketing: A Source of 
Reputational, Competitive, and Financial Advantage,” Journal of Business Ethics, 
23 (3), 299-312. 
 
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1986), “Price and Advertising Signals of Product 
Quality,” 94 (4), Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), 796-821. 
 
Mill, Greig A. (2006), “The Financial Performance of a Socially Responsible Investment 
Over Time and a Possible Link with Corporate Social Responsibility,” Journal of 
Business Ethics, 63 (2), 131–148. 
79 
 
Mishina, Yuri, Bernadine J. Dykes, Emily S. Block, and Timothy G. Pollock (2010), 
"Why "Good" Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High 
Expectations, and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality," Academy 
of Management Journal, 53 (4), 701-722. 
Muller, Alan and Roman Kraussl (2011), "Doing Good Deeds in Times of Need: A 
Strategic Perspecive on Corporate Disaster Donations," Strategic Management 
Journal, 32 (9), 911-929. 
 
Nehrt, Chad (1996), “Timing and Intensity Effects of Environmental Investment,” 
Strategic Management Journal, 17 (7), 535–547. 
 
Newberry, William (2010), "Reputation and Supportive Behavior: Moderating Impacts of 
Foreignness, Industry and Local Exposure," Corporate Reputation Review, 12 (4), 
388-405. 
 
Nguyen, Nha (2010), "Competence and Benevolence of Contact Personnel in the 
Perceived Corporate Reputation: An Empirical Study in Financial Services," 
Corporate Reputation Review, 12 (4), 345-356. 
 
Nicholls-Nixon, Charlene L. and Carolyn Y. Woo (2003), "Technology Sourcing and 
Output of Established Firms in a Regime of Encompassing Technological 
Change," Strategic Management Journal, 24 (7), 651-666. 
 
Nunnally, Jum  C. and Ira H. Bernstein (1994), Psychometric Theory. 3
rd
 edition, New 
York, McGraw Hill. 
 
O’Neill, Hugh M., Charles B. Saunders, and Anne D McCarthy (1989), “Board members, 
corporate social responsiveness and profitability: Are tradeoffs necessary?” 
Journal of Business Ethics, 8 (5), 353–357. 
 
Obloj, Tomasz and Laurence Capron (2011), "Role of Resource Gap and Value 
Appropriation: Effect of Reputation Gap on Price Premium in Online Auctions," 
Strategic Management Journal, 32 (4), 447-456. 
 
Orlitzky, Marc (2001), “Does Firm Size Confound the Relationship Between Corporate 
Social Performance and Firm Financial Performance?” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 33 (2), 167-180. 
 
Orlitzky, Marc, Frank L. Schmidt, and Sara L. Rynes (2003), “Corporate Social and 
Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis,” Organization Studies, 24 (3), 403-441. 
 
Park, Chan Su and V. Srinivasan (1994), “A Survey-based Method for Measuring and 
Understanding Brand Equity and Its Extendibility,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 31 (2), 271-288. 
80 
 
Pava, Moses L. and Joshua Krausz (1996), “The Association Between Corporate Social-
Responsibility and Financial Performance: The Paradox of Social Cost,” Journal 
of Business Ethics, 15 (3), 321–357. 
 
Peltzman, Sam (1981) “The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 24, 403–448. 
 
Penman, Stephen H. (1998), “Combining Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation,” 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 15 (3), 291-324. 
 
Pennings, Johannes M., Harry Barkema, and Sytse Douma (1994), “Organizational 
Learning and Diversification,” Academy of Management Journal, 37 (3), 608-
640. 
 
Pfarrer, Michael, Timothey G. Pollock, Violina P. Rindova (2010), "A Tale of Two 
Assets: The Effects of Firm Reputation and Celebrity on Earnings Surprises and 
Investors' Reactions," Academy of management Journal, 53 (5), 1131-1152. 
 
Philippe, Deborah and Rodolphe Durand (2011), "The Impact of Norm-Conforming 
Behaviors on Firm Reputation," Strategic Management Journal, 32 (9), 969-993. 
 
Podolny, Joel M. (1993), “A Status-Based Model of Market Competition,” American 
Journal of Sociology, 98 (4), 829-872. 
 
Podolny, Joel M. (1994), “Market Uncertainty and the Social Character of Economic 
Exchange,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 39 (3), 458-483. 
 
Price, James L. and Charles W. Mueller (1986), Hanbook of Organizational 
Measurement. 2
nd
 edition, Pitman, Marchfield, MA. 
 
Pruitt, Stephen W. and David R. Peterson (2005), “Security Price Reactions Around 
Product Recall Announcements,” Journal of Financial Research, 20 (3), 113-122. 
 
Raman, K. K. and Earl R. Wilson (1994), "Governmental Audit Procurement Practices 
and Seasoned Bond Prices," Accounting Review, 69 (4), 517-38. 
 
Rao, Akshay R. and Mark E. Bergen (1992), “Price Premium Variations as a 
Consequence of Buyers’ Lack of Information,” Journal of Consumer Research, 
19 (3), 412-423.  
 
Rao, Akshay R. and Kent B. Monroe (1996), “Causes and Consequences of Price 
Premiums,” Journal of Business, 69 (4), 511-535. 
 
81 
 
Rao, Hayagreeva (1994), “The Social Construction of Reputation: Certification Contests, 
Legitimation, and the Survival of Organizaitons in the American Automobile 
Industry: 1895-1912,” Strategic Management Journal, 15 (1), 29-44. 
 
Rao, Raghunath S., Rajesh K. Chandy, and Jaideep C. Prabhu (2008), "The Fruits of 
Legitimacy:Why Some New Ventures Gain More from Innovation Than Others," 
Journal of Marketing, 72 (July), 58-75. 
 
Rhee, Mooweon and Pamela R. Haunschild (2006), “The Liability of Good Reputation: 
A Study of Product Recalls in the U.S. Automobile Industry,” Organization 
Science, 17 (1), 101-117. 
 
Rindova, Violina P., Timothy G. Pollock, and Mathew L. A. Hayward (2006), “Celebrity 
Firms: The Social Construction of market Popularity,” Academy of management 
Review, 31 (1), 50-71. 
 
Rindova, Violina P., Ian O. Williamson, Antoaneta P. Petkova, and Joy Marie Sever 
(2005), "Being Good or Being Known: An Empirical Examination of the 
Dimensions, Antecedents, and Consequences of Organizational Reputation," 
Academy of Management Journal, 48 (6), 1033-1049. 
 
Roberts, Peter W. and Grahame R. Dowling (2002), "Corporate Reputation and Sustained 
Superior Financial Performance," Strategic Management Journal, 23 (12), 1077-
1093. 
 
Rosenthal, Robert (1979), “The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results,” 
Psychological Bulletin, 86 (3), 638-641. 
 
Rosenthal, Robert (1995), “Writing Meta-Analytic Review,” Psychological Bulletin, 118 
(2), 183-192. 
 
Rosenthal, Robert and Ralph L. Rosnow (1991), Essentials of Behavioral Research: 
Methods and Data Analysis. 3
rd
 edition, New York, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company. 
 
Ross, Stephen A. (1973), “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” 
American Economic Review, 63 (2), 134-139. 
 
Ross, Stephen A. (1977), “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive 
Signaling Structure,” Bell Journal of Economics, 8 (1), 23-40. 
 
Ruf, Bernadette M., Krishnamurty Muralidhar, Robert M. Brown, Jay J. Janney, and 
Karen Paul (2001), “An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship Between 
Change in Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A 
Stakeholder Theory Perspective,” Journal of Business Ethics, 32 (2), 143–156. 
82 
 
Russo, Michael V. and Paul A. Fouts (1997), "A Resource-Based Perspective on 
Corporate Environmental Performance and Profitability," Academy of 
Management Journal, 40 (3), 534-59. 
 
Sabate, Juan Manuel de la Fuente and Esther de Quenvedo Puente (2003), “Empirical 
Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Reputation and Financial 
Performance: A Survey of the Literature,” Corporate Reputation Review, 6 (2), 
161-177. 
 
Salancik, Gerald R. and Jeffrey Pfeffer (1980), “Effects of Ownership and Performance 
on Executive Tenure in U.S. Corporations,” Academy of Management Journal, 23 
(4), 653-664. 
 
Sauer, David A. (1997), “The impact of social-responsibility screens on investment 
performance: Evidence from the Domini 400 Social Index and Domini Equity 
Mutual Fund,” Review of Financial Economics, 6: 137–149. 
 
Saxton, Todd (1997), "The Effects of Partner and Relationship Characteristics on 
Alliance Outcomes," Academy of Management Journal, 40 (2), 443-461. 
 
Saxton, Todd and marc Dollinger (2004), "Target Reputation and Appropriability: 
Picking and Deploying Resources in Acquisitions," Journal of Management, 30 
(1), 123-147. 
 
Schnietz, Karen E. and Marc J. Epstein (2005), "Exploring the Financial Value of a 
Reputation for Corporate Social Responsibility During a Crisis," Corporate 
Reputation Review, 7 (4), 327-345. 
 
Scott, Susanne G. and Vicki R. Lane (2000), “A Stakeholder Approach to Organizational 
Identity,” Academy Management Review, 25 (1), 43-62. 
 
Seifert, B., Morris, S. A., & Bartkus, B. R. (2003), “Comparing big givers and small 
givers: Financial correlates of corporate philanthropy,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 45, 195–211. 
 
Shapiro, Carl (1983), “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations,” 
Journal of Economics, 98 (4), 659-679. 
 
Shamsie, Jamal (2003), "The Context of Dominance: An Industry-Driven Framework for 
Exploiting Reputation," Strategic Management Journal, 24, 199-215. 
 
Shane, Philip B. and Barry H. Spicer (1983), “Marketing response to environmental 
information produced outside the firm,” Accounting Review, 58 (3), 521–538. 
83 
 
Shane, Scott A. (1996), “Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implication for 
Firm Growth and Survival: A Study of New Franchisors,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 39 (1), 216-234. 
 
Shenkar, Oded and Ephraim YichtmanYaar (1997), “Reputation, Image, Prestige, 
Goodwill: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Organizational Standing,” Human 
Relations, 50 (11), 1361-1381. 
 
Shrum, Wesley and Robert Wuthnow (1988), “Reputational Status of Organizations in 
Technical Systems, “ American Journal of Sociology, 93 (4), 882-912. 
 
Simon, Carol J. and Mary W. Sullivan (1993), “The Measurement and Determinants of 
Brand Equity: A Financial Approach,” Marketing Science, 12 (Winter), 28-52. 
 
Smith, J. Brock and Donald W. Barclay (1997), "The Effects of Organzitional 
Differences and Trust on the Effectiveness of Selling partner Relationships," 
Journal of Marketing, 61 (1), 3-21. 
 
Spence, Michael (1973), “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87 
(3), 355-374. 
 
Spence, Michael (2002), “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of 
markets,” American Economic Review, 92, 434-59. 
 
Spyropoulou, Stavroula, Dionysis Skarmeas, and Constantine S. Katsikeas (2010), "The 
Role of Corporate Image in Business-to-Business Export Ventures: A Resource-
Based Appraoch," Industrial marketing Management, 39, 752-760. 
 
Srivastava, Rajendra K., Thomas H. McInish, Robert A. Wood, and Anthony J. Capraro 
(1997), "The Value of Corporate Reputation: Evidence from the Equity Markets,” 
Corporate Reputation Review, 1 (1/2), 62-68. 
 
_______ and Allan D. Shocker (1991), “Brand Equity: A Perspective on its Meaning and 
Measurement,” Working Paper No. 91-124. Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science 
Institute. 
 
Standifird, Stephen S. (2001), "Reputation and E-commerce: eBay auctions and the 
Asymmetrical Impact of Positive and Negative Ratings," Journal of Management, 
27, 279-295. 
 
Stanwick, Peter A. and Sarah D. Stanwick (1998), “The Relationship Between Corporate 
Social Performance, and Organizational Size, Financial Performance, and 
Environmental Performance: An Empirical Examination,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 17 (2), 195-204. 
 
84 
 
Staw, Barry M. and Lisa D. Epstein (2000), "What Bandwagons Bring: Effects of 
Popular Management Techniques on Corporate Performance, Reputation, and 
CEO pay," Administrative Science Quarterly, 45 (3), 523-556. 
 
Stice, James D. (1991), "Using Financial and market Information to Identify Pre-
Engagement Faactors Associated with Lawsuits Against Auditors," Accounting 
Review, 65 (3), 516-533. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002), “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics,” 
American Economic Review, 92 (3), 460-501. 
 
Stuart, Toby E. (2000), “Interorganizational Alliances and the Performance of Firms: A 
Study of Growth and Innovation Rates in a High-Technology Industry,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 21 (8), 791-811. 
 
Suh, Taewon and Mark B. Houston (2010), "Distinguishing Supplier Reputation from 
Trust in Buyer-Supplier Relationships," Industrial marketing Management, 39, 
744-751. 
 
Suchman, Mark C. (1995), “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches,” Academy of Management Review, 20 (3), 571-610. 
 
Surroca, Jordi, Josep A. Tribo, and Sandra Waddock (2010), "Corporate Responsibility 
and Financial Performance: The Role of Intangible Resources," Strategic 
Management Journal, 31 (5), 463-490. 
 
Swaminathan, Vanitha and Christine Moorman (2009), "Marketing Alliances, Firm 
Networks, and Firm Value Creation," Journal of Marketing, 73 (September) 52-
69. 
 
Teoh, Siew Hong and T. J. Wong (1993), "Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings 
Response Coefficient," Accounting Review, 68 (2), 346-366. 
 
Turban, Daniel B., and Daniel W. Greening (1996), “Corporate Social Performance and 
Organizational Attractiveness to Prospective Employees,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 40 (3), 658–672. 
 
Turban, Daniel B. and Daniel M. Cable (2003), "Firm Reputation and Applicant Pool 
Characteristics," Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, 733-751. 
 
Vershoor, Curtis C. (1998), “A Study of the Link Between a Corporation’s Financial 
Performance and Its Commitment to Ethics,” Journal of Business Ethics, 17 (13), 
1509–1516. 
 
85 
 
Waddock, Sandra A., and Samuel B. Graves (1997), “The Corporate Social Performance-
Financial Performance Link,” Strategic Management Journal, 18 (4), 303–319. 
 
Wagner, Tillmann, Richard J. Lutz, and Barton A. Weitz (2009), "Corporate Hypocrisy: 
Overcoming the Threat of Inconsistent Corporate Social Responsibility 
Perceptions," Journal of Marketing, 73 (November), 77-91. 
 
Walsh, James P., Klaus Weber, and Joshua D. Margolis (2003), “Social Issues and 
Management: Our Lost Cause Found,” Journal of Management, 29 (6), 859-881. 
 
Washington, Marvin and Edward J. Zajac (2005), “Status Evolution and Competition: 
Theory and Evidence,” Academy of Management Journal, 48 (2), 282-296. 
 
Weber, Joseph, Michael Willenborg, and Jieying Zhang (2008), "Does Auditor 
Reputation matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG," Journal 
of Accounting Research, 46 (4), 941-972. 
 
Weigelt, Keith and Colin Camerer (1988), “Reputation and Corporate Strategy: A 
Review of Recent Theory and Applications,” Strategic Management Journal, 9 
(5), 443-454. 
 
Weiss, Allen M, Erin Anderson, Deborah J. MacInnis (1999), "Reputation Management 
as a Motivation for Sales Structure Decisions," Journal of Marketing, 63 (4), 74-
89. 
 
Wejnert, Barbara (2002), “Integrating Models of Diffusion of Innovations: A Conceptual 
Framework,” Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 297-326. 
 
Whetten, David A. and Alison Mackey (2002), “A Social Actor Conception of 
Organizational Identity and Its Implications for the Study of Organizational 
Reputation,” Business Society, 41 (4), 393-414. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1991), “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of 
Discrete Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), 269-
296.  
 
Wood, Donna J. and Raymond E. Jones (1995), “Stakeholder Mismatching Theoretical 
Problem in Empirical Research on Corporate Social Performance,” International 
Journal of Organizational Analysis, 3 (3), 229-267. 
 
Wong, Sze-Sze and Wai Fong Boh (2010), “Leveraging the Ties of Others to Build a 
Reputation for Trustworthiness Among Peers,” Academy of management Journal, 
53 (1), 129-148. 
 
86 
 
Wright, P., & Ferris, S. P. (1997), “Agency conflict and corporate strategy: The effect of 
divestment on corporate value,” Strategic Management Journal, 18: 77–83. 
 
Wright, P., Ferris, S. P., Hiller, J. S., & Kroll, M. (1995) “Competitiveness through 
management of diversity: Effects on stock price valuation,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 38: 272–287. 
 
Yoo, Boonghee, Naveen Donthu, and Sungho Lee (2000), “An Examination of Selected 
Marketing Mix Elements and Brand Equity,” Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 28 (2), 195-212. 
  
87 
 
CARRY-OVER EFFECTS OF FIRM REPUTATION  
AMONG ITS TWO KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives (Freeman 1984, p.46).”  Building better 
relations with key stakeholders like employees, consumers, suppliers, communities and 
environments is expected to improve firm reputation (Berman et al. 1999; Freeman 
1984).  Since stakeholders comprehensively evaluate the motivations, processes, and 
outcomes of a firm to determine firm reputation (FR) (Fombrun and Shanley 1990), the 
firm may achieve stability in its FR through its efforts toward stakeholder management.  
For example, in January 2010, Toyota announced a recall of some eight million Toyota 
vehicles due to mechanical problems in the gas pedals.  Toyota’s key asset of its quality 
reputation was at risk after this massive recall.  Consumers complained about Toyota’s 
inadequate response to various complaints and crashes due to its faulty product quality 
assurance. The decision to announce the vehicle recalls put the reputation of Toyota’s 
pedal supplier CTS Corporation (i.e., Toyota’s upstream channel members) as well as its 
dealers (i.e., Toyota’s downstream channel members) at risk.  The damage to FR of 
Toyota was carried over to the reputations of both up-stream and downstream 
stakeholders in Toyota’s value delivery system.  Since the recall announcement, Toyota 
has worked closely with its suppliers by implanting Toyota’s engineers in suppliers’ 
production lines to produce quality auto parts that meet Toyota’s standards.  The 
relationship between Toyota and Toyota’s dealers has strengthened while Toyota’s 
dealers strive to provide satisfactory services to their unsatisfied consumers.  At the same 
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time, Toyota has engaged in nationwide advertising to repair its reputation and has 
brought on a new lobbyist to reestablish its relationships with the Government.  As a 
result, Toyota has slowly regained its quality reputation with its consumers and 
leadership in its value delivery system.   
In franchise systems, downstream channel members (franchisees) are one of the 
key stakeholder relationships unique to the franchisor firm, and the role of franchisees 
cannot be over-stressed in the success of franchise systems.  The value of products and 
services is not only created by the firm that manufactures and supplies them, but also 
franchisees that bridge the link between the firm (franchisor) and consumers in the 
marketplace (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999).  Thus, firms must continue their 
endeavors to improve FR in the eyes of their channel members.  
Despite the importance of understanding the perspectives of downstream channel 
members on FR, hardly any extant FR literature has empirically investigated the role of 
perceived FR of downstream channel members on the establishment of firms’ overall FR 
in the Business-to-Business (B2B) market or the Business-to-Consumer (B2C) market.  
FR represents the accumulated impression that stakeholders form of the firm resulting 
from their past interactions with the firm (Brown et al. 2006; Fombrun and Shanley 
1990).  Stakeholders use the lenses of FR to set their expectations and to evaluate firm 
performance.  Even though various stakeholders judge FR in the marketplace based on 
their own interests (Fombrun 1996; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Lange, Lee, and Dai 
2011; MacMillan et al. 2005), FR has mainly been studied from the perspectives of 
consumers or capital investors (Brown and Dacin 1997; Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and 
Braig 2004; Standifird 2001; Walsh and Beatty 2007).  In this study, FR in two different 
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markets (i.e., the B2B market and the B2C market) that deal with multiple stakeholder 
groups is defined.  Using institutional theory, the study investigates the carry-over effects 
of FR between two different stakeholder groups (i.e., franchisees and consumers) and 
pinpoints how the opinions of one stakeholder group matter to the opinions of the other 
stakeholder group.   
FR in the marketplace signals the level of performance quality that is delivered by 
a firm (Brown and Dacin 1997; Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 2004; Standifird 
2001; Walsh and Beatty 2007).  Reputable franchise systems can attract more qualified 
and motivated franchisees to partner in the success of their enterprise (Caves and Murphy 
1976; Jambilingam and Nevin 1999; Mathewson and Winter 1985; Shane 1998).  As one 
may expect, FR in the eyes of consumers is greatly influenced by the experiences the 
consumers have with the franchise systems and most ostensively  by the interactions they 
have with local franchisees (e.g., Kennedy 1977; Padgett and Allen 1997; Tax, Brown, 
and Chandrashekaran 1998).  In this study, I investigate how the perceptions of 
franchisees toward FR in the B2B market matter for consumers in their own perceptions 
of FR, and vice versa.  This transference phenomenon is defined as the carry-over effect 
in this literature.  Since previous studies emphasize the carry-over effects of FR between 
a firm and its upstream channel members or its alliance partners (Anderson, Håkansson, 
and Johanson 1994; Kang 2008; Swaminathan and Moorman 2009), this multilevel 
investigation is aimed at furthering our understanding of stakeholder management for 
downstream channel members in the value delivery chain in a franchising context.   
The findings will also shed light on the mechanisms of “push” and “pull” 
strategies within the scope of the entire value delivery chain, and the relative 
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effectiveness of these strategies.  A push strategy focuses on inducing downstream 
channel members to carry, promote, and sell products and services to the end consumers 
(Kotler and Armstrong 2012).  Push strategies are appropriate when firms have weak 
reputation in their industry, brand selections are made by downstream channel members, 
and benefits of products and services are well understood (e.g., Dant 2008).  Firms use 
their sales force and trade promotion to operationalize push strategies.  A pull strategy, on 
the other hand, focuses on persuading the end consumers to enhance market demand so 
that downstream channel members are induced to buy more products and services from 
firms (Kotler and Armstrong 2012).  Pull strategies are appropriate when firms have a 
strong reputation in their industry, consumers are highly involved with their purchasing 
decisions and the perceived values of products and services vary between brands (e.g., 
Dant 2008).  Firms use national advertising and various consumer promotions to enact 
their pull strategies.   On the one hand, firms may employ push strategies if firms have 
strong FR assessed by their downstream channel members (internal FR).  On the other 
hand, firms may employ pull strategies if firms have strong FR assessed by their end 
consumers (external FR).   
Push and pull strategies have not been fully explored in the field of 
franchising.  Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968) first introduced push and pull strategies into the 
franchising context.   They suggested that a “push-pull” model can explain the success 
and the ownership structure of franchise systems.  They investigated “what forces would 
push and pull both franchisors and franchisees toward a wholly-owned system? 
(p.70)”  Later, Dant (2008) introduced several research questions for a future research 
agenda in the field of franchising, and one of the key research questions was “are 
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successful franchise operations doomed to be “push”-oriented systems or are ongoing 
“pull” strategies viable in franchising? (p. 93)”   However, both of these studies were 
conceptual in nature, and the push and pull strategies of franchisors have not been 
empirically investigated.  By examining the reciprocal carry-over effects of the two types 
of FR, this paper will evaluate the relative merits of push and pull strategies in a 
franchising context.   
To analyze the carry-over effects of FR from one stakeholder group to another, 
this study addresses the following research questions: (1) How does satisfaction of key 
stakeholders affect their perceptions on the focal franchisor’s FR?, (2) How does 
financial performance affect these stakeholders’ perceptions on the focal franchisor’s 
FR?, (3) How do firm strategies shape the firms’ standing (i.e., their FR) in the 
marketplace?, And finally (4) Does FR of one stakeholder group carry over to another 
stakeholder group’s perceptions on the focal franchisor’s FR?  And if so, which strategy 
is more effective between a push strategy (from internal FR to external FR) and a pull 
strategy (from external FR to internal FR)?  
This study makes several contributions of both theoretical and empirical 
importance.  First, this study defines different types of FR based on the type of market 
(i.e., the business market and the consumer market) in which the chain operates.  It 
unveils great opportunities for scholars in various disciplines to further investigate 
collective FR from the perceptions of various stakeholder groups.  Second, the multilevel 
model attempts to bridge the different perspectives of stakeholder groups nested within 
each firm.  It is important to obtain holistic views on FR and its impacts by employing the 
entire value delivery system. In this empirical study, all three key constituents of 
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franchise systems are simultaneously investigated: firms (or franchisors), downstream 
channel systems (or franchisees), and end consumers.  Potential firm strategies for 
performance enhancement through developing different stakeholder management 
strategies are provided.  Third, this study introduces institutional theory to scholars in the 
field of marketing channels while making a managerial contribution by defining 
important roles of stakeholder management on the carry-over effects of FR in the value 
delivery system. 
The following section provides the definition of two different types of reputation 
by framing FR using institutional theory and the notion of reputation carry-over effects is 
introduced.  Subsequently, the operationalization of the key constructs utilized in this 
study is thoroughly delineated in the methodology section.  Finally, the study concludes 
with a discussion of the results, and their implications for theory and practice together 
with consideration of its potential shortcomings.  
 
FIRM REPUTATION: A MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
Firms exist to create value for their stakeholders (Hillman & Keim 2001).  The 
value of firms can be assessed by stakeholders’ impressions and collective judgments on 
the practices of firms in the marketplace, (definitionally, FR) which can determine the 
success of firms, even their survival (Rao 1994).  FR is “observers’ collective judgments 
of a firm based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts 
attributed to the firm over time” (Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty 2009, p.34).  Since FR 
represents the accumulated impression that stakeholders form based on their past 
interactions with the firm (Brown et al. 2006; Fombrun and Shanley 1990), it is not a 
93 
 
single action of firms that determines the level of its FR, but the overall structure and 
actions that reflect the “sociocultural norms” of firms (Dacin 1997; DiMaggio 1988; 
Scott 1987, 1994).  In other words, firms ought to focus on their “proper” and 
“acceptable” decisions and ways of managing their value delivery systems to strengthen 
FR if the institutional environments of firms value FR. 
Institutional theory focuses on the resilience of firms by studying how they create, 
adapt, and develop their own social structures.  The ostensive recognition of institutional 
environments to understand the exchange systems between firms and their stakeholders is 
the key tenet of institutional theory.  The institutional environments are principally 
associated with cognitive legitimacy concerns (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002)
23
, and they 
can be defined as “taken-for granted social and cultural meaning systems, or norms, that 
define social reality” (Handelman and Arnold 1999, p.34).  The institutional 
environments, such as firms’ founding imprints, socio-cultural values (e.g., rules, 
expectations, and habitualized actions) and firm history, shape firms’ actions (Grewal and 
Dharwadkar 2002).  Rather than being strictly rational or strategic, the process of firms’ 
decision making involves the socio-culturally acceptable norms.  Institutional theory, 
hence, allows us to understand the processes and the patterns of actions of firms and how 
they evolve over time.   
                                                 
23
 Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) developed a framework on the institutional environment in 
marketing  channels.  They identified three institutional environments that influence the 
legitimacy of exchange relationships between firms and their channel members.  First, 
regulatory institutions refer to regulatory bodies that influence firms to act in certain ways (e.g., 
laws).  Second, normative institutions refer to professional and social obligations that shape 
firms’ actions in certain ways (e.g., trade associations, professional associations, and 
accreditation agencies). Third, cognitive institutions refer to cultural and social norms that drive 
firms to act in certain ways (e.g., habits and imprinting). Based on their definition, cognitive 
institutions are the most appropriate institutional environment which can help us understand the 
operative institutional environments.  
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A firm that treats its own FR as a valuable resource can be said to have been 
“institutionalized” (Rao 1994), and it is possible to predict the actions of such a firm.  In 
franchise systems, a firm that leads and socializes its franchisees cannot realize its 
intention to maintain good FR in the consumer market without having FR as a valuable 
resource in its institutional environments (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).  Actions of the 
firm toward its franchisees in the B2B market will influence how franchisees practice in 
the local market.  Through interactions with franchisors, an appreciative cultural meaning 
of FR of franchise systems will be delivered to the end consumers.  In particular, the 
value franchisors place on their FR is likely to be revealed in their franchise contracts that 
set clear guidelines for franchisees to follow.  One of the key strategic actions of 
franchisors seeking to implement institutional environments that value FR is to carefully 
develop franchise contracts so that franchisees are forced to conduct their operations in 
accordance with the value that franchisors place on their FR.  In sum, strategic actions of 
firms are derived from institutional environments that value FR in franchise systems, and 
different stakeholder groups would judge FR over the financial, social, and 
environmental impacts attributed to the firm that is institutionalized over time.   
  Internal Reputation. Internal reputation refers to the shared perceptions of firm 
identity among its internal stakeholders (e.g., employees, channel members, suppliers, 
and alliance partners) that closely interact with the firm and may have exposure to 
internal information.  These internal stakeholder groups work closely with a firm to 
create value for other stakeholder groups, such as the end consumers and community.  
Internal stakeholder groups such as employees, channel members, suppliers, and alliances 
have an internal viewpoint on FR (Albert and Whetten 1985; Davies, Chun, and Kamins 
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2010; Money et al. 2010).  The majority of these stakeholders have their interactions with 
the firm within a B2B context.  Human resources and networking are extremely valuable 
sources of competitive advantage for firms (Huselid 1995; Pfeffer 1994), and firms’ 
strategic management of their downstream channel members affect their financial 
performance (Delery & Doty 1996; Huselid 1995; Pfeffer 1994; Youndt, Snell, Dean, & 
Lepak 1996). Since the franchisees deliver goods and services as representatives of their 
franchisors in franchise systems, franchisees can help their franchisors to improve FR in 
the B2C market (e.g., Bitner 1990; Solomon et al. 1985).  Thus, internal FR in this study 
is captured from the perspectives of franchisees within a B2B context.    
External Reputation. External reputation can be defined as FR that is assessed by 
stakeholder groups that do not work together with firms to deliver value to the 
marketplace.  External reputation is formed by stakeholders like the ultimate consumers, 
governments, and communities, who do not have membership in the value delivery 
systems of the firms.  Firms that offer their products or services to the end consumers 
cannot avoid the effects of FR in the marketplace.  External reputation is defined as the 
accumulated impression of the brand value of the firms among stakeholders that have a 
limited amount of internal information about the focal firm (Davies, Chun, and Kamins 
2010).  In this study, external reputation of a firm is captured from the perspectives of 
consumers in the B2C market.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this study, I aim to understand (1) how relational strength (operationally, 
satisfaction) with stakeholders influences their assessment of FR, (2) how financial 
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performance influences stakeholders’ assessment of FR, (3) how firm strategies (i.e., as 
captured by experience, royalty rate, training, and dual distribution) influence 
stakeholders’ assessment of FR, and (4) how two different types of FR (i.e., internal FR 
and external FR) influence one another.  Figure 2-1 shows the hypothesized model of 
reputation carry-over effects in the B2B and B2C markets.  Using institutional theory, 
this paper examines how firms’ actions and practices, such as investing in relationships 
with their stakeholders, excellent financial performance, and firm strategies, are linked to 
firms’ institutionalized value of FR (operationally, internal and external FR).     
Satisfaction. 
Institutional theory explains that firms’ actions and practices are taken within 
socio-cultural expectations that are institutionalized.  If a firm values its FR in the 
marketplace, then its actions and practices in the marketplace are taken through 
institutionalized mechanisms of valuing FR (Scott and Meyer 1983).  Firms would take 
actions and practices in the marketplace to satisfy their key stakeholders since developing 
satisfying relationships with key stakeholders can improve FR (Anderson and Weitz 
1989; Barney and Hansen 1994; Hill 1995; Jones 1995; Wicks, Berman, and Jones 1999).  
In general, satisfaction drives the loyalty of stakeholders toward the firm and therefore 
enhances and strengthens the firm-stakeholder relationships (Anderson, Fornell, and 
Lehmann 1994).  Firms’ downstream channel members can either help firms to overcome 
the unexpected incidents in their value delivery systems or worsen FR (e.g., Farris, Olver, 
and de Kluyver 1989).  On the one hand, consumers’ perceived values of firms will be 
greatly influenced by the experiences through the interactions with downstream channel 
members (e.g., Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998).  On the other hand, consumer 
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dissatisfaction can be created by shirking behaviors of franchisees, wherein the overall 
value of firms may be compromised (Wathne and Heide 2000).  Thus, in franchise 
systems, harmonious franchisor and franchisee relationships are a key driver of success in 
franchise systems since satisfied franchisees are more likely to participate in collective 
activities and follow the guidelines of their franchisors (Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991; 
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999).   
Anderson and Sullivan (1993) have argued that the firm that satisfies its key 
stakeholders is less vulnerable to temporary quality declines or crisis.  When Toyota had 
to announce the mass product recall announcement in January 2010, there was great 
doubt whether Toyota would rebound in the marketplace (New York Times 2010; 
USATODAY 2010).  However, the stock price of Toyota came back to where it was 
before the mass product recall within a year (Yahoo 2012).  The financial market had 
confidence in Toyota since Toyota had satisfying relationships with its downstream 
channel members and consumers in the long run.  As Fombrun (1996) stated, ‘reputation 
breeds customer loyalty’ (p.78).  Even if some hardship befalls the firm, its satisfied 
stakeholders are more likely to remain loyal (Fornell 1992).  Furthermore, in franchise 
systems both franchisees and consumers evaluate FR through their past interactions (e.g., 
Roberts and Dowling 2002).  Since stakeholders assess FR based on their accumulative 
interactions with the firm over time (Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty 2009), one negative 
incident of the firm would likely be considered as a small piece of information that may 
even be dismissed as an aberration.  The level of satisfaction based on their cumulative 
past experiences with the firm will shape how they may judge FR of the focal firm.  
Investing in stakeholder satisfaction is equivalent to taking out an insurance policy.   
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Through the institutional mechanisms of firms that value their FR, firms attempt to 
increase their FR by establishing positive relationships with their stakeholders.  
Therefore, firms that have institutional mechanisms to improve FR will better manage 
their relationships with these two stakeholder groups.  Thus: 
H1a:  Franchisees’ satisfaction with their franchisors will be positively           
          related to franchisees’ perceptions of their internal FR. 
 
H1b:  Consumers’  satisfaction  with  their  franchise  systems  will  be         
          positively related to consumers’ perceptions of their external FR. 
 
Financial Performance. 
One of the key predictions of FR is the previous financial performance of firms 
(Carmeli and Tishler 2006; Roberts and Dowling 2002).  By dividing the overall FR into 
a component that is predicted by firms’ previous financial performance and another 
component that is “left over,” Roberts and Dowling (2002) investigated how the financial 
performance history affects firms’ current FR.  Even though both economic and social 
aspects of franchise systems are equally important for prospective franchisees to select a 
particular franchise system, franchisees join a franchise system if they see it as an 
attractive economic investment.  Franchisees learn the know-how of daily operations and 
business strategies and enjoy the easy market entry facilitated by the brand image of the 
focal firms in the B2C market.  If the businesses are profitable and franchisees can enjoy 
sustainable growth of their businesses, then the perceptions of franchisees toward the 
franchisor are positive.  Without the franchisors’ effort to assure the quality of products 
and services in their franchise systems, the local franchisee-level financial performance is 
likely to be poor.  Institutional theory (Powerll and DiMaggio 1991) would predict that 
firms with institutional norms of valuing FR would continually support their franchisees   
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FIGURE 2-1  
HYPOTHESIZED MODEL OF THE REPUTATION CARRY-OVER EFFECTS 
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to deliver competitive value to their end consumers.  As a result, franchisees that work in 
franchise systems that value FR in the marketplace can be expected to be profitable in 
their local markets.   
Financially successful firms can influence consumers’ overall perceptions of FR 
as well.  Firms with financial success are likely to invest more of their budgets for nation-
wide advertising and various promotions (Capon, Farley, and Hoenig 1990; Kirmani and 
Wright 1989).  Consumers do not directly observe the full range of activities of the 
franchise systems to form impressions about the firms.  They may, however, rely on 
firms’ frequent appearance in the marketplace through their promotional efforts as a 
signal of the firm’s overall quality.  Thus, financial strength of firms may be a signal of 
quality in the marketplace (Aaker and Jacobson 1994).  In the marketplace, strong 
financial performance of the firm will lead both stakeholder groups to believe that the 
firm is doing well. 
Therefore,  
H2a:  Franchisees’ financial performance will be positively related to     
          franchisees’ perceptions of their internal FR. 
 
H2b:  Franchisors’ financial performance will be positively related to  
          consumers’ perceptions of their external FR. 
 
Firm Strategies.  
The fundamental focus of strategy is to obtain an advantage over competitors that 
is sustainable over time (Barney 1986).  In franchise systems, firm strategies are 
developed to protect firms’ resources, such as brands, trade names, and business formats, 
since franchisors create these resources and sell the right to use them to franchisees.  This 
unique form of business allows the franchisors to generate revenue in the B2B market 
101 
 
through the collection of a lump-sum initial investment and an on-going royalty paid as a 
percentage of the franchisee’s sales in their operating units.  By forcing franchisees to 
follow standard procedure, franchisors monitor their franchisees more effectively and 
control the quality of products and services provided under their brand name.  Firm 
strategies will be discussed in this study as “the aggregate pattern among firms’ decisions 
that address the unique nature of franchise systems” (Combs and Castrogiovanni 1994, p. 
37).  Since the institutional environment of franchise systems that serve their franchisees 
is developed based on each franchisee’s unique structure, it is important to understand the 
impact of different firm strategies on FR.  In this study, four firm strategies are 
investigated, i.e., those related to (1) experience, (2) royalty rate, (3) training, and (4) 
dual distribution.  These four firm strategies were selected since information of these are 
readily available from public domain sources and since prospective franchisees and 
consumers can easily access this information.     
Experience. Institutional theory views a firm as an organic entity that is 
influenced by a complex environmental system and the firm forms its own “sociocultural 
norms” over time based on its institutional environments (Dacin 1997).  Franchisors 
acquire the total knowledge and capabilities from their cumulative franchising 
experiences and develop their own institutional environment within their franchise 
systems.  When a firm engages in a new activity for the first time, it needs to establish 
norms, standard operating procedures, and relationships with their franchisees (Shane and 
Foo 1999).  In time, it learns about routines, procedures, roles, and patterns for 
interacting with franchisees in ways that strengthen leadership in franchise systems (Scott 
1987; Biggart and Hamilton 1987).  It also helps the socialization of new franchisees into 
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the franchise system, establishes routines and procedures for supporting franchisees, and 
communicates effectively with its consumers (Hannan and Freeman 1984).  Through 
experience, firms are able to learn the most effective and efficient operating procedures.  
After gaining insights regarding these best practices, the firm is able to subsequently 
distribute its know-how to its franchisees (Bradach 1997; Hossain and Wang 2008; Knott 
2003).  Moreover, the experience of the firm signals sustainability and longevity of the 
firm to the marketplace.  The end consumers are more likely to be exposed to brands and 
trade names of franchise systems that have practiced their businesses in the marketplace 
for the long run.  Consumers are also likely to evaluate the qualities of products and 
services from firms with more experience move highly since these firms would have had 
time and resources to reinvent themselves to be more marketable.  Firms’ cumulative 
experience in the marketplace should, hence, contribute positively to consumers’ 
assessment FR in the B2C market as well.  In sum, firms with longer experience are 
likely to have better reputation in the marketplace.  The above suggests:  
H3a: Franchisors’ experience will be positively related to franchisees’   
          perceptions of their internal FR. 
 
H3b:  Franchisors’ experience will be positively related to consumers’  
          perceptions of their external FR. 
 
Royalty Rate.  Based on institutional theory, franchisors’ decisions on fee 
structure are closely related to institutionalizing socio-cultural values (e.g., rules, 
expectations, and habitualized actions) in franchise systems (e.g., Grewal and 
Dharwadkar 2002) since fee structure is an important mechanism to control and monitor 
franchisees.  Fee structure even indicates the quality of franchise systems (Lal 1990; Sen 
1993; Windsperger 2000).  From the logic of the institutional theory a firm’s appreciation 
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on its FR would be a key influencer to determine its fee structure.  There are two types of 
fees that firms can use to strategize and form their franchise systems: initial fees and 
ongoing royalties (Dant and Berger 1996).  The initial fee is a large initial lump-sum 
payment that franchisees have to pay in order to join a franchise system.  The royalties 
are imposed on revenues realized by the franchisees (IFA 2012) usually as a percent of 
their sales.  A firm often reduces its royalty rates when it increases the initial fees that are 
charged up-front.  For example, a start-up firm with low market awareness starts with a 
low initial fee since its FR is not yet established and the value of the brand in the 
marketplace is relatively unknown.   
Franchisors tend to lower the royalty rates in order to align their interests with 
those of their franchisees.  When the royalty rates are low, the motivation of franchisees 
is enhanced since lower loyalty rates mean increases in franchisees’ net revenues.  
Especially, firms set the royalty rate low when it is difficult for franchisors to monitor 
franchisees’ behaviors in the local market.  Franchisees are incentivized by paying a 
lower royalty rate to their firms, and firms can use this as a way to motivate their 
downstream channel members (Blair and Kaserman 1982; Rubin 1978).   
Royalty rates can also directly influence external FR in the B2C market.  For 
example, Burger King franchisees sued their firm over a $1 double cheeseburger 
promotion because the cost of selling this dollar menu item exceeded their promoted 
price (Huffingtonpost 2009).  Franchisees argued that there is no incentive for them to 
serve dollar menus in their units because it only benefits the firm while they lose money.  
Since royalty rate share to be paid as a percentage of revenue, such a promotional deal 
was deemed to be unfair to franchisees.  A consumer, who visits a local Burger King 
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restaurant after watching advertisings for such a promotion, would be very disappointed 
if the franchised unit did not provide the promotional deal that the consumer was 
interested in purchasing.  Such an exposed dispute between the firm and its franchisees 
may damage FR in the consumer market.  Thus, the royalty rate of the firm can influence 
both external and internal FR.  High royalty rates may negatively influence FR in 
stakeholders’ perceptions since the royalty rates influence franchisees’ choice of which 
goods to serve and how to set prices in their franchised units.  Therefore:   
H4a:  Franchisors’ royalty rate will be negatively related to franchisees’  
          perceptions of their internal FR. 
 
H4b:  Franchisors’ royalty rate will be negatively related to consumers’  
          perceptions of their external FR. 
 
 Training.  Internal stakeholders of a firm would be exposed to institutional 
environments and adapt to socio-cultural norms of the firm through its provision of 
training.  Training is an important process for a firm to integrate and socialize its 
downstream channel members (Ashforth and Mael 1989).  The new franchisees in 
franchise systems learn the institutionalized values and culture through training to truly 
become a part of their franchise systems (e.g., Eisenhardt 1988; Handelman and Arnold 
1999).  A firm can ensure that its franchisees are qualified to provide the standardized 
quality of goods and services through training (IFA 2012).  This part is critical for the 
firm to improve its FR, since it is at this stage when the firm can closely monitor the 
behaviors of franchisees.  Firms with a good reputation in the marketplace understand the 
importance of the training in terms of socializing their downstream channel members to 
appropriately represent and deliver the brand to ultimate consumers (Justis and Chan 
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1991; Litz and Stewart 2000).  Both firms and franchisees learn to communicate through 
this process.  The training process is not only important for franchisees to learn the know-
how of the firm to become successful agents, but also to adapt to the institutionalized 
values and culture of the franchise system (e.g., Eisenhardt 1988).  If franchisees become 
competent at delivering the standardized products and services through their participation 
in the training program, then the end consumers’ experience with firms is also likely to be 
pleasant.  Thus, training is an important tool for the firm to assure both its internal and 
external FR in the marketplace.  Hence, 
H5a:  Franchisors’ training will be positively related to franchisees’ perceptions  
          of their internal FR. 
 
H5b:  Franchisors’ training will be positively related to consumers’  
         perceptions of their external FR. 
 
Dual Distribution.  A firm’s dual distribution is a hybrid system involving the 
simultaneous use of vertical integration and market governance (Srinivasan 2006).  The 
proportion of a franchise system’s franchised units to the total number of its system-
operated units in the franchise system is the indicator of its dual distribution strategy.  
Dual distribution is based on the ability of a firm to manage complementarily between 
company-owned and franchised units (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Combs et al. 2011; 
Perryman and Combs 2012).  Franchisors gain competitive advantages in the marketplace 
by using dual distribution in their franchise systems (Dant and Kaufmann 2003).  Firms’ 
dual distribution captures the emphasis on the creation of intangible assets (e.g., 
development of firm specific downstream channel members, relationships, knowledge, 
and capabilities) (Dant, Kaufmann, and Paswan 1992).  There is a positive relationship 
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between dual distribution strategy and firm value (Srinivasan 2006).  Franchisees may 
attract consumers on the basis of the FR, but deliver inferior goods and services.  By 
having several company-owned units, firms can directly serve the ultimate consumers 
and their ongoing understanding of market operations allows firms to more effectively 
communicate with their downstream channel members and maintain control of their 
system (Dant and Kaufmann 2003).  The dual distribution can synergize the mutual 
learning process of the entire franchise systems between the firm and franchisees 
(Bradach 1997; Dant and Kaufmann 2003; Sorenson and SØrensen 2000).  Overall, dual 
distribution in franchise systems enables mitigation of contractual hazards, fosters the 
dynamics of learning, and has a positive impact on brand name value (Penard, Raynaud, 
and Saussier 2003; Sorenson and SØrensen 2000; Srinivasan 2006).  Institutional theory 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991) would predict that firms with the dual distribution strategy 
are better at adequately utilizing the institutional environments throughout their franchise 
systems.  Dual distribution strategy is equally relevant to consumers since firm strategies 
shape how the firm is portrayed in the consumer market.  This argument leads to: 
H6a:  Franchisors’ dual distribution (the greater the proportion of  
          franchised  units) will be  positively   related  to franchisees’  
          perceptions of their internal FR. 
 
H6b:  Franchisors’ dual distribution (the greater the proportion of  
          franchised  units) will be  positively   related  to consumers’  
          perceptions of their external FR. 
 
FR Carry-Over Effects 
In this study, a reputation carry-over effect can be defined as the impact of one 
stakeholder group’s perceptions on FR on another stakeholder group’s perceptions on FR.  
In previous FR literature, the carry-over effect of FR is used in various contexts (Beatty 
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et al 1998; Kang 1998; Mayer 2006; Roberts and Dowling 1997).  For example, Beatty 
and colleagues (1998) suggested that the reputation of a client is positively related to that 
of its underwriter (p.160) since the underwriter’s assurance-based reputation determines 
the level of uncertainty about the future trajectory of the client firm’s profitability.  Kang 
(2008) examined how the interlocks of a board director in various firms influence the 
overall FR of each firm.  In particular, if an interlocking board director from an accused 
firm held an audit or governance chair position of another firm, then significant 
reputational penalties could be expected.  Roberts and Dowling (1997) used the term of 
“carry-over” effect of past FR to the future FR by investigating whether good reputations 
help firms sustain their superior performance once they have attained a strong position in 
the marketplace.  However, in this study, the carry-over effects of FR refer to how firms’ 
internal stakeholders may influence external stakeholders’ perceptions on FR and how 
firms’ external stakeholders may influence internal stakeholders’ perceptions on FR (e.g., 
Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and Sever 2006; Stuart 2000).  The firms with good 
external reputations tend to have advantages in the B2C market, and the firms with good 
internal reputations tend to have advantages in the B2B market.  In other words, carry-
over effects refer to good external reputation not only providing advantages to firms’ 
position in the B2C market but also in the B2B market, and vice versa.     
FR in the B2B market can carry over to boost the perceived quality of a focal firm 
in the B2C market.  Firms that are better able to manage their FR with one stakeholder 
group can use their ability to manage their relationships with other stakeholder groups.  
In service literature, scholars have found evidence that more satisfied service providers 
tend to create more positive service experiences for their consumers, and consumers are 
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more satisfied (Bitner 1990; Solomon et al. 1985).  Since services are inseparable from 
service providers, their job satisfaction is very relevant to their interactions with 
consumers.  Since franchisees represent their firms and interact with consumers on a 
daily basis, franchisees attitudes toward their parent firms can be instrumental in shaping 
the external reputation of the firms in the B2C market.  Internal reputation influences 
external reputation in the B2C market through the quality of interaction processes.  In 
other words, there will be a positive internal reputation carry-over effect on external 
reputation (e. g., Megginson and Weiss 1991).  Reputable franchise systems can attract 
more qualified and motivated franchisees to be a part of their success story (Caves and 
Murphy 1976; Jambilingam and Nevin 1999; Mathewson and Winter 1985; Shane 1998).  
Thus, I hypothesize: 
H7a:  Consumers’  perceptions   of  franchisors’  external  FR  will  be  
          positively related to franchisees’ perceptions of their internal FR. 
 
H7b:  Franchisees’ perceptions   of  franchisors’  internal  FR  will  be  
          positively related to consumers’ perceptions of their external FR. 
 
METHOD 
Data Collection. 
Research Context. Franchise systems in the food and beverage industry were 
chosen to test the proposed hypotheses.  In franchise systems, the channel members, 
franchisees, provide products and services and encounter consumers on a daily basis.  
The internal FR based on franchisor-franchisee relationships are hypothesized to carry 
over to the external FR while franchisees create brand experience for individual 
consumers.  Potential franchisees select a particular franchise system to join due to its FR 
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in the consumer market.  In addition, the representative names of firms and brands for 
both franchisor firms and franchisees are identical in the consumer market since 
franchisees use their franchisor’s brand names and logos during the contract period to 
serve consumers.  Studying franchise systems minimizes consumers’ confusion related to 
differentiating reputations of different brands for manufacturers, service providers, and 
retailers.  Finally, it is convenient to identify franchisees in franchise systems since 
contact information of different franchise outlets can be easily found in either systems’ 
websites or secondary sources (e.g., YellowPages).  One particular industry, the food and 
beverage industry, is selected since every industry has different characteristics, norms, 
and cultures that may influence variances between firms.  The food and beverage industry 
is an industry in which franchising is a popular form of governance structure.  Thus, the 
prospective survey participants for the consumer level survey can be easily approached.  
Franchise systems in the food and beverage industry regulate their franchisees to strictly 
follow standard procedures in order to offer qualified products and services to the end 
consumers (Dant and Schul 1992).  Since the research goal is to investigate the carry-
over effects of FR from the consumer market to the business market and vice versa, 
surveying the food and beverage industry seemed most logical.   
  Data Source. The multilevel approach is applied to conduct surveys from 
franchisors, their franchisees, and consumers since the empirical studies aim to 
understand three constituencies of franchise systems with a holistic view (Dant 2008).  
The empirical results reported below are based on a multi-level sample survey of 29 
franchisors, 210 franchisees belonging their franchise systems (average of 7 franchisees 
per system), and 925 consumers (average of 32 consumers per system).  In the first phase 
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I selected target franchise systems in the food and beverage industry based on Bond’s 
franchise guide and Enterprise magazine.  I developed a list of contact information with 
146 franchise systems that operate in the U.S. market.  A total of 146 franchise systems 
was individually contacted via email and/or phone.  Of the contacted franchise systems, 
62 executives or marketing directors responded after the initial contact.  Once they agreed 
to participate in the franchisor survey, an email along with the URL of the online survey 
site was sent out.  In order to survey qualified key informants, the respondents’ positions 
and their levels of knowledge were prescreened, and their willingness to participate in the 
survey using the online survey instrument was ascertained (Campbell 1955).  In the 
recruitment, I incentivized franchisors by providing a customized report for their 
franchise system.  Of the 62 franchisors, 29 franchisors finally agreed to participate in the 
on-line based survey.  The response rate based on the pre-committed sample is 47%, 
which is above the acceptable levels (greater than 40 percent) for surveying executives 
(e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Heide and John 1990; Mohr and Spekman 1994). 
After the first phase of the data collection was completed, the second phase of 
data collection was developed by generating a franchisees list for the 29 participating 
franchise systems.  I asked franchisors whether they would cooperate in administering the 
surveys to their franchisees and consumers.  Three franchisors out of 29 franchisors 
endorsed the survey by sending out the recruiting emails directly to their franchisees.  
The recruitment email was sent out along with the URL of the online survey site for the 
franchisee-level survey.  Then I called each franchised outlet to recruit franchisees to 
participate in the franchisee-level online survey.  Unfortunately at this point, participation 
remained low.  Only 67 franchisees participated in the online survey; nine of which had 
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to be dropped due to incomplete surveys.  Subsequently, individual franchisees were 
contacted via phone and questionnaire items were read through the phone.  Each survey 
took about fifteen to twenty minutes, and one third of the contacted franchisees 
participated in the survey.  Overall, 58 franchisee-level surveys were done online, and 
152 surveys were completed through landline communication.
24
  A total of 210 
franchisees level surveys were completed.  
The last phase of the data collection was aimed at consumers.  A total of 498 
consumer-level data surveys were collected from students in a large, Midwestern 
university and 427 were collected in publicly accessible locations in nearby metropolitan 
Midwestern cities.
25
  The off-classroom surveys were conducted on an individual 
intercept basis.  In the selection process, the respondents for the consumer survey were 
asked whether they had patronized one of 29 franchise brands in the past.  If potential 
respondents qualified, then a short consumer survey was handed out.  Three individuals 
had to be approached for every consumer-level survey on the average. A total of 925 
usable consumer level surveys are used in this analysis.  
In order to test the non-response bias of the sample, a telephone survey was 
undertaken on a random sample of marketing executives in firms and franchisees who did 
                                                 
24
 For the franchisee-level surveys, a MANOVA test was conducted to examine a multivariate effect of the 
data collection method using Internal Reputation, Franchisees’ Satisfaction, and Franchisees’ Financial 
Performance as dependent variables (F (3, 206) = .84, n.s.).  The test result confirms that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the survey data collection method in the franchisee dataset.  
Hence, data from both groups were combined and treated as a homogenous sample for subsequent 
inferential analysis. 
25
 For the consumer-level surveys, a similar MANOVA test was conducted to test a multivariate effect of 
the data collection method using External Reputation and Consumers’ Satisfaction as dependent 
variables (F (2, 922) = .78, n.s.).  The test result once again confirms that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the survey data collection method in the consumer dataset.  Hence, data 
from both groups were combined and treated as a homogenous sample for subsequent inferential 
analysis. 
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not participate in the survey.  The short survey that contained the most representative 
item from each construct was created to survey the non-responders over the phone (Hill, 
et al., 1997).  Finally, 6 firms (20% of the total firm-level sample) and 30 franchisees 
(14% of the total franchisee-level sample) participated in the phone survey.  No 
statistically significant differences between responders and non-responders to the 
questionnaire were detected.
26
   
Measures 
Variables employed in the surveys to franchisors, franchisees, and consumers are listed in 
Appendix A.  We showcase the inter-item correlations for measures employed in 
franchisee and consumer surveys, respectively (Appendices E and F).  To test the model, 
three different levels of data have been employed.  Appendix A provides a complete list 
of measurement items and the factor loadings for each construct used in the study.  Table 
2-1 displays the descriptive statistics and inter-trait correlations of all study variables in 
all three levels (i.e., firm (franchisor), franchisee, and consumer).  The Cronbach’s alpha 
indices indicated that the construct measures were psychometrically sound.  More 
specifically, for all constructs, no coefficient alpha values are lower than the 
conventionally acceptable value of .70, and the average variance extracted (AVE) of all 
constructs is greater than .50 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Bagozzi 1991; Hair et al., 
                                                 
26
 In order to test the non-response bias, a MANOVA test was conducted to test the group difference 
between respondents and non-respondents using all ten latent construct variables (See Appendix E) as 
dependent variables (F (10, 23) = .23, n.s.).  The test result confirmed that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the respondents and non-respondents in the franchisor dataset.  Also, a 
similar test was conducted to test the non-response bias for the franchisee dataset.  The group mean 
differences for fifteen latent construct variables were compared for respondents and non-respondents, and 
there was no significant difference between two groups (F (15, 224) = 1.26, n.s.). Hence, data from both 
groups were combined and treated as a homogenous sample for subsequent inferential analysis. 
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2010).   Discriminant validity of all latent constructs is supported since the AVE for each 
pair of constructs exceeds the squared correlations, the shared variance, between them 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981, pp.45-46; See Table 2-1).  After assessing their psychometric 
properties the multi-item scales shown in Appendix A were subsequently collapsed into 
construct scores for inferential analyses.  
Internal Reputation.  Franchisees’ perspectives on FR of firms were measured by 
employing a five-item internal reputation scale adapted and modified from Wang et al., 
2006 and Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000.  Since the available firm reputation scales 
did not adequately capture the nature of firms’ internal reputations in the business market, 
the scale was modified.  For example, the original item of “customers’ overall 
perceptions of total experience in the firm are rather good” was modified to “my overall 
perceptions of total experience with this franchise system are very good.”  All items in 
the measurement model were anchored with a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7).  The coefficient alpha was .93 and the 
variance extracted was estimated as .90.   
External Reputation.
27
 Consumers’ perspectives on firms’ reputation in the 
marketplace were measured by employing a five-item external reputation scale 
(Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000; Wang et al. 2006; α = .81, AVE = .68) that was 
                                                 
27
 In this study internal FR and external FR are defined as separate constructs because the two terms differ 
due to differences in information availability, interaction frequency; moreover, interaction interests are 
different for internal stakeholders versus external stakeholders.  Internal stakeholders have more internal 
information about the focal firm, and more frequently interact with key representatives of the focal firm, 
and have a greater level of economic interest in such exchange relationships.  Expectations of internal 
stakeholders in exchange relationships with the focal firm and their experiences are likely to be different 
compared to external stakeholders.  Although internal FR and external FR are defined as separate 
constructs, both essentially measure overall FR from two different populations.  Thus, the parallel scales 
for internal FR and external FR are used while the contextual differences of targeting two different 
stakeholder groups.  It would not be appropriate to compare the findings of franchisee-level models and 
consumer-level models if parallel scales are not used for internal FR and external FR.  
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also adapted and modified.  One scale item had to be dropped due to its low factor 
loading on the construct.  Even though internal reputation measures and external 
reputation measures are extracted from firm reputation literature, the scales were 
carefully modified to tap into FR in two different markets.   
Satisfaction. Both franchisees and consumers evaluated their satisfaction with 
their firms and brands.  The four item scale of satisfaction (α franchisees = .93, AVE franchisees 
= .90; α consumers = .95, AVE consumers = .94) adapted from Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 
(1990) and Ganesan (1994).  One of four items in the satisfaction construct was dropped 
in order to meet the minimum requirement for reliability at both levels.  Each scale item 
was modified to fit the context of the survey participants.   
Firm Strategies. Key informants in franchisor firms were asked to rate four firm-
level variables such as experience, royalty rate, training, and dual distribution. The 
Experience variable was computed by subtracting the first year of franchising the system 
from 2012 (mean = 21.55; s.d. = 15.37).  Royalty rate is the on-going royalty fee that is 
required and is explained as a percent of franchisees’ sales (mean = 5.05; s.d. = 1.48).  
Training is the total duration of any initial training sessions, and an open-ended question 
was converted to a numeric variable as the total training days.  Dual distribution is the 
proportion of franchised units over the total operating units of a franchise system 
(Srinivasan 2006; mean = 0.82; s.d. = 0.26).  
FR Carry-Over Effects. The average of internal reputation rated by franchisees 
(A_INFR_EE) and the average of external reputation rated by consumers 
(A_EXFR_CON) are constructed as the firm-level variables by aggregating the responses  
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of franchisees and consumers within the firm.  Theoretically, the firm level analysis for 
these internal and external FRs are necessary in this study since executives in firms 
develop strategies to enhance FR in the marketplace (Schneider, White, and Paul 1998).  
Both the aggregation statistics and the theoretical reasoning provide sufficient support for 
aggregation. 
 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Two linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are developed to 
estimate franchisees’ perceptions on internal FR in the B2B market and consumers’ 
perceptions on external FR in the B2C market (See Table 2-2).  In the franchisee model 
four of the seven hypothesized relationships are supported (Adjusted    = .31, F (7, 202) 
= 14.79, p < .001), and in the consumer model five of the seven hypothesized 
relationships are supported (Adjusted    = .69, F (7, 917) = 287.93, p < .001).  
Multicollinearity was determined to not be an issue in both linear models since all VIF 
values were below 5 (Hair et al. 2006; Mason and Perreault 1991).   
Satisfaction.  In the franchisee model, H1a predicts that franchisees’ satisfaction 
of their franchise systems is positively associated with their assessment of internal FR in 
the B2B market.  In the consumer model, H1b predicts that consumers’ satisfaction 
influenced their assessment on external FR in the B2C market.  Both H1a (        
      and H1b (              are supported.  The result shows that franchisors need 
to enhance satisfaction of their key internal and external stakeholder groups since 
satisfied stakeholders are likely to rate firms’ FR more positively.   
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Financial Performance.  H2a predicts that franchisees’ financial performance 
will positively influence their perceptions of internal FR, whereas H2b predicts that 
firms’ overall financial performance will positively influence consumers’ perceptions of 
external FR.  Both hypotheses are supported.  The results show that franchisees’ 
profitability in their local units enhances their assessments on internal FR (H2  
           .  Also, consumers’ judgment of external FR is positively influenced by 
firms’ financial performance in the marketplace (H2b:              .  In sum, 
financial performance is found to be a significant and positive driver that improves FR in 
both the B2B market and the B2C market.  
Firm Strategies.  Four firm-level strategies (i.e., experience, royalty rate, training, 
and dual distribution) were used as predictors of stakeholders’ assessment of FR.  H3a 
and H3b test the positive influences of the firms’ experience on FR.  H3a predicts a 
positive relationship between firms’ experience and internal FR is supported (  
           .  But H3b, which predicts the positive relationship between firms’ 
experience and external FR, is not found to be statistically significant (            .  
Hence, more experienced firms that have institutionalized processes for regulating, 
validating, and habitualizing their franchisees into their franchise systems, are more 
likely to have stronger internal reputations among franchisees since internal stakeholders 
like franchisees are the main beneficiaries of firms’ accumulated knowledge that is 
integrated in franchise systems over time.  However, firms’ experience does not appear to 
directly influence consumers’ judgments on external FR in the B2C markets.   
H4a and H4b test the hypothesized negative influences of the firms’ royalty rate on FR.  
H4a predicts a negative relationship between firms’ royalty rates and internal FR.  H4a is 
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not supported, but it is found to be statistically significant and directionally different 
(             .  H4b predicts a negative relationship between firms’ royalty rate and 
external FR, and is supported (              .  Before a franchise contract between 
the firm and its franchisee is signed, the franchisee is aware of the royalty rate and is 
“locked-in” for the contractual period (e.g., fifteen to twenty years).  Hence, franchisees 
learn to tolerate the agreed royalty rate, which may explain the positive influence of 
royalty rate on franchisees’ judgments of internal FR.  However, franchise systems with 
high royalty rates are more likely to have lower external FR reputation, the prediction of 
H4b.  Franchisees have to reduce their operational costs in order to make royalty 
payments if they want to optimize their revenue.  This may lead franchisees to behave 
opportunistically or shirk (i.e., reduce their efforts and free ride on the brand image of  
the franchise system).  Moreover, the royalty rate influences franchisees’ participation in 
firm-level promotions and pricing strategies of products and services.  As a result, the 
quality of products and services that are consumed in the B2C market may be indirectly 
influenced by such franchisees’ actions that are traceable to the royalty rates fixed by the 
franchisors.  
H5a and H5b tested the predicted positive influences of the firms’ training on FR.  
H5a predicted a positive impact of firms’ training on internal FR but was rejected 
(           .  But H5b that predicted a positive impact of firms’ training on external 
FR is supported (             .  Taken together, the results suggest that franchisees 
seem to believe that much of their learning has occurred in the early years of their 
partnership.  Since franchisees learned by operating their own units and develop their 
own effective and efficient ways to conduct their practices, their assessments of internal 
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FR in the B2B market may not be significantly related to the firms’ training.  The average 
age of association with the franchise system of the franchisees in the sample is 4.01 years 
and their tenure ranges from 2 to 18 years.  It seems like the impact of initial training 
provided by the franchisor erodes as franchisees become more familiar with their own 
operating experience.  This effect was also observed in Dant et al. (2013).  However, 
consumers view firms with longer training periods as more reputable than firms with 
shorter training periods.  It is possible that consumers are more likely to experience better 
products and services from franchise systems that offer longer training to their 
franchisees.  
H6a and H6b predicted positive influences of the firms’ dual distribution on FR, 
respectively on internal FR and external FR.  Both H6a (            and H6b    
          are rejected in that the effect failed to reach the requisite level of statistical 
significance.  It appears then that even though previous literature recognizes the benefits 
of dual distribution strategy on the firm-level performance (Srinivasan 2006; Dant and 
Kaufmann 2003), these dual distribution strategies do not influence stakeholders’ 
judgments on FR.  These results show that the dual distribution strategy of franchisors 
does not directly influence either franchisees’ judgments on internal FR in the B2B 
market or consumers’ judgments on external FR in the B2C markets.   
In sum, three of the eight firm strategy related hypotheses are supported.  
Franchisors’ experience is positively associated with franchisees’ perceptions of internal 
reputation.  While high royalty rate enhanced internal reputation in the B2B market, high 
royalty rate decreased external reputation in the B2C market.  The long initial training 
can help franchise systems to establish a good external reputation in the B2C market.  
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The results of these tests show that firms’ strategy differently influences each stakeholder 
group.  Firms should recognize these differences as they forge future strategies to 
enhance their FR in the B2B and B2C markets. 
Reputation Carry-Over Effects.  H7a and H7b propose reputation carry-over 
effects.  H7a predicts the reputation carry-over effect of external FR in the B2C market to 
internal FR in the B2B market.  In the franchisee model, the aggregated consumers’ 
perspective on external reputation (A_EXFR_CON) is employed to predict the carry-over 
effect of external FR on internal FR.  H7b predicts the reputation carry-over effect of 
internal FR in the B2B market to external FR in the B2C market.  In the consumer model, 
the aggregated franchisee’ perspective on internal reputation (A_INFR_EE) is employed 
to predict the carry-over effect of internal FR on external FR.  Both H7a (        
     and H7b (             are found to be statistically significant and directionally 
supported.  The implication would be that reputable firms that establish good 
relationships with their franchisees in the B2B market will also be well regarded in the 
B2C market.  Similarly, reputable firms that establish good relationships with their end 
consumers will attract more qualified franchisees to join their franchise systems.  Thus, 
reputation carry-over effects mutually reinforce each other. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is critical for firms to carefully nurture and cultivate their reputation in the 
marketplace to ensure competitiveness and longevity.  This study broadens our 
understanding of FR by defining two different types of FR (namely, internal and external 
FR), identifying antecedents of FR, and demonstrating the carry-over effects of FR.  I 
theorize the relationships between satisfaction, financial performance, and firm strategies 
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and FR using institutional theory.  The institutionalized process of reputation formation is 
constantly evolving for any given firm.  Actions of firms are influenced by the 
institutionalized way of doing things (e.g., whether a firm has a consumer-centric view, 
whether it emphasizes profit generation, or whether it is more socially-minded), and the 
collective judgments on FR rated by stakeholders are driven by firms’ actions in the 
marketplace.  By developing a theoretical framework to explain the relationships between 
firm strategies and FR rated by two different stakeholder groups, this paper offers 
insights to firms struggling to create and maintain their desired reputation in the 
marketplace among different stakeholder groups.  Studying FR from the various 
perspectives of stakeholders’ has been identified as a future research agenda for the field 
of FR (Hillman and Keim 2001; Jones 1995).  The carry-over effects of FR shed light on 
the dilemma faced by managers in firms’ stakeholder management (Berman et al., 1999).  
Although ideas regarding reputation and stakeholder management have not received 
much attention in the marketing literature, the reputation and stakeholder management 
seems of interest since they are linked with outcomes deemed important to the firm.  
Moreover, in the stakeholder management literature, a stakeholder mismatch issue 
between the theoretical development and the operationalization of empirical studies 
remains a concern and a challenge (Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; Wood and Jones 
1995).  
Theoretical Implications. 
This study makes several theoretical contributions to the FR and stakeholder 
management literatures.  First, the two different types of FR (i.e., internal reputation and 
external reputation) are identified and defined by the characteristics of different 
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stakeholder groups (i.e., franchisees and consumers, respectively).  The most common 
reputation quotient developed by Fombrun and his colleagues (2000) contains six 
different dimensions of FR (i.e., emotional appeal, vision and leadership, products and 
services, workplace environment, social and environmental responsibility, and financial 
performance). However, all six different dimensions of FR may not be applicable for 
different stakeholder groups since they differ in their perspectives on the focal firms.  
Internal stakeholders like employees view a dimension like “workplace environment” as 
more important than “financial performance” when they evaluate firms they work for.  
But, external stakeholders are like a community and view a dimension like “social and 
environmental responsibility” as more important than “emotional appeal.”  In addition, 
the level of information asymmetry between firms and different stakeholder groups vary.  
Compared to internal stakeholders (i.e., who frequently interact with a firm and know 
more internal information about the firm), external stakeholders (i.e., who rarely interact 
directly with the firm and just have an overall impression) cannot answer many questions 
in such FR surveys.  Thus, understanding how different stakeholder groups judge the 
overall FR and which firm strategies influence stakeholders’ assessments of FR should 
help franchisors strategically balance different stakeholder groups’ interests.  
The findings of this study are based on the unidimensional measure of overall 
internal and external FR.  Internal reputation is defined as the shared perceptions of firm 
identity among its internal stakeholders (i.e., stakeholder groups that closely interact with 
the firm and may have been exposed to internal information).  External reputation is 
defined as the accumulated impression on the brand value of the firms among 
stakeholders such as final consumers that have limited amounts of internal information 
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about the firm.  Identifying two different types of FR allows us to better understand the 
dynamics of FR and reputation management from different stakeholders’ perspectives.   
Second, this multilevel investigation bridges the gap between different approaches 
employed by B2C and B2B marketing studies.  While B2C studies focus on consumers’ 
perspectives on FR, B2B studies focus on reputational impacts by developing firms’ 
networks with new strategic partners or supply chain members.  Having the holistic view 
of FR is critical for firms since different stakeholder groups may influence one another to 
judge FR in the marketplace (i.e., the carry-over effect strongly supported by my 
empirical findings).  The findings show that the levels of satisfaction and financial 
performance are important antecedents for firms to improve FR in both the B2B and the 
B2C markets.  Thus, establishing good relationships with stakeholders, strong firm-level 
financial performance, and supporting downstream channel members to excel in the 
marketplace are important for firms to enhance their overall reputation.   
However, firms’ strategies of experience, royalty rate, training, and dual 
distribution appear to have different impacts on the two different stakeholder groups.  
While franchisees are positively influenced by firms’ experience and royalty rate, 
consumers are negatively influenced by the royalty rate but are positively influenced by 
firms’ training.  Franchisors with more franchising experience are likely to have strong 
internal FR as perceived by their franchisees.  Since more experienced franchisors have 
more opportunities to establish their institutionalized environments, franchisors with 
more experiences are better able to share their accumulated knowledge to their 
franchisees. Moreover, franchisees are likely to view a higher royalty rate as assisting 
their franchisors to become better leaders.  Franchisees may believe that franchisors’ 
125 
 
endeavors to protect the strength of their brand should be incentivized through on-going 
royalty payments.  Hence, franchisees learn to tolerate the agreed-up on royalty rate, 
which may explain the positive influence of the royalty rate on franchisees’ judgments of 
internal FR.  However, consumers’ perceptions of external FR may be negatively 
influenced by franchise systems with high royalty rates because the quality of products 
and services that are served in the B2C space may be lowered due to franchisees’ 
obligations of royalty payments.  In order for franchisees to optimize their profits, 
franchisees may set prices high if franchisors allow setting prices in franchisee owned 
units, minimize costs by purchasing poor quality materials, and not participate in national 
marketing promotions.  Taken together, franchisors may consider following the industry 
average for setting their royalty rates in franchise contracts or alternatively, franchisors 
should attempt to find the optimal level of royalty rate that balanced out internal FR in 
the B2B market and external FR in the B2C market.  Furthermore, other surprising 
findings were the insignificant relationship between training and internal FR while the 
relationship between training and external FR was supported.  It is possible that after 
franchisees have accumulated their own operating experiences, the initial training 
provided by franchisors is not seen as directly influencing when franchisees profits and 
hence their judgments on the internal FR of franchisors.  The results show that the impact 
of the initial training provided by the franchisors erodes as franchisees become more 
familiar with their own operating experiences.  However, the length of the initial training 
positively influences consumers’ perceptions on external FR possibly because consumers 
are more likely to experience quality assured and standard products and services from 
franchise systems that offer longer training to their franchisees.  Lastly, dual distribution 
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strategy has no impact on either stakeholder group when they assess FR.  Even though 
previous findings supported the relationship between dual distribution strategy and the 
firm-level financial performance, dual distribution strategy does not seem to influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions on FR.   
These show that firms’ strategy may have different impacts in the B2B market 
and the B2C market.  For example, Dant (2008) has cited that the field of franchising can 
gain more insights by understanding the interactions among the three key constituents of 
franchise systems (i.e., franchisors, their franchisees, and the end consumers).  This study 
broadens our understanding by examining the impact of firms’ relationship and strategies 
on established FR on the perceptions of both franchisees and consumers.  In addition, the 
carry-over effect of external reputation to internal reputation and the carry-over effect of 
internal reputation to external reputation are confirmed.  Without investigating FR in the 
B2B market and the B2C market, it is impossible to speculate how FR is assessed by 
different stakeholders.  Thus, discussing the influential firms’ strategies to FR in the B2B 
market and the B2C market provides avenues for studying stakeholder management and 
such investigations should normatively employ a multilevel analytical approach. Future 
research may broaden the scope of stakeholder management by examining the tradeoffs 
of firm strategies to balance different interests of each stakeholder group.   
Third, understanding the relationship between firms’ actions and FR and the 
carry-over effects of FR using institutional theory adds great value to this field of study.  
Even though Grewal and Dharwadlar (2002) introduced the conceptual framework for the 
role of the institutional environment in marketing channels, institutional theory has not 
received enough attention from scholars in the field of marketing.  Using institutional 
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theory, this study explains (1) how firms’ actions are derived by their institutional 
environments; (2) how their downstream channel members and end consumers are 
influenced by firms’ actions that are influenced by institutional environments; and (3) 
why shaping institutional environments of firms are important for them to improve their 
FR.   
Fourth, the multilevel approach is adopted in my investigation to study 
franchisors, their franchisees, and consumers.  It addresses the call to simultaneously 
study the three core-constituencies of franchise systems to get a holistic view of the 
franchising phenomenon (Dant 2008).  Moreover, how different stakeholder groups 
evaluate the firms’ current standing in the marketplace is investigated by defining two 
different types of FR (i.e., internal and external FR).  Previous FR studies have selected 
only one particular stakeholder group such as employees, suppliers, or consumers if they 
have employed primary datasets.  Otherwise, the separate attributes of Fortune or KLD 
scales are used to represent different stakeholder groups’ perspectives on FR.  However, 
this multilevel study demonstrates how franchisors’ strategies for their downstream 
channel members (franchisees) may influence various stakeholder groups in the entire 
value delivery system.  Since firms’ strategic actions in the marketplace can be used as 
signaling information for stakeholders to evaluate FR, this study will help the field to 
acknowledge these impacts.  Moreover, franchisors’ strategic variables are collected from 
the firm level and the evaluation of franchisees and consumers on FR are collected 
separately.  This also expands our understanding of the impact of FR on different 
stakeholders, not only from the perspectives of franchisors, but from their stakeholders.  
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Managerial Implications. 
One factor of the FR equation that can be controlled by a firm is the strategy it 
chooses to employ in relation to the development of reputation.  Strategy is a complex 
factor that encompasses many elements depending on what is to be planned and achieved.  
FR in the marketplace will help franchising firms protect critical resources, such as 
brands and trademarks.  Some companies have not been able to recover from negative 
incidents and have been forced to abandon their brands and trademarks to help establish a 
new reputation.  Phillip Morris and Valujet are examples of firms that were eventually 
forced to change their name due to the insurmountable damage to their reputation.  Firms 
that have a higher reputation are better able to withstand negative incidents in the 
marketplace than firms that have a lower reputation.   
Based on the findings of this study, firms’ strategies based on experience, royalty 
rate, and training in franchise systems appear to predict FR perceived by franchisees and 
consumers.  In franchisees’ perceptions, royalty fees may prevent the double-side moral 
hazard of a franchisor by compensating franchisors’ efforts and support (Lal 1990; 
Lafontaine 1992; Mathewson and Winter 1985; Sen 1993).  Moreover, franchisees view 
firms’ experiences to strengthen their franchise systems to be more reputable in the B2B 
market, while consumers view firms’ training as strengthening their franchise systems 
and make them more reputable in the B2C market.  Firms’ actions in the marketplace 
have different reactions in the B2B market and the B2C market.   
However, the study also finds support for both reputational carry-over effects: (1) 
the carry-over effect of external reputation on internal reputation, which is analogous to 
pull strategy and (2) the carry-over effect of internal reputation on external reputation, 
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which is equivalent to push strategy.  Previously, push and pull strategies of firms were 
often viewed from the perspectives of manufacturers in operations management (Cachon 
2004; Deleersnyder et al., 1989; Van der Lann et al., 1999).  Unfortunately ignored were 
the different strategies to enhance profit through influencing two key stakeholders in 
value delivery systems (i.e., downstream channel members like franchisees and 
consumers).  On the one hand, franchise systems that prefer to use pull strategy should 
maintain good relationships with their ultimate consumers, have strong financial 
performance, lower the royalty rate, and increase the initial training period to their 
franchisees.  Even though establishing good firm-franchisee relationships in franchise 
systems is an important task, it would be better for marketing managers to set the 
threshold level benchmark to maintain good standing among franchisees.  Firms’ 
investments to strengthen downstream channel networks may be disposed if franchisees 
leave franchise systems.  Thus, it would be better off for firms to strengthen their external 
FR by employing pull strategy and benefiting from the reputation carry-over effect from 
the B2C market to the B2B market.  On the other hand, franchise systems that prefer to 
use push strategy should establish good relationships with their franchisees, support 
franchisees to be more profitable, enhance franchising experiences, and increase the 
royalty rate.  Without understanding institutionalized norms and cultures of franchise 
systems, franchisees may not agree with firms’ actions and strategies in the marketplace 
that indirectly affect financial performance of franchisees.  Thus, it would be better for 
firms to strengthen their internal FR by employing push strategy and benefiting from 
reputation carry-over effects from the B2B market to the B2C market.   
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So, which would be the most impactful strategy for firms to utilize?  Previous 
studies on push-pull strategies in communication and network development agree that 
firms are better off by using both push and pull strategies.  Liu and his colleagues (2004) 
have demonstrated that the benefit of balancing push and pull strategies in data gathering 
and dissemination in large wireless networks.  This study found that the combination of 
push and pull strategies perform better than either pure push or pure pull strategies.  
Sands (2003) also suggested that firms should utilize their websites, which are the most 
controllable electronic consumer relationship management tool available to firms, more 
conscientiously for their push-pull strategies in communication.  As a means to pull 
strategy firms to provide information that consumers may be interested in through their 
websites using outbound marketing mechanisms.  When consumers’ information, such as 
e-mail addresses, is captured from visits to a website, firms can use pull strategy by 
proactively engaging with consumers.  In sum, firms can manage their stakeholders 
through balancing both push and pull strategies in communication.  Since the findings 
suggest that even the actions of a firm (i.e., royalty rate) is directly tied to one specific 
stakeholder group, other stakeholder groups may also be influenced by them.  Marketing 
managers should wisely allocate their budget to both push-pull strategies to maximize the 
benefits from reputation carry-over effects.  
Limitations and Further Research. 
The results of this study should be examined in light of some of its limitations.  
Because data was drawn from franchise systems in the foods and beverage industry, the 
generalizability of empirical findings may be a concern.  Franchise systems are unique in 
the sense that the ownership of the brand is exclusive to firms.  Generalizations to 
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dissimilar industries and governance structures should be taken with caution.  Since 
restaurants offer experience-based services, the findings here may not hold in retail 
industries, credence-based service industries, and many other industries.  Additionally, 
business format franchising firms only allow franchisees to use the system-wide business 
concept and brands during the contractual period.  Thus, the exclusive channel 
relationships between firms and their franchisees allowed for the measurement of internal 
reputation of franchise systems more readily than any other stakeholder groups (i.e., 
suppliers and governments).  However, the finding may not be applicable to the different 
types of channel arrangements, suppliers, or alliance partners.   
This empirical study has employed OLS analysis as its inferential methodology.  
Compared to the classical method of using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
the HLM regression can correct for standard errors that are correlated within a firm 
among its franchisees and its consumers.  Even though the coefficient betas that are 
estimated in the two different approaches are very similar, the HLM technique attends to 
the source of errors more rigorously by considering the clustering of data within groups 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  Moreover, the regression coefficients estimated with these 
two approaches can be quite different in some cases.  Future research in multilevel 
investigation should employ the HLM technique and compare the difference between the 
findings using the OLS approach and the findings using the HLM technique.   
Another limitation of this study stems from the fact that the consequences of FR 
have not been included in the proposed model.  Future study should include the 
relationship between FR and the consequences.  For example, both financial firm 
performance and non-financial firm performance (i.e., brand equity, price premium, 
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relationship development with stakeholders) can be included in the model to demonstrate 
the consequences of the carry-over effects of FR.  
Future research should investigate the internal reputation as seen by other internal 
stakeholder groups (i.e., employees, suppliers, and advertising and PR agents) to further 
our understanding of internal reputation.  Each stakeholder group would provide different 
perspectives on FR.  A marketing manager can gain a better understanding of how 
internal reputations are developed and how they influence perspectives of various 
external stakeholder groups (i.e., consumers, government, consumer interest groups, and 
media).  Additionally, four firm-level strategies that are employed in this study have 
accessible information to all stakeholders.  Thus, these empirical findings can open the 
door to future studies that investigate the different types of reputations among the 
different stakeholder groups.   
Future research should investigate whether good internal FR can be associated 
with bad external FR under certain circumstances or whether bad internal FR can be 
associated with good external FR under certain circumstances.  For example, franchisors’ 
efforts to standardize their operating systems may lead to negative impacts on internal FR 
by reducing franchisees’ autonomy; however, external FR may be strengthened since 
their operating system presumably leads to serving uniform products and services to 
consumers throughout the franchise system.  Thus, it is possible that firms’ endeavors to 
improve internal FR in the B2B market does not always strengthen internal FR but 
instead strengthens external FR in the B2C market.  Moreover, cluster analysis can be 
conducted to compare the characteristics of franchise systems that have a strong internal 
FR and a weak external FR or have a weak internal FR and a strong external FR.  The 
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characteristics of franchisors’ strategies in each category can be identified, and this 
should help firms develop better strategic decisions to improve their FR from the 
perspectives of targeted stakeholder groups and to benefit from carry-over effects of FR.  
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THE LINKAGES AMONG  
FIRM STRATEGIES, FIRM REPUTATION, AND PERFORMANCE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the linkage among firm strategies, firm reputation, and 
their overall effects on performance in franchise systems from the viewpoints of two 
different stakeholder groups, namely, franchisees and consumers.  Since Freeman (1984) 
introduced his seminal notions of strategic management as seen through the lenses of 
stakeholders, many conceptual arguments have been subsequently developed to identify 
the importance of stakeholder-focused strategic management.  Prior firm reputation and 
corporate social performance studies have addressed the importance of developing 
strategic choices as the main implication of the stakeholder framework (Berman et al., 
1999; Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000).  Yet, relatively little is known regarding 
how each stakeholder group (e.g., suppliers, employees, channel members, consumers, 
government, and community) may react to firms’ strategic decisions in the marketplace.  
Also, relatively unknown is how managers should deal with possible conflicts with 
individual stakeholder groups while balancing the interests of various stakeholders.  An 
investigation of the dynamics of firm strategies, firm reputation, and performance in the 
firm-stakeholder relationships can shed welcome light on our understanding of 
stakeholder management.  
In this study, the current unanswered research question of whether firms’ 
strategies are equally effective among different stakeholder groups will be empirically 
tested by investigating how the strategic decisions of franchisors influence their 
performance with two key stakeholder groups; franchisees and consumers.  For example, 
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Domino’s pizza sets the standards to control franchisees’ operations beyond what is 
related to the preparation of products.  Good examples of franchisors’ channel strategies 
are the following: the franchisees’ store hours, the handling of consumer complaints, the 
method of payment by consumers, and the location and re-location of franchised units.  
Such strategic factors influence the quality of brand experiences of the end consumers in 
the marketplace since when (i.e., operating hours), how (i.e., payment methods), and 
where (i.e., location) to purchase products and services are determined by franchisors.  
Thus, this study investigates how firm reputation may directly and interactively (with 
franchisors’ strategies) influence stakeholders’ perceptions of firms’ performance.  More 
specifically, this study empirically tests whether franchisors’ strategies of 
Standardization, Innovativeness, and Communication influence stakeholders’ perceptions 
of performance of focal firms.  Firm performance is conceptualized in terms of 
Satisfaction, Commitment, Word-of-Mouth (WOM) Intention, and Purchasing Intention 
between franchisors and their stakeholders.  Hopefully, the results of this investigation 
will help firms select their strategic decisions to facilitate stakeholder management more 
effectively. 
The study aims to answer the following research questions: (1) Does firm 
reputation influence stakeholders to establish their relationships with firms? (2) Do the 
stakeholders’ assessments of franchisors’ strategies of Standardization, Innovativeness, 
and Communication help in their relationship establishment with the firms?,  (3) How is 
the relationship between firm strategies and relational consequences of Satisfaction, 
Commitment, WOM Intention, and Purchasing Intention influenced by firm reputation?, 
and (4) Do the different stakeholder groups react differently to firms’ strategies and 
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reputational effects?  And what lessons do these findings provide for stakeholder 
management? 
The paper is organized as follows.  The following section develops the theoretical 
framework linking firm’s strategy, firm reputation, and performance from two different 
stakeholder groups’ perspectives using the lenses of agency theory and stakeholder 
theory.  Three pivotal firm strategies important to sustaining franchise systems are 
employed to demonstrate how strategies can shape internal and external reputations
28
 and 
their consequences in the marketplace.  Next, the methodology adopted for this empirical 
investigation is detailed.  Finally, the study concludes with a discussion of results along 
with its weaknesses and an agenda for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Agency Theory.  
In franchise systems, franchisors have contractual agreements with their 
franchisees that permit franchisees’ usage of franchisors’ brands, trade names, and 
business formats during the franchising contractual period.   Franchisors are the creators 
and the owners of their brands, trade names, and business formats.  By requiring 
franchisees to pay an up-front initial investment when joining the system, franchisors 
believe that franchisees are more likely to behave in the interest of the firm and thus 
minimize agency problems (i. e., opportunistic shirking behavior).  Like most principal-
agency relationships (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Mecklilng 1976; Ross 1973; 
                                                 
28
 Internal firm reputation refers to the overall assessment of firm standing perceived by internal 
stakeholders (i.e., employees, channel members, suppliers, and alliance partners) who closely interact 
with the firm and have exposure to internal information.   External reputation refers to the current 
standings of firms that are judged by external stakeholder groups (i.e., the end consumers, governments, 
and communities) that do not work together with firms to deliver value to the marketplace. 
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Eisenhardt 1989), a franchise system models the relationship between firms which 
delegate local-level operations to its franchisees. However, it is difficult for firms to 
monitor daily operations of franchisees and firms have little control over franchisees’ 
day-to-day behaviors.  Hence, there is a potential for agency problems in franchise 
systems (Carney and Gedajlovic 1991; Shane 1998).  In particular, firms have to take 
steps to prevent any potential damages to their unique brands and trade names that can be 
caused by agency problems.  Thus, franchisors’ strategic decisions in franchise systems 
are not only employed to protect firms’ intellectual property by more effectively 
monitoring and controlling franchisees’ behavior, but also to safeguard the interest of 
franchisees, who may be victimized by free-riders in franchise systems.  Implications of 
agency theory help explain why proposed firm strategies that are somewhat unique to 
franchise systems (i.e., Standardization, Innovativeness, and Communication) shape 
firms’ relationship with their franchisees. 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholders of franchise systems include stockholders, creditors, managers, 
employees, franchisees, consumers, suppliers, local communities, and the general public.  
The term ‘stakeholders’ refers to those groups of constituents that have legitimate 
interests in the functioning of the firm (Freeman 1984; Pearce 1982).  Stakeholder groups 
can be seen as supplying the firm with critical resources and, in exchange, each expects 
its interests to be satisfied (March and Simon 1958).  As described above, franchise 
systems have a special stakeholder group, franchisees, that develop their legitimate 
relationship with their franchisors through ongoing transactions.  Franchisors allow 
franchisees to use their unique brands, trade names, and business formats during the 
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contractual period and provide ongoing business support.  Franchisees pay a lump-sum 
initial fee and ongoing royalty based on sales when they enter into a franchising contract 
(Dant and Berger 1996).  They provide critical resources to the franchisors including 
financial capital, managerial talent, and local market knowledge needed for the success of 
franchise systems (Dant and Kaufmann 2003).  Another key stakeholder group, the 
consumers, supplies the firm with revenues and, in exchange, expects value for their 
money.  Since franchisors and their stakeholders are engaged in exchange relationships, 
the values that are offered by franchisors must fit with their stakeholders’ interests; that 
is, stakeholders shape the environment and boundaries for firms’ strategic decision-
making.  Furthermore, firms’ strategies and actions determine the actual realized 
exchanged relationships between firms and their stakeholders.  By integrating agency 
theory and stakeholder theory, we can begin to understand how firm strategies in 
franchise systems (employed to effectively monitor and control their franchisees) can 
cause and shape the relationships between the franchisors (principals) and their 
franchisees (agents) and even firms’ relationships with other stakeholders like consumers.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
By combining agency and stakeholder theories, this paper investigates how firm 
strategies regarding their franchisees (agents) contribute to stakeholder management in 
franchise systems.  First, hypotheses regarding firm reputation (FR)’s influences on 
different aspects of perceived performance (i.e., satisfaction, commitment, WOM 
intention, and purchasing intension) will be proposed.  Second, hypotheses focused on 
the effects of firms’ strategies on firm-stakeholder relationships will be examined.  
Finally, the interactions between firm strategies and FR and their impacts on four 
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different relational consequences will be discussed.  The hypothesized model of the 
linkage among firm strategies-FR-relational consequences is shown in Figure 1 below.   
 
The Linkages between Firm Reputation and Performance 
In order to examine firms’ relationship with their stakeholders, four perceptual 
measures of performance operationalized as (a) Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM 
Intention, and (d) Purchasing Intention are introduced.  While these relational outcomes 
have been widely studied (e.g., Palmatier et al., 2006), scholars have accorded only 
limited attention to how firm strategies influence social interactions of firm relationships 
with different stakeholders. 
Satisfaction. Stakeholder satisfaction can be defined as a stakeholder’s overall 
affective evaluation of firm performance (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 1990; Johnson and 
Fornell 1991; Reynolds and Beatty 1999).  Stakeholders’ satisfaction metrics are 
developed based on the discrepancy between stakeholders’ expectation of products or 
services of a firm and subsequent performance (Oliver 1980).  Firm reputation can serve 
as an initial reference point before stakeholders experience and develop their exchange 
relationships with a firm.  In other words, the discrepancy between firm reputation and 
outcomes of firm strategies, and firm performance, would determine the level of 
satisfaction in stakeholders’ minds, and satisfaction should be positively related to FR.   
Commitment. In this study, stakeholder commitment is defined as an enduring 
desire  to  maintain  a  valued  relationship  (Moorman,  Zaltman,  and  Deshpande  1992,  
p.316).  Stakeholders’ commitment reflects the enduring desires of stakeholders to 
maintain  their  relationships  with  the  firm  and, accordingly, their  commitment  cannot   
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exist without irreplaceable values that are delivered by firms (Anderson and Weitz 1992; 
Mooreman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  For example, a 
franchisee may be committed to its franchise system because of the transaction costs that 
would be incurred if they were to switch systems (i.e., switching costs, firm specific 
investments, alternative search costs, etc.).  Another franchisee may have a strong 
emotional connection with its franchise system and want to grow together with the firm.  
Consumers also have many different reasons governing why they are committed to a firm 
and a brand.  One consumer may like to express his or her characteristics and personality 
by making a commitment to a particular firm.  Another consumer with low variety-
seeking tendencies may prefer to patronize products and services from a particular firm 
out of habit.  Like examples from franchisees and consumers, each stakeholder group 
differs in its reasons for committing to their exchange relationships with a firm.   
The effect of a strong reputation leads to a high level of stakeholder commitment 
as consumers’ value-associations and transactions are closely related to firm reputation 
(Roberts and Dowling 2002).  Reputation in interorganizational relationships can help a 
firm determine dependability and reliability of its partnering firm (Smith and Barclay 
1997).  Firms with good reputation are more likely to attract and keep committed 
stakeholders than firms with low reputations (Fombrun and van Riel 1997; Greyser 1999; 
Hall 1992).  Thus, firm reputation should be positively associated with stakeholders’ 
commitment to the firm.   
Word-of-Mouth (WOM) Intention. Stakeholders’ WOM intentions refer to their 
willingness to refer a firm to other stakeholders (Brown and Reingen 1987; Reynolds and 
Beatty 1999).  WOM communication plays an important role in shaping stakeholders’ 
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attitudes and behaviors (Anderson 1998).  Through the social ties of stakeholders, referral 
information travels from one group to another group and is disseminated to the broader 
social system (Brown and Reingen 1987).  It is possible that the impact of WOM 
communication expands to change attitudes and behaviors of some stakeholder groups.  
For example, franchisees that work closely with their franchisors can spread their 
impressions from their experiences to the end consumers.  Or franchisees may share their 
experiences with their franchise systems to future potential franchisees.  Franchise 
systems often require potential or new franchisees to be trained in a current operating 
unit, which provides the franchisees a perfect opportunity to communicate with potential 
franchisees, and help shape their attitudes and behaviors towards the firm.  As an 
example, in B2B situations, before a firm negotiates with a new franchisee partner, the 
testimonials of previous business partners play an important role in bringing a closure to 
the contract.  Strong reputation of a firm is likely to garner positive WOM 
communication.   
Purchasing Intention. A stakeholders’ purchasing intention may be defined as 
the willingness to remain in the existing exchange relationship with the firm.  Subjective 
certainty of stakeholders toward a firm impacts intentions and confidence in their 
judgment on the quality of firm performance (Howard and Sheth 1969; Howard 1989).  
Bennett and Harrell (1975) suggest that confidence plays a major role in predicting 
intentions to buy.  Firm reputation not only provides assurance of the quality of products 
or services, but also the overall values and culture of the firm.  Thus, firm reputation 
provides confidence in stakeholders’ minds to develop and continue exchange 
relationships with the firm.  
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Drawing from the logic of firm-and-stakeholder relationship development, firms’ 
exchange relationships with stakeholders are the consequences of firm reputation present 
in the marketplace (Berman, et al 1999).  Thus, I propose the following relationships 
between firm reputation and relational consequences: 
 
H1:  The greater the level of reputation perceived by franchisees (i. e., 
internal FR), the stronger the franchisees’ perceptions of (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention. 
 
H2:  The  greater  the  level  of   reputation  perceived  by  consumers 
 (i. e.,  external FR),  the stronger  the  consumers’  perceptions  of 
 (a)  Satisfaction  ,  (b)  Commitment , (c)  WOM Intention,   and 
 (d)  Purchasing Intention. 
 
The Linkages between Firm Strategies and Relational Consequences 
Standardization. Standardization is an important strategy that determines the 
success of a franchise firm in the global marketplace.  Even though standardization seems 
most feasible in settings where market infrastructure is well developed, firms are able to 
market standardized products and services in many different countries, where the 
infrastructure may not be as evolved.  As the global marketplace becomes more 
homogenized, firms increasingly strive to control the quality of products and services, 
strengthening their relationships with stakeholders globally (Sorenson and Wiechmann 
1975; Jain 1989).  Franchise systems do this in order to strengthen their relationships 
with their respective stakeholders.  
From firms’ strategic viewpoint, one of the primary drivers for the 
“standardization of the business format” is to minimize unnecessary monitoring costs 
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(Kaufmann and Eroglu 1998).
29
  Franchise contracts emerge as an efficient organizational 
tool for minimizing agency (including monitoring) costs, while affording the opportunity 
for franchisees to employ their knowledge of local markets to produce local services 
efficiently for the mutual benefit of the firm and franchisees (Mathewson and Winter 
1985). Since production and distribution occur at many different locations, franchisors 
face uncertainty regarding the actual actions of all their franchisees or about particular 
pieces of information because continual observation is very costly (Rubin 1978).  
Moreover, franchise systems can gain efficiencies in the marketplace by using 
standardized operations (Norton 1988).  Thus, standardization is a logical and efficient 
way for franchisors to control agency problems while delivering quality products and 
services in many different locations.   
However, franchisees may have different opinions about the standardization of 
their franchise systems.  Previous organizational cynicism studies have found that 
employees have negative feelings, such as contempt, frustration, and hopelessness toward 
their employers when they violate psychological contracts (Andersson and Bateman 
1997).  Firms’ efforts to change and to improve qualities of products and services in the 
marketplace can engender cynicism (Dean, Brandes, and Dharwadkar 1998).  Thus, 
franchisors’ enforcement of standardization in franchise systems may engender cynicism 
from their franchisees.  In particular, when entrepreneurial franchisees have a great desire 
for autonomy (Kaufmann and Dant 1996; Stanworth et al., 1996), the contradictory 
                                                 
29
 The most common ways to differentiate between types of franchisees are “product, trademark, and retail 
franchising” versus “business format franchising” (see Vaughn 1974).  In the “product, trademark, and 
retail” format, franchise systems lease the trademark to their franchisees for contracted periods (e.g., 
gasoline retailing, automobile dealers, insurance salespeople), whereas in the “business format,” 
franchise systems provide more operational support and training.  Franchisees of “business-format” 
systems must adhere to a strict format or operating procedures (e.g., fast food restaurants).  
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perspectives on standardization may lead to deleterious effects.  Since franchisees invest 
a large stake of their individual wealth in their franchise systems and deliver value in the 
marketplace as ambassadors of their franchisors, they have certain expectations to follow 
the instructed processes (Stanworth et al., 1996) as standardization may impose some 
limits on franchisee decision-making authority (e.g., Minkler 1992).  The franchisees’ 
desire for autonomy (Dant and Gundlach 1998) may make them less satisfied with their 
firms when the level of standardization increases.  As a result, firms’ relationships with 
their franchisees are expected to be negatively influenced by standardization.  Thus:  
H3:  The greater the level  of firms’ standardization,  the  weaker the  
        franchisees’ perception of (a) Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c)  
        WOM Intention, and (d) Purchasing Intention. 
 
In order to enhance consumers’ perceptions of a franchise system’s quality, the 
employment of standardization in franchise systems is critical (e.g., Morgan & 
Murgatroyd, 1994; Swiss 1992).  The main motivation behind franchisors’ instructions to 
franchisees to follow standard operating procedures is to ensure consistent products and 
services at all outlets and to continuously improve quality of products and services.  
Standardization can reduce the gap in service quality perceptions between service 
providers and consumers (e.g., Parasuraman, Berry, and Zeithaml 1991).  Job 
standardization can lead to more congruent service quality perceptions because it helps 
eliminate uncertainty and variability in the consumer value creation processes (Klein 
1991; Hsieh, Chou, and Chen 2002).  If franchise systems offer products that contain a 
large component of services in the market, then their exchange relationships with 
consumers would be greatly influenced by standardization of firm strategy. Thus: 
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 H4:  The greater the level of firms’ standardization, the stronger the  
         consumers’ perceptions of (a) Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c)  
         WOM Intention, and (d) Purchasing Intentions. 
 
Innovativeness. Firms’ innovativeness refers to the ability to create and 
implement new ideas, products, and processes (Hult and Ketchen 2001).  In franchise 
systems, innovativeness is often linked to firms’ willingness to accept and apply 
innovative ideas from their franchisees.  Historically many innovative ideas adapted by 
franchise systems have been generated by franchisees.  Stanworth and Curran (1999) 
have argued that “franchisees can make a substantial contribution to franchise system 
innovation in ways ranging from developing new products or services to pioneering ways 
of adapting to local conditions (p.338).”  Some of the most popular products McDonalds 
sells were initially proposed by their franchisees.  For instance, the Egg McMuffin 
breakfast sandwich, the Big Mac, and kid-friendly Happy Meals all originated from 
franchisees’ ideas.  Therefore, much of the current success of McDonalds can be 
attributed to the innovative ideas that were created by franchisees (Forbes 2007).  
Franchisees have strong incentives to develop offerings that fit local demands through 
local adaptation.  While managers in company-owned units are compensated largely 
based on a fixed salary, franchisees make their money by reducing operational costs and 
satisfying consumers (Bradach 1998; Seawright et al., 2012).   
However, franchisees’ ability to advocate new ideas is limited by this discretion 
and willingness on the part of franchisors to accept innovative ideas from their 
franchisees.  Sorenson and SØrensen (2001) found that firms are better able to learn 
through experiments and exploitation (i.e., the incremental improvements in existing 
routines).  In other words, franchise systems are better able to acquire and diffuse 
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innovative ideas generated through company-owned units versus those found in 
‘exploration’ (i.e., the development of new routines) from franchised-owned units.  Thus, 
firms may in fact prefer to have high levels of innovativeness from managers in 
company-owned units while desiring low levels of innovativeness from their franchisees.  
Furthermore, franchisees may not welcome firms’ enforcement of, additional equipment 
purchases resulting from the implementation of ‘innovative’ ideas. When firms keep to a 
low level of innovativeness, they are more likely to sustain their positive firm-franchisee 
relationships.  Thus: 
H5:  The greater the level of firms’ innovativeness, the weaker the       
franchisees’ perceptions of  (a) Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c)  
         WOM Intentions, and (d) Purchasing Intentions. 
 
Innovativeness is one of the key consequences of market orientation (Kirca, 
Jayachandran, and Bearden 2005).  Even though firms’ innovativeness may have a 
negative impact on firm-franchisee relationships, firms may be able to strengthen their 
relationships with consumers through their innovations.  For example, the innovativeness 
of Domino’s pizza has caused the company to aggressively introduce new menus in all 
U.S. operating units since 2008, and 85% of the Domino’s menu is new 
(ToledoBlade.com, 2012).  Sales in the Domino’s franchise system have dramatically 
risen since these innovations.  Firms’ innovativeness reflects consumers’ desire for 
irreplaceable and inimitable value.  Thus, consumers are more satisfied and committed to 
a firm that has a high level of innovativeness.  Consumers are more willing to spread 
good publicity for the firm, and retain the existing relationship through their continued 
patronage.  Therefore:    
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H6:  The greater the level of firms’ innovativeness,  the stronger  the  
        consumers’ perceptions of (a) Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c)  
        WOM Intention, and (d) Purchasing Intention 
  
Communication. Communication helps shape the perceptions of obligations 
between parties in exchange relationships (Mohr and Nevin 1990).  In this study, firm-
level communication strategy refers to firms’ propensity and willingness towards 
effective communication with their franchisees.  Since channel communication mediates 
the relationship between channel structures and performance (e.g., the strength of 
contractual relationships in marketing channels and performance) (Mohr and Nevin 
1990), franchisors’ communication strategy with their franchisees is critical for franchise 
systems to succeed in the marketplace.   
Communication represents one of the main mechanisms that firms use to 
minimize information asymmetry in franchise systems (e.g., Bleeke and Ernst 1994).  
Even though goals, values, and visions of franchise systems are chiefly created by 
franchisors, their franchisees are the main implementers of accomplishing these goals of 
franchise systems.  Communication reduces role conflict and ambiguity (Nygaard and 
Dahlstrom 2002), promotes mutual problem solving, and creates synergy between 
partners (Cummings 1984).  For instance, AlphaGraphics Inc., a print shop franchise 
system, reduced its operational problems and improved its performance by installing a 
telephone hotline to obtain franchisees’ feedback (Gassenheimer, Baucus, and Baucus 
1996).  Communication between firms and franchisees provides franchise systems with 
intelligence, prior warning, and a greater awareness of the firm or competitive 
environment (Rice 2008).  Communication remains a critical feedback mechanism in 
regards to performance (Anderson and Narus 1990) and it fosters confidence in the 
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continuity of the relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1989).  Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
also surmised that the availability of information allows people to complete tasks more 
effectively while increasing their level of satisfaction.  Franchisors’ communication 
strategy helps both franchisors and their franchisees to obtain enhanced competitiveness 
in the marketplace.  
Moreover, effective communication can elevate the system-wide learning 
activities.  With the help of the communication between firms and franchises, a uniform 
identity of franchise systems under the identical brand can be created across all operating 
units.  As a result, franchisees ought to experience less confusion since the variation of 
products and services across all operating units is minimized through channel 
communication.  Franchisors’ efforts to communicate with their franchisees will increase 
organizational commitment (e.g., Leiter and Maslach 1988; Mathieu and Zajac 1990).  
The relational strength between franchisors and their franchisees will therefore enhance.  
Thus, 
H7:  The  greater  the  level of  firms’  communication  with  their  
         franchisees,  the  stronger  the   franchisees’   perceptions  of  
         (a)  Satisfaction,  (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention,  and  
         (d) Purchasing Intention. 
          
When franchisors and their franchisees communicate effectively, the end 
consumers experience less confusion.  Communication helps franchisors coordinate the 
firm identities of their franchise systems under the identical brand across all operating 
units.  The gap between consumers’ expectation of the brand and the realization of 
delivered products and services is likely to be small since effective communication helps 
the system integration and the variation across all operating units is minimized.  Thus, 
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franchisors expect their communication strategy in channel management to enhance the 
value that is delivered to the end consumer.   
 H8:  The  greater  the  level  of  firms’  communication  with    their  
        franchisees,   the   stronger   the   consumers’   perceptions   of  
        (a)  Satisfaction,  (b)  Commitment, (c)  WOM Intention,   and  
        (d)  Purchasing Intention. 
 
Interaction Effects between Firm Strategies and Firm Reputation on Performance 
The proposed relationships between firm strategies and firms’ exchange 
relationships with their stakeholders are expected to be strengthened by the firms’ 
reputation.  One of the main drivers for franchise systems to employ particular firm 
strategies (i.e., Standardization, Innovativeness, and Communication) is the protection of 
their intellectual property which includes brands, trade names, and business formats.  
Firms with a strong reputation in the marketplace acknowledge that their strategies have 
helped foster their relationships with stakeholders.  Conversely, firms with low reputation 
may have less incentive to implement such firm-level strategies to minimize shirking 
behaviors of franchisees.  The latter firms may attempt to generate profit through the 
initial investments and on-going royalties and advertising fees from franchisees rather 
than through managing the overall firm reputation.  Since monitoring franchisees is 
costly, franchisors may act opportunistically to enjoy franchisees’ resources without 
being a good leader and strategic partner to their franchisees.  In other words, both 
franchisors and franchisees have to face double-sided moral hazards in the franchise  
systems
30
 (Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990).   
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 Single-sided moral hazard occurs between a risk-neutral principal (franchisor) and a risk-averse agent 
(franchisee) engaged in a contract (i.e., one side takes advantage of the situation).  However, a double-
sided moral hazard problem is caused when both parties engage in opportunistic actions (e.g., imperfect 
monitoring by franchisors and shirking behaviors by franchisees) (Mathewson and Winter 1985).  
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Standardization allows franchisors to effectively control franchisees’ behavior and 
to reduce monitoring costs associated with policing their franchisees even when the 
geographic distance between the parties is great (Kaufmann and Eroglu 1998).  
Standardization negatively influences the development of franchisor-franchisee 
relationships by reducing the autonomy of entrepreneurial franchisees to operate their 
franchised units (e.g., Dant et al., 2013; Grunhagen and Mettelstaedt 2005), and the 
magnitude of the negative association between Standardization and firms’ performance as 
perceived by the franchisees is relatively stronger for franchisors with stronger internal 
firm reputation.  For example, a franchise system with a strong reputation should be able 
to address and confront the agency problems (i.e., shirking or free-riding) of franchisees 
more easily by using its reputational power over its franchisees compared to other 
systems with weak reputations.  Reputable franchisors that recognize the importance of 
intangible assets (e.g., brands, trade names, and business formats) would view 
implementation of standard procedures in their franchise systems as a key driver to 
market competitiveness.  The search costs associated with seeking qualified prospective 
franchisees is relatively lower than franchisors with weak reputations.  Thus, reputable 
franchisors are more likely to employ and enforce Standardization strategy within their 
franchise system, even though they are likely to experience low Satisfaction, 
Commitment, WOM Intention, and Purchasing Intention from their franchisees.  This 
suggests: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Double-sided moral hazards refer to a two-sided hidden action between franchisors and their franchisees 
due to differing incentive issues for both parties (Lafontaine 1992).     
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H9:  The greater the internal firm reputation perceived by the 
franchisees, the stronger the negative association between 
Standardization strategy and franchisee perceptions of (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention.  
 
Innovativeness is also expected to negatively influence the development of 
franchisor-franchisee relationships due to the long and frustrating process of 
implementing integrated innovative ideas in all operating units.  More reputable firms 
should have a greater impact from Innovativeness on relational consequences with 
franchisees than franchisors with a lower reputation.  In order for franchisors to introduce 
new products and policies based on franchisees’ innovative ideas, they have to follow 
strict decision rules and to develop new products and policies that can be monitored and  
measured before rolling them out throughout their franchise systems (Forbes 2007).  
Reputable franchisors are expected to be better at playing the role of orchestrator of 
knowledge integration and socialization of franchisees (e.g., Dhanasai and Parkhe 2006); 
however, the actualization of franchisee generated ideas will likely be low because of 
their stricter standards.  Once rolled out, even if the benefits from innovative ideas are not 
very promising franchisees will still have to use their own resources in implementing 
these innovations, which will likely cause increased frustration.  Thus, the negative 
association between Innovativeness and firms’ performance perceived by franchisees 
becomes stronger as internal firm reputation of franchisors is greater.   
H10: The greater the internal firm reputation perceived by the 
franchisees, the stronger the negative association between 
Innovativeness strategy and franchisee perceptions of (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention.  
Communication in marketing channels allows both franchisors and franchisees to 
understand their expectations based on shared contracts.  Effective communication helps 
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franchisors to learn more about local markets, support their franchisees more effectively, 
reduce information asymmetry of franchisees, and run national marketing promotions in 
cooperation with their franchisees.  Franchisors with a strong reputation are likely to be 
willing to invest in developing infrastructure needed to create an organizational climate 
that fosters communication in their marketing channels.  Simply but, franchisors with a 
weak reputation will likely feel that the rewards from solving a moral hazard problem of 
their franchisees are less than the costs associated with minimizing such problems in their 
franchise systems.  Thus, if firm reputation is high, then the linkages between 
Communication and relational consequences would be stronger. 
 H11: The greater the internal firm reputation perceived by the 
franchisees, the stronger the positive association between 
Communication strategy and franchisee perceptions of (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention.  
 
The positive association between franchisors’ strategies (i.e., Standardization, 
Innovativeness, and Communication) and the relational performance consequences 
perceived by consumers will be strengthened as external firm reputation increases.    
Standardization enhances the uniformity of products and services and the delivery of 
consistent quality of products and services to the consumers.  Innovativeness increases 
the market competitiveness of franchise systems by enhancing operational efficiency and 
providing innovative (and presumably desired) products and services to the ultimate 
consumers.  
The expectations of consumers for competent products and services across 
different outlets under the same brand name will be higher for franchise systems with a 
strong external reputation.  In order to maintain the consistency of value proposition, 
franchisors have to develop marketing channel strategies, such as Standardization, 
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Innovativeness, and Communication with their franchisees, to meet with consumers’ 
expectations in the marketplace.  When consumers’ expectations are met, relational 
performance consequences (i.e., satisfaction, commitment, WOM intention, and 
purchasing intention) in franchisor-consumer relationships will be strengthened.  Thus, 
the association between firms’ strategies in their franchise systems (i.e., Standardization, 
Innovativeness, and Communications) and firms’ perceived performance with consumers 
becomes stronger as external firm reputation enhances.  Thus, 
H12: The greater the external firm reputation perceived by the 
consumers, the stronger the positive association of 
Standardization strategy and consumer perceptions of (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention.  
 
H13: The greater the external firm reputation perceived by the 
consumers, the stronger the positive association of 
Innovativeness strategy and consumer perceptions (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention.  
 
H14: The greater the external firm reputation perceived by the 
consumers, the stronger the positive association of 
Communication strategy and consumer perceptions of (a) 
Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and (d) 
Purchasing Intention.  
 
METHOD 
Data Collection 
Research Context. Franchise systems in the food and beverage industry were 
chosen to test the proposed hypotheses firm strategy-FR-relational consequence linkages.  
In franchise systems, the channel members, franchisees, provide products and services 
and encounter consumers on a daily basis.  Potential franchisees select a particular 
franchise system to join due to its FR in the consumer market.  In addition, the 
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representative names of firms and brands for both franchisor firms and franchisees are 
identical in the consumer market since franchisees use their franchisor’s brand names and 
logos during the contract period to serve consumers.  Studying franchise systems 
minimizes consumers’ confusion related to differentiating reputations of different brands 
for manufacturers, service providers, and retailers.  Finally, it is convenient to identify 
franchisees in franchise systems since contact information of different franchise outlets 
can be easily found in either systems’ websites or secondary sources (e.g., YellowPages).  
One particular industry, the food and beverage industry, is selected since every industry 
has different characteristics, norms, and cultures that may influence variances between 
firms.  The food and beverage industry is an industry in which franchising is a popular 
form of governance structure.  Thus, the prospective survey participants for the consumer 
level survey can be easily approached.  Franchise systems in the food and beverage 
industry regulate their franchisees to strictly follow standard procedures in order to offer 
qualified products and services to the end consumers (Dant and Schul 1992).  Since the 
research goal is to investigate firm strategy-FR-relational consequence linkages, 
surveying the food and beverage industry seemed most logical.  Moreover, the food and 
beverage industry follows the business format franchising
31
 where the strategies of 
Standardization, Innovation, and Communication are most utilized. 
The firm strategies employed in the hypotheses (i.e., are most appropriate for 
“business format” franchise systems. In addition, prospective franchisee and consumer-
                                                 
31
 The two most common ways to distinguish different types of franchisees is “product, trademark, and 
retail franchising” and “business format franchising” (Vaughn 1974).  In “product, trademark, and retail 
franchising”, firms lease their brands and trade names to the franchisee during the contractual period 
(e.g., gasoline retailing, automobile dealers, and insurance salespeople).  In “business format 
franchising,” firms provide more extensive services and support, and franchisees follow the format and 
operating procedures that are provided by firms. 
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level survey participants can be conveniently approached for franchise systems in the 
food and beverage industry.  Thus, firms, their franchisees, and consumers in the food 
and beverage industry are surveyed in this study.  
    Data Source. The multilevel approach is applied to conduct surveys from 
franchisors, their franchisees, and consumers since the empirical studies aim to 
understand three constituencies of franchise systems with a holistic view (Dant 2008).  
The empirical results reported below are based on a multi-level sample survey of 29 
franchisors, 210 franchisees belonging to their franchise systems (average of 7 
franchisees per system), and 925 consumers (average of 32 consumers per system).  In 
the first phase I selected target franchise systems in the food and beverage industry based 
on Bond’s franchise guide and Enterprise magazine.  I developed a list of contact 
information with 146 franchise systems that operate in the U.S. market.  A total of 146 
franchise systems was individually contacted via email and/or phone.  Of there, 62 
executives or marketing directors responded after the initial contact.  Once they agreed to 
participate in the franchisor survey, an email along with the URL of the online survey site 
was sent out.  In order to survey qualified key informants, the respondents’ positions and 
their levels of knowledge were prescreened, and their willingness to participate in the 
survey using the online survey instrument was ascertained (Campbell 1955).  In the 
recruitment, I incentivized franchisors by providing a customized report for their 
franchise system.  Of the 62 franchisors, 29 franchisors finally agreed to participate in the 
on-line based survey.  The response rate based on the pre-committed sample is 47%, 
which is above the acceptable levels (greater than 40 percent) for surveying executives 
(e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Heide and John 1990; Mohr and Spekman 1994). 
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After the first phase of the data collection was completed, the second phase of the 
data collection was developed by generating a franchisees list for the 29 participating 
franchise systems.  I asked franchisors whether they would cooperate in administering the 
surveys to their franchisees and consumers.  Three franchisors out of 29 franchisors 
endorsed the survey by sending out the recruiting emails directly to their franchisees.  
The recruitment email was sent out along with the URL of the online survey site for the 
franchisee-level survey.  Then I called each franchised outlet to recruit franchisees to 
participate in the franchisee-level online survey.  Unfortunately at this point, participation 
remained low.  Only 67 franchisees participated in the online survey; nine of which had 
to be dropped due to the incomplete surveys.  Subsequently, individual franchisees were 
contacted via phone and questionnaire items were read through the phone.  Each survey 
took about fifteen to twenty minutes, and one third of the contacted franchisees 
participated in the survey.  Overall, 58 franchisee-level surveys were done online, and 
152 surveys were completed through landline communication.
32
  A total of 210 
franchisees level surveys were completed.  
The last phase of the data collection was aimed at consumers.  A total of 498 
consumer-level data surveys were collected from students in a large, Midwestern 
university and 427 were collected in publicly accessible locations in nearby metropolitan 
Midwestern cities.
33
  The off-classroom surveys were conducted on an individual 
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 For the franchisee-level surveys, a MANOVA test was conducted to examine a multivariate effect of the 
data collection method using Internal Reputation, Franchisees’ Satisfaction, and Franchisees’ Financial 
Performance as dependent variables (F (3, 206) = .84, n.s.).  The test result confirms that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the survey data collection method in the franchisee dataset.  
Hence, data from both groups were combined and treated as a homogenous sample for subsequent 
inferential analysis. 
33
 For the consumer-level surveys, a similar MANOVA test was conducted to test a multivariate effect of the 
data collection method using External Reputation and Consumers’ Satisfaction as dependent variables (F (2, 
922) = .78, n.s.).  The test result once again confirms that there is no statistically significant difference between 
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intercept basis.  In the selection process, the respondents for the consumer survey were 
asked whether they had patronized one of the 29 franchise brands in the past.  If potential 
respondents qualified, then a short consumer survey was handed out.  Three individuals 
had to be approached for every consumer-level survey on average. A total of 925 usable 
consumer level surveys were used in this analysis.  
In order to test the nonresponse bias of the sample, a telephone survey was 
undertaken on a random sample of marketing executives in firms and franchisees who did 
not participate in the survey.  The short survey that contained the most representative 
item from each construct was created to survey the non-responders over the phone (Hill, 
et al., 1997).  Finally, 6 firms (20% of the total firm-level sample) and 30 franchisees 
(14% of the total franchisee-level sample) participated in the phone survey.  No 
statistically significant differences between responders and non-responders to the 
questionnaire were detected.
34
   
Measures. 
Variables employed in the surveys to franchisors, franchisees, and consumers are 
listed in Appendix J.  We showcase the inter-item correlations for measures employed in 
franchisee and consumer surveys, respectively (Appendices L and M).  To test the model, 
three different levels of data have been employed.  Appendix J provides a complete list of 
measurement items and the factor loadings for each construct used in the study.  Table 3-
                                                                                                                                                 
the survey data collection method in the consumer dataset.  Hence, data from both groups were combined and 
treated as a homogenous sample for subsequent inferential analysis. 
34 In order to test the non-response bias, a MANOVA test was conducted to test the group difference between 
respondents and non-respondents using all ten latent construct variables (Appendix E) as dependent variables 
(F (10, 23) = .23, n.s.).  The test result confirmed that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
respondents and non-respondents in the franchisor dataset.  Also, a similar test was conducted to test the non-
response bias for the franchisee dataset (Appendix F).  The group mean differences for fifteen latent construct 
variables were compared for respondents and non-respondents, and there was no significant difference 
between two groups (F (15, 224) = 1.26, n.s.). Hence, data from both groups were combined and treated as a 
homogenous sample for subsequent inferential analysis. 
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1 displays the descriptive statistics and inter trait correlations of all study variables in all 
three levels (i.e., firm (franchisor), franchisee, and consumer).  The Cronbach’s alpha 
indices indicated that the construct measures were psychometrically sound.  More 
specifically, for all constructs, no coefficient alpha values are lower than the 
conventionally acceptable value of .70, and the average variance extracted (AVE) of all 
constructs is greater than .50 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Bagozzi 1991; Hair et al., 
2010).   Discriminant validity of all latent constructs is supported since the AVE for each 
pair of constructs exceeds the squared correlations, the shared variance, between them 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981, pp.45-46; See Table 3-1).  After assessing their psychometric 
properties the multi-item scales shown in Appendix A were subsequently collapsed into 
construct scores for inferential analyses.  
Firm-Level Strategies. Three firm strategies; Standardization, Innovativeness, 
and Communication were employed as the firm-level dependent variables in this study.  
Executives and marketing managers in franchise systems were asked to assess these firm 
strategies.  All items in the measurement model were anchored with a 7-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7).   
Standardization. Standardization was measured by employing the Job 
Standardization scale developed by Hsieh, Chou, and Chen (2002).  The five-item 
Standardization scale was modified to address standard procedures in “business-format” 
franchise systems (α = .83, AVE = .61).   
 Innovativeness.  Innovativeness of franchise systems was measured by using an 
adapted  Innovation  scale  from  Hurley  and  Hult  (1998).  The  five - item  scale  for  
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Innovativeness was modified to tap into firms’ orientation and willingness to accept 
innovative ideas from franchisees (α = .85, AVE = .83).   
Communication. Communication was measured by employing the 
Interorganizational Communication scale from Anderson and Weitz (1992).  Since the 
interest of this study is firms’ strategies on Communication with their franchisees not 
their end consumers, this five-item scale of Communication seemed most appropriate (α 
= .71, AVE = .90). 
Internal Reputation.  Franchisees’ perspectives on FR of firms were measured by 
employing a five-item internal reputation scale adapted and modified from Wang et al., 
2006 and Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000.  Since the available firm reputation scales  
did not adequately capture the nature of firms’ internal reputations in the business market, 
the scale was modified.  For example, the original item of “customers’ overall 
perceptions of total experience in the firm are rather good” was modified to “my overall 
perceptions of total experience with this franchise system are very good.”  The coefficient 
alpha was .93 and the variance extracted was estimated as .90.   
External Reputation. Consumers’ perspectives on firms’ reputation in the 
marketplace were measured by employing a five-item external reputation scale 
(Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000; Wang et al., 2006; α = .81, AVE = .68) that was 
also adapted and modified.  One scale item had to be dropped due to its low factor 
loading on the construct.  Even though internal reputation measures and external 
reputation measures are extracted from firm reputation literature, the scales were 
carefully modified to tap into FR in two different markets.   
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Relational Performance.  Four different relational consequences of FR were used 
as dependent variables: (a) Satisfaction, (b) Commitment, (c) WOM Intention, and  (d) 
Purchasing Intention.   
Satisfaction. Both franchisees and consumers evaluated their satisfaction with 
their firms and brands.  The four item scale of satisfaction (α franchisees = .93, AVE franchisees 
= .90; α consumers = .95, AVE consumers = .94) adapted from Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 
(1990) and Ganesan (1994).  One of four items in the satisfaction construct was dropped 
in order to meet the minimum requirement for reliability at both levels.  Each scale item 
was modified to fit the context of the survey participants.   
Commitment. Commitment measures were again adapted from Chaudhuri and 
Holbrook (2002), Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990) and Ganesan (1994).  Three out of 
the six-item scale were converted into the Commitment construct (α franchisees = .81, AVE 
franchisees = .71; α consumers = .82, AVE consumers = .73).  Three identical scale items from each 
franchisee and consumer level were dropped to meet the minimum requirements for 
reliability.  
WOM Intention. Four WOM Intention measures were adapted from File, Judd, 
and Prince (1992).  Three items of the scale were converted into a WOM Intention 
construct for both the franchisee and consumer-level dataset (α franchisees = .85, AVE 
franchisees = .79; α consumers = .94, AVE consumers = .93).  The fourth item had to be dropped to 
ensure adequate psychometric property of these measures. 
Purchasing Intention. A manifest scale from Hellier et al. (2003) was adapted to 
measure Purchasing Intention (Mean franchisees = 4.88; Mean consumers = 4.41). 
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ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
How the franchisors’ key strategies of Standardization, Innovativeness, and 
Communication and stakeholders’ perceptions on FR interact and derive four different 
relational performance consequences of Satisfaction, Commitment, WOM Intention, and 
Purchasing Intention was integrated from the perspectives of two key stakeholder groups 
(i.e., franchisees and consumers).  Since the individual-level stakeholders’ perspectives 
are nested within firms, the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) full maximum likelihood 
was used to estimate the models using Stata 11. (e.g., Hirst et al., 2011; Lam, Kraus, and 
Ahearne 2010; Palmatier 2008).  Several researchers in the franchise context have 
employed the HLM method reflecting the uniquely nested structure in franchisor-
franchisee relationships (e.g., Akremi, Mignonac, and Perrigot 2010; Liao and Chuang 
2004).  Compared to the classical method of using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, the HLM regression can correct for standard errors that are correlated within a 
firm among its franchisees and its consumers.  Even though the coefficient betas that are 
estimated using OLS and HLM are very similar, the HLM technique attends to the 
sources of errors more rigorously than OLS by considering the clustering of data within 
groups (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002), thereby leading to more refined hypothesis testing.  
The initial model only included the four main effects and did not include the three 
interaction effects between FR and franchisors’ strategies (Appendix K).  The initial 
model and the final model that include both the four main effects and the three interaction 
effects were subsequently compared.  The chi-square difference test was carried out 
compare the results of the two models and evaluate the improvement of fit.  The final 
model and the results of the franchisee-level study and the consumer-level study are 
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presented in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3, respectively.  The random effects were included 
and estimated in the models but are not reported to simplify the presentation in Table 3-2 
and Table 3-3.   
In the franchisee-level study, the final model (See Appendix K) includes three 
hypothesized interactions using the main effects of firm (three firm strategy variables) 
and franchisee (Internal Reputation) level variables and random slope effects as the initial 
model.  The proportion of variance explained ranges from 5% to 32% of the variance in 
the four relational consequences of franchisees (Table 3-2).  Having four main effects and 
three interaction terms in the model significantly improves model fit, and all the changes 
of fit indices from the initial model are significant.  In the consumer-level study (Table 3-
3), the final model include three hypothesized interactions using the main effects of firm 
(three firm strategy variables) and consumer (External Reputation) level variables and 
random slope effects as the initial model.  The proportion of variance explained ranges 
from 13% to 26% of the variance in the four relational consequences (see Table 3-3).  
Once again, compared to the fit indices from the initial model, the final model that 
includes four main effects and three interactions significantly improves model fit. 
HLM Results  
The Relationship between Firm Reputation and Its Consequences.  Hypotheses 
1 and 2 test the relationship between firm reputation and its consequences from the 
perspectives of  two different  stakeholder  groups.   In the franchisee - level study, H1 
predicted that Internal Reputation is positively associated with perceptions of the four 
relational consequences associated with their franchisees.  Internal Reputation indeed has 
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a significantly positive relationship with all four consequences: (a) Satisfaction (       
           , (b) Commitment (                     (c) WOM Intention (            
     , and (d) Purchasing Intention (                  (Table 3-2).  Hence, H1a, H1b, 
H1c, and H1d are accepted.  These findings show that franchisees’ perceptions of firm 
reputation are important intangible firm assets in establishing firm-franchisee 
relationships in the long run, and are likely to significantly boost franchisees’ 
engagement with their franchisors in a proactive manner.   
In the consumer-level study, H2 predicted that External Reputation is positively 
associated with perceptions of the four relational consequences toward the franchisor 
they patronize.  External Reputation has a significantly positive relationship with all four 
consequences: (a) Satisfaction (                  , (b) Commitment (            
        (c) WOM Intention (                 , and (d) Purchasing Intention (       
            (See Table 3-3).  Hence, H2a, H2b, H2c, and H2d are also supported.  Like 
franchisees’ perceptions on Internal Reputation of their franchise systems, consumers’ 
assessments on firms’ External Reputation determine consumers’ willingness to establish 
firm-consumer relationships.  If a firm wants to retain its existing consumers and hopes to 
develop a long-term relationship with them, then having a strong external reputation in 
the marketplace seems to help.  In sum, firms with strong reputations have a better 
chance of satisfying their key stakeholders than firms with weak reputations.  When a 
firm has a good reputation in stakeholders’ minds, stakeholders are more likely to be 
committed to the firm, more willing to spread positive word-of-mouth to other 
stakeholders about the firm, and more likely to retain their transactional relationships 
with the firm.  
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The Relationship between Firm Strategies and Consequences.  The relationships 
between the three key firm strategies in franchise systems: Standardization (H3 and H4), 
Innovativeness (H5 and H6), and Communication (H7 and H8), and the four 
consequences of firm reputation are also tested by HLM.  Three firm strategies are 
included in the model as firm-level variables.  In the franchisee-level study (Table 3-2), 
both the H3 and H5 predicted a negative relationship between Standardization and 
Innovativeness and the four consequence variables, while H7 proposed a positive 
relationship between Communication and consequences.  First, three out of the four 
consequences associated with H3 are supported.  Standardization is significantly and 
negatively related to franchisees’ Satisfaction (                   , Commitment 
(                   , and Purchasing Intention (                   ; however, 
the relationship between Standardization and WOM Intention of franchisees is not found 
to be significant (    :           .).  Second, none of four effects associated with H5 
were supported.  Even though the relationship between Innovativeness and franchisees’ 
Satisfaction was statistically significant, the direction was opposite from the prediction 
(                  .  The associations between Innovativeness and the three other 
consequence variables were not significant.  Lastly, among the Communication strategy’s 
effects only the WOM Intention of franchisees (H7c) is supported.  Firms’ willingness to 
communicate effectively with their franchisees was found to be positively associated with 
franchisees’ WOM Intention (                  .   
The consumer-level study (Table 3-3) proposed that all three firm strategies (i.e., 
Standardization (H4), Innovativeness (H6), and Communication (H8)) are positively 
related to four consequence variables.  First, Standardization (H4) is positively and 
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significantly related with all four relational consequences.  Standardization is positively 
related to consumers’ Satisfaction (                  .), Commitment (        
           , WOM Intention (                   and Purchasing Intention 
(                      Second, the relationships between Innovativeness and 
consumers’ relational sentiments toward firms (H6) were not found to be significant.  
Finally, three out of the four consequences for Communication (H8) were supported, 
excluding the relationship between Communication and consumers’ Commitment (     
            .  The effective communication strategy between a firm and its 
franchisees is positively associated with consumers’ Satisfaction (             
     , WOM Intention (                     and Purchasing Intention (        
           .   
In sum, four hypotheses (H3a, H3b, H3d, and H7c) are supported in the 
franchisee-level study, while seven hypotheses (H4a, H4b, H4c, H4d, H8a, H8c, and 
H8d) are supported in the consumer-level study (see Table 3-4).  Even though 
Standardization reduces franchisees’ Satisfaction, Commitment, and Purchasing 
Intention, it enhances consumers’ Satisfaction, Commitment, WOM Intention, and 
Purchasing Intention.  The influence would appear to be that “Business-format” franchise 
systems should standardize their processes to maintain the quality of goods and services 
in order to gain consumer patronage.  However, franchisees continue to be dissatisfied by 
the standardized processes.  Apparently, franchisees view standardization of systems to 
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TABLE 3-4 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Hypotheses 
Predicted 
Direction 
Result 
 
Franchisee Hypotheses 
H1   a Internal FR  Satisfaction + Supported 
b Internal FR  Commitment + Supported 
c Internal FR  WOM Intention + Supported 
d Internal FR  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H3   a Standardization  Satisfaction − Supported 
b Standardization  Commitment − Supported 
c Standardization  WOM Intention − Rejected 
d Standardization  Purchasing Intention − Supported 
    
H5   a Innovativeness  Satisfaction − Rejected 
b Innovativeness  Commitment − Rejected 
c Innovativeness  WOM Intention − Rejected 
d Innovativeness  Purchasing Intention − Rejected 
    
H7   a Communication  Satisfaction + Rejected 
b Communication  Commitment + Rejected 
c Communication  WOM Intention + Supported 
d Communication  Purchasing Intention + Rejected 
    
H9   a Internal FR x Standardization  Satisfaction + Supported 
b Internal FR x Standardization  Commitment + Supported 
c Internal FR x Standardization  WOM Intention + Rejected 
d Internal FR x Standardization  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H10 a Internal FR x Standardization  Satisfaction + Rejected 
b Internal FR x Standardization  Commitment + Rejected 
c Internal FR x Standardization  WOM Intention + Rejected 
d Internal FR x Standardization  Purchasing Intention + Rejected 
    
H11 a Internal FR x Innovativeness  Satisfaction + Rejected 
b Internal FR x Innovativeness  Commitment + Rejected 
c Internal FR x Innovativeness  WOM Intention + Supported 
d Internal FR x Innovativeness  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
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TABLE 3-4 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Hypotheses 
Predicted 
Direction 
Result 
 
Consumer Hypotheses 
H2   a External FR  Satisfaction + Supported 
b External FR  Commitment + Supported 
c External FR  WOM Intention + Supported 
d External FR  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H4   a Standardization  Satisfaction + Supported 
b Standardization  Commitment + Supported 
c Standardization  WOM Intention + Supported 
d Standardization  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H6   a Innovativeness  Satisfaction + Rejected 
b Innovativeness  Commitment + Rejected 
c Innovativeness  WOM Intention + Rejected 
d Innovativeness  Purchasing Intention + Rejected 
    
H8   a Communication  Satisfaction + Supported 
b Communication  Commitment + Rejected 
c Communication  WOM Intention + Supported 
d Communication  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H12 a External FR x Standardization  Satisfaction + Rejected 
b External FR x Standardization  Commitment + Rejected 
c External FR x Standardization  WOM Intention + Supported 
d External FR x Standardization  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H13 a External FR x Standardization  Satisfaction + Rejected 
b External FR x Standardization  Commitment + Rejected 
c External FR x Standardization  WOM Intention + Supported 
d External FR x Standardization  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
    
H14 a External FR x Innovativeness  Satisfaction + Supported 
b External FR x Innovativeness  Commitment + Rejected 
c External FR x Innovativeness  WOM Intention + Rejected 
d External FR x Innovativeness  Purchasing Intention + Supported 
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be there to monitor franchisees’ operations in the marketplace, and seem to feel that their 
autonomy and entrepreneurial desires are stifled by such a firm strategy.  Firms’ 
Innovativeness is positively associated to franchisees’ Satisfaction, even though 
consumers’ relational sentiments to firms are not influenced by Innovativeness.  
Franchisees’ suggestions and contributions have to be integrated by their franchisors.  
Thus, franchisees are more likely to be satisfied with firms when firms are more 
accepting of franchisees’ innovations in their franchise systems.  However, firm-
consumer relationships are not influenced by firms’ Innovativeness.  Firms’ strategy on 
Communication with their franchisees is significantly related to franchisees’ WOM 
Intention.  Communication strategy also strengthens firms’ relational sentiments 
regarding consumers’ Satisfaction, WOM Intention, and Purchasing Intention.  When 
firms proactively communicate with their downstream channel members like franchisees, 
their endeavors of communication with the franchisee group seem to influence the value 
positioning in consumers’ minds as well. 
Interaction Effects of FR in the Relationship between Firm Strategies and 
Consequences.  The interaction effects of FR and the three key firm strategies in 
franchise systems: Standardization (H9 and H12), Innovativeness (H10 and H13), and 
Communication (H11 and H14), and four consequences of firm reputation were also 
tested by HLM.  In particular, the franchisee-level study (Table 3-2) proposes that 
interaction effects between firm strategies (i.e., Standardization (H9), Innovativeness 
(H10), and Communication (H11)) and Internal Reputation will significantly influence 
the four consequence variables.  First, three interaction effects between Standardization 
and Internal Reputation (H9) were supported: (1) the interaction effect on Satisfaction 
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(                  , (2) the interaction effect on Commitment (             
     , and (3) the interaction effect on Purchasing Intention (                  ; 
however, the interaction effect of Standardization and Internal Reputation does not 
appear to exert an influence on franchisees’ WOM Intentions (              .).  The 
stronger the Internal Reputation, the stronger becomes the negative impact of 
Standardization on franchisees’ Satisfaction, Commitment, and Purchasing Intention.  
Second, H10 was not supported.  Even though the interaction effect between 
Innovativeness and Internal Reputation on franchisees’ Satisfaction was statistically 
significant, the direction was opposite from that proposed (     :               .  It 
appears that the stronger the Internal Reputation, the weaker is the positive impact of 
Innovativeness on franchisees’ Satisfaction.  There were no significant interaction effects 
of Innovativeness and Internal Reputation on three other consequence variables.  Third, 
two out of four hypothesized interaction effects of Communication and Internal 
Reputation (H11) were supported.  As Internal Reputation enhances, so too does the 
impact of Communication on franchisees’ WOM Intention (                   and 
Purchasing Intention (                   .  The interaction effects of Communication 
and Internal Reputation on Purchasing Intention (H11d) is found to be significant while 
the main effect of Communication did not have any significant influence on Purchasing 
Intention (H7d).  But the interaction effects of Communication and Internal Reputation 
do not have a significant influence on franchisees’ Satisfaction or Commitment.    
Like the franchisee-level study, the interaction effects between three firm 
strategies (i.e., Standardization (H12), Innovativeness (H13), and Communication (H14)) 
and External Reputation were proposed for the consumer-level study.  The findings are as 
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follows (Table 3-3).  First, two interaction terms of Standardization and External 
Reputation (H12) were supported, and this result shows that the impact of 
Standardization on WOM Intention (                    and Purchasing Intention 
(                     are enhanced as External Reputation rises.  However, contrary 
to a prior expectation, the interaction effect between Standardization and External 
Reputation has a negatively significant impact on consumers’ Satisfaction (         
           ) and Commitment (                         As consumers’ 
perceptions on External Reputation rise, the strength of the positive influence of 
Standardization on Satisfaction and Commitment seems to decline.  These are surprising 
effects since the positive influence of Standardization on Satisfaction and Commitment 
decreases when franchise systems have strong reputation.  Second, the stronger the 
External Reputation, the stronger is the impact of Innovativeness of firms on Word-of 
Mouth Intention of consumers (                      and Purchasing Intention 
(                       There were no significant interaction effects between 
Innovativeness and the two other consequence variables of Satisfaction and Commitment.  
Lastly, two out of the four interaction effects of Communication and External Reputation 
(H14) were supported.  As External Reputation with consumers grows, the impacts of 
Communication on Satisfaction (                     and Purchasing Intention 
(                      become stronger.  But, the interaction effects between 
Communication and External Reputation on consumers’ Commitment and WOM 
Intention are not found to be significant. 
In sum, five interaction effects (H9a, H9b, H9d, H11c, and H11d) are supported 
in the franchisee-level study (Table 3-2), while six interaction effects (H12c, H12d, 
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H13c, H13d, H14a, and H14d) are supported in the consumer-level study (Table 3-3).  In 
general, the stronger FR among both stakeholder groups, the stronger the impact of 
Standardization on stakeholders’ relational sentiments, but the weaker the impact of 
Standardization on consumers’ Satisfaction (H12a) and Commitment (H12b).  Even 
though none of the proposed main effects between Innovativeness and firm performance 
in consumers’ perspectives were supported (H6), the result shows that the impact of 
Innovativeness on WOM Intention (H13c) and Purchasing Intention (H13d) increases if 
Internal Reputation increases.  Consumers’ intentions to “spread the word” out to other 
stakeholders is more likely to be influenced by Innovativeness of franchise systems as 
consumers’ assessment of firm reputation becomes stronger.  As franchisees’ judgment of 
Internal Reputation increase, the influence of the Communication strategies of firms 
increases franchisees’ WOM Intention (H11c) and Purchasing Intention (H11d) toward 
their focal firm.  Firms’ communication strategy toward their franchisees has a greater 
impact on consumers’ Satisfaction (H14a) and Purchasing Intention (H14d) when 
consumers rate the external reputation of franchisors strongly.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study seeks to broaden our understanding of the roles of firm strategies and 
firm reputation in firm-stakeholder relationships.  I have developed the linkages among 
firm strategies, firm reputation, and firm performance by integrating both agency theory 
and stakeholder theory.  In this study, firms’ strategies with their marketing channels are 
linked to the development of exchange relationships with their franchisees as well as the 
end consumers.  In essence, then, the study sheds light on how firms can optimize their 
187 
 
reputations with two distinct stakeholder groups through strategies focused on just 
stakeholder group.    
Theoretical Implications. 
In this study, the impact of firm strategies in marketing channel management has 
been hypothesized to influence firms’ exchange relationships with multiple stakeholder 
groups.  Freeman (1984, p.101) developed a typology to answer “what does a firm stand 
for,” and within the typology, the five different firm-level strategies discussed were the 
following: (1) specific stakeholder strategy, (2) stockholder strategy, (3) utilitarian 
strategy, (4) Rawlsian strategy, and (5) social harmony strategy.
35
  Based on the Freeman 
typology (1984), previous studies have emphasized “stockholder strategy” by focusing on 
optimizing returns to stockholders (more broadly, the market value of the firm) (Clarkson 
1995; Hillman and Keim 2001; McWilliams and Siegel 2001).  Even though previous 
literature on stakeholder-oriented strategic approaches has discussed various firms’ social 
performance, the consequences of firms’ strategic orientation were generally related to 
just financial performance (Berman et al., 1999; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003).  In 
marketing literature, “specific stakeholder strategy” has often been discussed to 
understand optimizing the returns to a small set of stakeholders like consumers (Luo and 
Bhattacharya 2006; Maignan and Ferrell 2004).   
                                                 
35
 Freeman developed a typology of five generic enterprise level strategies which can be seen as achieving 
“fit” among stakeholders, values, and social issues. First, specific stakeholder strategy refers to the 
actions of the firm that maximize benefits to one or a small set of stakeholders.  Second, the essence of 
stockholder strategy is to maximize benefits to stockholders (broadly financial stakeholders).  Third, 
utilitarian strategy refers to firms’ actions that try to improve benefits for a greater number of 
stakeholders and potentially raise the general welfare of society.  Forth, Rawlsian strategy refers to firms’ 
strategy to raise the level of the least well-off stakeholder and promote equal opportunity to all 
stakeholders.  Finally, social harmony strategy refers to firms’ actions to gain consensus from society, 
and the principles of social harmony comes from values of communitarianism (Freeman, 1984, p.101-
110). 
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However, the findings of this study involve a discussion of stakeholder 
management from using the “stockholder strategy” and the “specific stakeholder 
strategy” to using the “utilitarian strategy,” or a hybrid form of strategies.  According to 
Freeman (1984), the “utilitarian strategy” states that the existence of firms is to create 
value to a wide range of various stakeholder groups.  This study examined how firm 
strategies specific to marketing channel members, like franchisees, affect firms’ exchange 
relationships with franchisees and consumers.  The investigation of a wide range of 
effects on various stakeholders using the “utilitarian strategy” is more realistic and robust 
from a theoretical standpoint.  For instance, the notion that firms’ communication 
strategy toward their franchisees may influence firms’ relationship with their end 
consumers is supported by the results, as opposed to the influence of communication 
merely directly targeted to a stakeholder group.  Moreover, issues like standardization in 
franchise systems can be an important consideration for various stakeholder groups (e.g., 
Government, suppliers, or consumer interest groups).  From franchisors’ perspective, the 
establishment of standardized procedures in their franchise systems is closely related to 
their performance in the marketplace.  Even though franchisees may feel standardized 
procedures forced upon them by firms violate their sense of autonomy, standardization 
helps consumers form the initial referential points for their expectations.   Standardization 
in franchise systems also influences regulators to monitor work standards in the labor 
market (e.g., the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Small Business Administration) 
and qualities of products and services that are acceptable for the regulations (e.g., the 
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission and the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection 
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Service).  Franchisors effectively reduce the amounts of resources that Government has 
to expend to regulate individual business owners in the marketplace.   
By examining the agency and stakeholder theories of the firm, this study attempts 
to construct a paradigm that explains the marketing channel and branding strategies of a 
firm.  Proposed hypotheses suggest how firms can manage their reputation by balancing 
the interests of various stakeholder groups.  As an implication for both theory and 
business practice, the integration of agency and stakeholder theories suggests that firms 
can prioritize the importance of key stakeholders’ interest to their organizations.  Firms 
can develop long-term strategies and daily operational strategies to avoid conflict 
between objectives and interests from different stakeholder groups.  The interaction 
results revealed in this study clearly show that it does not make sense to deal with 
individual stakeholder groups in isolation.   
Since the interests of each stakeholder group vary, developing consistent 
strategies that are tailored to the interests of each stakeholder group is difficult (Scott and 
Lane 2000).  Even with strategies developed through stakeholder analysis, the practical 
implementation of these strategies in the marketplace may be nearly impossible to 
implement. Managers may be able to cluster the trade-off values among different 
stakeholder groups.  Firms can analyze how strategies directed at a specific stakeholder 
group may influence other stakeholder groups that share similar interests.  Or if firms’ 
strategies regarding a specific stakeholder group are in conflict with interests of another 
stakeholder group, then firms need to attempt to develop a strategy that balances the 
welfare of both stakeholder groups in an equitable fashion.  It is possible that creditors 
and institutional investors want firms to minimize costs and long-term investments but 
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firms’ investments in franchise systems benefit suppliers and franchisees.  Thus, this 
study furthers the relevance and implications of stakeholder theory to broader topics in 
strategic management.   
Managerial Implications 
Firm reputation is a key driver to firms’ relationships with both franchisees and 
consumers.  In addition, firm reputation plays an important role as a moderator for firm 
strategy and relational consequences with stakeholders.  When a firm intends to tailor 
positioning strategies differently for each stakeholder group, it may choose to delineate 
the market approach suitable for the interests of each stakeholder group involved.  But 
then its reputation may be jeopardized in the long run.  When firms employ strategies for 
a specific stakeholder group, it is important for firms to derive their strategies based on a 
coherent and cohesive view by considering all stakeholders involved.  It may then prove 
easier for firms to find a way to explain the legitimate reasons for firms’ actions in the 
marketplace, even though individual stakeholder groups may view a particular firm’s 
actions with mixed feelings.  
Firms’ standardization strategies have different directional impacts for franchisees 
and consumers.  Franchisees are not as favorable toward firms’ standardization strategies 
and the franchisees’ satisfaction, commitment, and purchasing intentions are negatively 
related to standardization.  The general rule in franchise contracts provides franchisors 
the right of complete or substantial control over their franchisees under the premise that 
they are businesses started by the franchisors who then recruited franchisees for business 
expansion.  Franchisors often set qualifications for the franchisees’ employees and the 
standards for their demeanor.  For example, the pizza chain, Domino’s has specific 
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employment hiring requirements for all pizza delivery employees throughout its franchise 
system.  Specifically, Domino’s has standards that are focused on employees’ personal 
hygiene, which address facial and dyed hair, jewelry, tattoos, fingernails, nail polish, 
body piercing, and clothing.  Domino’s enforcement of these standards can even lead to 
the termination of its franchise contracts with franchisees that violate such standards.  As 
a result, Domino’s franchisees are likely to experience frustration through the substantial 
controls placed upon them by their franchisor because of the implementation of such 
standards.    
However, standardization positively influences consumers’ satisfaction, 
commitment, WOM intention, and purchasing intentions.  Standardization is a critical 
matter for (franchising) firms.  Standardization allows firms to reduce monitoring costs 
and deliver quality-assured products and services throughout their franchise systems.  It 
is understandable from a firm perspective as to why franchisees may not favor 
standardization.  However, firms need to explain the unrealized benefits that franchisees 
will receive in the long run.  When firms present the legitimate reasons why certain 
strategies have to be employed through effective communication, franchisees may be 
better able to accept the chosen actions of firms.   
Moreover, the above associations become stronger as firm reputation increases.  
Contrary to our expectation, the interaction effects between standardization and firm 
reputation are found to be significantly positive for franchisees’ satisfaction, 
commitment, and purchasing intention.  Similar patterns of positive interaction effects are 
found for consumers’ WOM intention and purchasing intention.  However, the negative 
interaction effects of standardization and external firm reputation are found for 
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consumers’ satisfaction and commitment.  It is possible that consumers’ expectations for 
purchasing standard products and services from reputable firms are high.  It is much more 
difficult for reputable franchisors to enhance consumers’ satisfaction and commitment 
through their standardization strategy compared to franchise systems with low reputation. 
At the same time, consumers are more likely to have a favorable view and repeatedly 
visit reputable franchisors that deliver uniform products and services to them.  These 
findings also show that utilizing standardization strategy is critical, but more challenging 
for reputable franchisors.  Having a strong reputation in the marketplace helps franchisors 
to utilize their standardization strategy more effectively, since firm reputation is one of 
the sources of franchisors’ power.   
The Innovativeness of franchisors positively influences franchisees’ satisfaction.  
Franchisees may feel that the innovativeness of franchisors supports their operations 
since franchisees are likely to be more innovative while they search for their own answers 
through their experiments in franchised units.  However, this association between 
innovativeness and franchisees’ satisfaction decreases as internal firm reputation 
increases.  Firms’ innovativeness is more useful for franchisors with low internal 
reputation.  In this study, using Hurley and Hult (1998)’s scales, innovativeness strategy 
is measured by the acceptability and openness of franchisors toward innovative ideas in 
the franchise system. Innovativeness strategy of each franchise system can be expected to 
be different and may even change over time.  For example, McDonalds’ previously had a 
high level of innovativeness and many of its popular menu items were developed by 
franchisees’ innovative ideas.  However, McDonalds’ later changed its innovativeness 
strategy since it found it more efficient to conduct firm-level in-house innovation rather 
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than accepting, testing, and launching franchisees’ innovation ideas in their operating 
units.  This reversal may have been caused by the size of the franchise system or the re-
structuring of governance.  It is well accepted that vertically integrated governance 
allows a firm to be more efficiently reflected in the marketplace than in a hybrid system 
like the franchising structure.  However, Domino’s pizza continues to have a high level of 
innovativeness towards the acceptance of franchisees’ innovative ideas.  Since testing the 
new pizza dishes and promoting the new menu in all operating units does not seem too 
costly for the franchisor to roll out, relatively speaking, Domino’s pizza can presumably 
still keep its strategy for innovativeness.   
Also, the kinds of innovation acceptable/desirable for each stakeholder group may 
be different.  From a consumer perspective, “product” attributes of innovation are likely 
to be considered to be the most important, while the “operationally efficient” attributes of 
innovation are expected to be considered more important for the franchisees.  Thus, the 
different aspects of innovation may have different impacts from the perspectives of 
different stakeholder groups. 
Firms’ communication strategies positively influence their relationships with 
franchisees’ WOM intentions.  Franchisees believe their firms are reliable when the firms 
are willing to hear franchisees’ opinions and issues.  Franchisees sense that they have a 
shared mutual understanding of their business and are more willing to talk about their 
system when firms communicate effectively.  The results show that when firms employ 
adequate communication strategies with their franchisees, those franchisees are more 
willing to spread WOM about their positive experiences with their franchise systems.  
Firms’ communication strategies with their channel members also exhibit statistically 
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significant impacts on consumers’ satisfaction, WOM intention and purchasing intention.  
This clearly demonstrates that firms’ channel relations influence firms’ relationship with 
other stakeholder groups as well.  A firm that has the ability and the willingness to 
communicate with one stakeholder group can reach a separate stakeholder group by 
utilizing this ability conscientiously.  The magnitude of the impact between 
communication and firm performance with consumers (that is, consumer satisfaction and 
purchasing intentions) increases as firm reputation increases.  
Limitations and Further Research 
Despite some notable findings, this empirical study has some limitations that raise 
opportunities for future research.  First, unidimensional FR measures are adopted in this 
study to compare the overall FR from the perspectives of two different stakeholder 
groups (i.e., franchisees and consumers).  By employing multi-dimensional FR measures, 
our understanding on why firm strategies have different impacts on different stakeholder 
groups can be advanced.  It would be valuable to measure FR with multiple dimensions 
from various stakeholders and to examine which dimensions of FR are considered the 
most important (e.g., Fraj-Andres, Marinez-Salinas, and Matute-Vallejo 2009).  In 
particular, we may understand why the interaction between standardization and external 
reputation has positive effects on satisfaction and commitment while the interaction has 
negative effects on WOM Intention and purchasing Intention.  
Second, there is a possible sample selection bias associated with any typical 
multilevel approach to analysis.  A larger sample study at the franchisor and franchisee 
level may have helped find more significant effects in this study, and a potential 
explanation for a lack of support on proposed hypotheses has to do with the relatively 
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small sample sizes.  Since there are only 29 different franchisors and about seven 
franchisees representing each franchise system, the sample that is used in this study may 
not represent the characteristics of franchisees in large franchise systems.  In particular, 
as revealed during phone interviews, different franchisees even within the same franchise 
system had different attitudes and expectations from their franchisors.  These differences 
may be related to franchisees’ differential expectations and motivations as to why they 
joined their franchise systems.  Some viewed joining the franchise system as an easy 
investment, some perceived their relationship with the franchisor as a partnership, and yet 
others complained about being abused by their franchisors with asymmetric power and 
unfair contracts.  Thus, an expanded sample size may provide different findings on the 
linkages among firm strategies, firm reputation, and firm performance.   
Moreover, discriminant validity of channel strategies could not be tested due to 
the small franchisor sample of only 29.  For instance, regarding the standardization 
strategy, it is difficult to see how franchisors would monitor their franchisees without use 
of effective communication.  Intuitively, effective communication can be expected to 
help franchisors execute standardization in franchise systems.  In short, the independence 
of each construct for the franchisor-level variables could not be clearly verified in the 
study given the small sample size. 
Fourth, although this study avoided potential common method biases by 
collecting data from two different sources in each model (e.g., the firm and franchisee 
datasets were employed for the franchisee-model), the direct measures of how 
stakeholders evaluate standardization, innovativeness, and communication is not 
contained in the model.  The possibility of a gap between firms’ assessment of their 
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channel strategies in their franchise systems and stakeholders’ assessment on firms’ 
strategies in the marketplace cannot be ruled out.  Future studies may benefit from a 
direct measure of firms’ standardization, innovativeness, and communication strategies 
from various stakeholder groups of franchise systems and compare them with the self-
assessments of firms presented here.  
Despite these limitations, the findings contribute to the understanding of 
stakeholder management.  Franchisees are unique to franchise systems, and they are a 
special stakeholder group that can be examined from various perspectives.  Franchisees 
can be considered as an investor that brings capital resources to their franchisors, as an 
employee that brings labor resources in franchise systems, as a marketing channel 
member in value delivery systems, and as a consumer in the B2B market.  It is valuable 
to discuss how franchisees are different from other stakeholder groups, how firms’ 
strategies for their franchisees influence the perceptions of other stakeholder groups, and 
how firms’ strategies for other stakeholder groups may influence the perceptions of their 
franchisees.  Future research should replicate this study by comparing franchisees with 
other stakeholder groups, such as capital investors (e.g., stockholders or institutional 
owners), employees, and downstream channel members of the multi-channel structures.  
This expanded stakeholder analysis should further our understanding of stakeholder 
management in the franchise context.   
Furthermore, future studies should test non-linearity of channel strategies.  In both 
franchisee and consumer models, the innovativeness related hypotheses were not 
supported.  The lack of support on such hypotheses may have been caused by the non-
linear relationships between channel strategies and relational performance consequences.  
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APPENDIX D 
MEASUREMENT SCALES FOR ESSAY 2 
 
Latent Constructs and Items 
Factor loadings 
Franc-
hisor 
Franc-
hisee 
Cons 
-umer 
 
Internal Reputation (Franchisees): Reliability = .93; AVE Estimate = .90 
   
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly 
agree”) 
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000 
   
 My overall perceptions of total experience with this franchise system are very good. ― .85 ― 
 My perceptions of our (this) franchise system compared to its competitors are very 
good. 
― .89 ― 
 I believe in the good long-term future for this franchise system. ― .83 ― 
 I believe the market standing of this franchise system is excellent. ― .87 ― 
 I believe the market visibility of this franchise system is high. ― .77 ― 
    
External Reputation (Consumers): Reliability = .81; AVE Estimate = .68    
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever (2000) 
 My overall perceptions of total experience with this brand are very good. ― ― .72 
 My perceptions of our franchise (this) brand compared to its competitors are very good. ― ― .73 
 I believe in the good long-term future for this brand. ― ― .77 
 I believe the market standing of this franchise system is high. ― ― .63 
 
Satisfaction (Franchisees & Consumers) 
Franchisees: Reliability = .93; AVE Estimate = .90 
Consumers: Reliability = .95; AVE Estimate = .94 
 
 
 
Adapted from Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990); Ganesan (1994)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”; a = franchisee level, b = consumer level) 
 I am satisfied with this franchise systema (a franchised fast-food restaurantb).  ― .87 .95 
 I am pleased with my franchisora (a franchised fast-food restaurantb).  ― .90 .95 
 The relationship quality that I have with my franchisora (this brandb) is excellent.  ― .85 .89 
 
Financial Performance (Franchisors & Franchisees) 
Franchisors: Reliability = .92; AVE Estimate = .90 
Franchisees: Reliability = .95; AVE Estimate = .94 
   
Adapted from Cavusgil and Zou (1994) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”;  
a = franchisor level, b = franchisee level) 
 The forecast of the performance of our systema (my businessb) in this year is very 
positive. 
.38 .74 ― 
 Wea (Ib) would rate the performance of our systema (my businessb) over the last five 
year in terms of sales growth as very successful. 
.87 .89 ― 
 Wea (Ib) would rate the performance of our systema (my businessb) over the last five 
year in terms of profits growth as very successful. 
.93 .92 ― 
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APPENDIX E 
FRANCHISOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear Franchisor: 
We would like to invite you to help us understand the factors that make your franchise 
system more competitive, successful, and reputable.  This questionnaire is designed to help 
us better understand the strategies you use to develop better relationships with your 
franchisee partners and to serve the end consumers.  This project seeks to understand what 
makes your franchise system attractive based on data collected from you, your franchisees 
and your ultimate customers. 
 
This study is being conducted by the University of Oklahoma in the U.S and Asia Pacific 
Centre for Franchising Excellence in Griffith University.  Your individual responses are 
guaranteed to be kept CONFIDENTIAL.  The attached questionnaire will take around 15 
minutes to complete.   
 
By the way of an incentive, if you participate in this survey, we will provide you with a 
customized report on how your franchisees and your final consumers think about your 
system.  Should this be of interest to you, please indicate this on the last page of the 
questionnaire. 
 
If you choose to help us with this study, we request that you try to complete all the questions 
since complete sets of responses facilitate our ability to properly analyze all of our 
data.  However, if you feel there is some risk involved in completing the survey and you are 
uncomfortable completing it, then you are free to exit the survey any time you wish. 
 
Thank you in advance for assisting us with this important research. 
 
Jean Jeon 
The University of Oklahoma 
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APPENDIX E (CONT.) 
FRANCHISOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
SECTION 1: This section seeks your opinions about your strategies in general.  To answer, review the 
statements below, and indicate your answers by checking the boxes that best reflect your opinions. 
 
Communication  
Adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 We keep our franchisees well informed about our products and what is going on in our franchise system.  
 Our franchise system and our franchisees make it a point to keep each other well informed.  
 We hesitate to give our franchisees too much information. (R)  
 We are quite involved in operations of the franchisee-owned outlets.  
 Our franchisees seek our advice and counsel concerning their operation efforts.  
 Our franchisees are willing to let us see their weaknesses as well as their strengths.  
 
Standardization  
Adapted from Hsieh, Chou, and Chen (2002) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 We follow standard operating procedures in our franchise system.  
 Franchisees are asked to strictly follow these operating procedures at all times.  
 This standardized procedure facilitates monitoring consistency in quality of franchise operations.  
 Our franchise system has standard procedures to deal with all possible situations.  
 Every franchisee in our franchise system has been provided with well defined operating procedures to 
follow.  
 
Innovation  
Adapted from Hurley and Hult (1998) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 Innovation, based on franchisees’ suggestions, is readily accepted by us.  
 Our franchise system actively seeks innovative ideas.  
 Innovation is readily accepted in program/ project management in our franchise system.  
 Franchisees are penalized for new ideas that don’t work (R).  
 Innovation in our franchise system is perceived as too risky and is resisted (R).  
 
Quantity of sustainable strategy  
Adapted from Blum-Kusterer and Hussain (2001)  
Please indicate whether or not your system engages in the following monitoring activities (Check all that 
apply) 
Assessment of the impact of your products and services on (1 = “yes,” and 2 = “no”) 
 Environment  
 Society  
 Climate change  
 Human rights 
 Animal Welfare 
 
If yes, how frequently are you involved in such activities? (1 = “very infrequently,” and 7 = “very 
frequently”) 
 Environment  
 Society  
 Climate change  
 Human rights 
 Animal Welfare 
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APPENDIX E (CONT.) 
FRANCHISOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
SECTION 2: This section seeks your opinions about how you view on the reputation of your franchise 
system in the market.  Please review the statements below, and indicate your answers by checking the 
boxes that best reflect your opinions. 
 
External reputation  
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000 
 Consumers’ overall perceptions of total experience with our brand are very good. 
 Consumers’ perceptions of our franchise brand compared to our competitors are very good. 
 Consumers believe in the good long-term future for our franchise brand. 
 Consumers believe in the market standing of our franchise system. 
 Consumers’ perceptions of the market visibility of our franchise system are high. 
 
Internal reputation 
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000 
 Franchisees’ overall perceptions of total experience with our franchise system are very good.  
 Franchisees’ perceptions of our franchise system compared to our competitors are very good.  
 Franchisees believe in the good long-term future for our franchise system.  
 Franchisees believe in the market standing of our franchise system.  
 Franchisees’ perceptions of the market visibility of our franchise system are high.  
SECTION 3: This section seeks to measure the overall financial performance of your franchise system. 
Financial performance 
Adapted from Cavusgil and Zou (1994) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 Our forecast of the performance of our system in this year (2011) is very positive.  
 We would rate the performance of our system over the last five year in terms of sales growth as very 
successful.  
 We would rate the performance of our system over the last five year in terms of profits growth as very 
successful.  
 We would rate the performance of our system over the last five year in terms of overall profitability as 
very successful.  
 We would rate the return on investment of our system over the last five year as very positive.  
 
Please indicate sales growth rates of your outlet in the last five years by checking the appropriate category 
in each column. (1 = “large negative growth,” 2 = “moderate negative growth”, 3 = “small negative 
growth,” 4 = “no growth”, 5 = “small positive growth,” 6 = “moderate positive growth”, and 7 = “large 
positive growth”) 
 Last year (2010) 
 Two years ago (2009) 
 Three years ago (2008) 
 Four years ago (2007) 
 Five years ago (2006) 
 
Was your business profitable over the last five years?  (1 = “yes,” and 2 = “no”) 
 Last year (2010) 
 Two years ago (2009) 
 Three years ago (2008) 
 Four years ago (2007) 
 Five years ago (2006) 
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APPENDIX E (CONT.) 
FRANCHISOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
SECTION 4: Demographics 
This final set of questions is aimed at getting an overview of your business and information that is often 
provided to the prospective franchisees.  We absolutely guarantee that your individual responses will 
never be revealed and this data will be used only in combined form for research purposes. 
 
 Franchise Trade Name:  _________ 
 Contact Name: ________________ 
 Position: _____________________ 
 E-mail: ______________________ 
 Telephone: ___________________ 
 
 Company was founded in (year): _________ 
 First year as franchisor was :    ___________ 
 Actual number of Franchised Units as of 7/01/2011 _____ units 
 Actual number of Company-Owned Units as of 
7/01/2011 
_____ units 
 
 What is the minimum net worth required from a perspective franchise?    $ _________ 
 What is the range of total investment required?   From $ _________     to $ _________                        
 How much is the on-going royalty fee?    _________  % or $ _________                       
 
 What is the location and duration of any initial training sessions included in the franchise fee? 
Location    Duration 
A. _________ _________ 
B. _________ _________ 
C. _________ _________ 
 
 Which of the following on-going services do you provide to the franchisee?  
(Please check all the boxes that apply) 
Service Included in Fees 
At additional 
Cost 
Not Available 
Central Data Processing    
Central Purchasing    
Field Operations Evaluation    
Field Training    
Initial Store Opening    
Inventory Control    
Franchisee Newsletter    
Regional or National Meetings    
Telephone Hotline for 
franchisees    
 
 Yes, I am interested in receiving a customized report on how my franchisees and my final customers 
think about  
     our system. 
Please email the report to: ______________________________________ 
 
Any comments for the research team? 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this important survey. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this important survey. 
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APPENDIX F 
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear Franchisee, 
We would like to invite you to help us understand the factors that make your franchise 
system more competitive, successful, and reputable.  The questionnaire is designed to help 
us better understand how franchise systems create values for the end consumers.  This 
project seeks to understand what makes your franchise system attractive based on data 
collected from you, your franchisor and your ultimate customers. 
 
This study is being conducted by the University of Oklahoma in the U.S.  Your individual 
responses are guaranteed to be kept CONFIDENTIAL.  The attached questionnaire will take 
around 15 minutes to complete.   
 
If you choose to help us with this study, we request that you try to complete all the questions 
since such complete set of response facilitate our ability to properly analyze all of our data.  
However, if you feel there is some risk involved in completing the survey and you are 
uncomfortable completing it, then you are free to exit the survey any time you wish. 
 
Thank you in advance for assisting us with this important research. 
 
 
Jean Jeon 
The University of Oklahoma 
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APPENDIX F (CONT.) 
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
SECTION 1: This section seeks your opinions about how you feel about your relationship with your 
franchisor in general.  To answer, review the statements below, and indicate your answers by checking the 
boxes that best reflect your opinions. 
 
Communication  
Adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 My franchisor keeps me well-informed about its products and what is going on in the franchise system. 
 My franchisor and I make it a point to keep each other well informed.  
 My franchisor hesitates to give me too much information. (R)  
 My franchisor is quite involved in operations of my outlet.  
 I often seek advice and counsel concerning my operation efforts from my franchisor.  
 My franchisor is willing to let me see weaknesses of the franchise system as well as its strengths.  
 
Relational commitment  
Adapted from Chaudhuri and Holbrook (2002); Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 I am committed to this franchise system. 
 I would be willing to pay a higher price to join this franchise system over other brands if I had to do this 
over. 
 I intend to acquire additional units of this franchise system in the future. 
 I intend to keep interesting in the development of this brand. 
 My franchisor and I have a mutually beneficial relationship. 
 
 I enjoy working with this franchisor.  
 It feels like the franchisor and I are constantly doing something for each other.  
 I feel as though the franchisor and I are “in it together”.  
 I feel that the values of this franchise system match my own.  
 The franchisor and I get along well together.  
 The franchisor and I tend to share similar values.  
 
Brand Equity  
Adapted from Yoo and Donthu (2001) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 I consider myself to be loyal to my franchisor.  
 My franchisor would always be my first choice as a business partner.  
 I will not buy another brand of franchise system if purchasing an additional outlet is available through 
my current franchisor.  
 I feel attached to my franchise system.  
 I put in quite a great deal of effort when I made the decision to join this franchise system.  
 My franchise system is well accepted by the marketplace.  
 Consumers have a very good impression of my franchise system. 
 My franchise system offers great value for my investment. 
 The brand of my franchise system is well recognized among its competing brands.  
 I am acutely aware of my franchise system’s brand image.  
 Characteristics unique to my franchise system are truly memorable. 
 I can quickly recall the symbol or logo of my franchise system.  
 I have difficulty in imaging my franchise system in my mind (R).  
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APPENDIX F (CONT.) 
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
SECTION 2: This section seeks your opinions about how you feel about your franchisor’s strategies in the 
market.  To answer, review the statements below, and indicate your answers by checking the boxes that 
best reflect your opinions. 
 
Innovation  
Adapted from Hurley and Hult (1998) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Innovation, based on our suggestions, is readily accepted by my franchisor.  
 My franchisor actively seeks innovative ideas from its franchisees.  
 Innovation is readily accepted in program/ project management in our franchise system.  
 Franchisees are penalized for new ideas that don’t work (R). 
 Innovation in our franchise system is perceived as too risky and is resisted (R).  
 
Quality of Product 
Adapted from Cronin, Brady, and Hult (2000) and Sweeney and Soutar (2001)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 Consumers’ overall perceptions of total experience with our brand are very good. 
 Consumers’ perceptions of our franchise brand compared to our competitors are very good. 
 Consumers believe in the good long-term future for our franchise brand. 
 Consumers believe in the market standing of our franchise system. 
 Consumers’ perceptions of the market visibility of our franchise system are high. 
 
Quality of Service 
Adapted from Cronin, Brady, and Hult (2000) and Sweeney and Soutar (2001)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 The quality of services that are supplied by my franchisor is excellent 
 The quality of services that are supplied by my franchisor is superior to the average in this industry. 
 The quality of services that are supplied by my franchisor meets high standards.  
 The quality of services that are supplied by my franchisor is not consistent. (R) 
 The quality of services that are supplied by my franchisor is poor relative to its competitors. (R) 
 
Franchisee (relational) satisfaction 
Adapted from Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990) and Ganesan (1994) 
 (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 I am satisfied with this franchise system.  
 I am pleased with my franchisor. 
 I am favorably disposed toward this franchise system. 
 The relationship quality that I have with my franchisor is excellent.  
 I feel content with my relationship with my franchisor.  
 
Purchase intention  
Adapted from Hellier et al. (2003) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 All things considered, it is highly and likely that will purchase an additional unit from my franchisor if it 
is allowed?  
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APPENDIX F (CONT.) 
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Word-of-Mouth Intention 
Adapted from File, Judd, and Prince (1992) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 I would gladly recommend to potential franchisees that they should join this franchise system.  
 I would recommend this franchise system to potential franchisees without hesitation.  
 I would gladly talk directly about my experience with my franchisor to prospective franchisees.  
 I would like to seek out other opportunities to work with my franchisor.  
 
Quantity of sustainable strategy  
Adapted from Blum-Kusterer and Hussain (2001)  
Please indicate whether or not your franchisor engages in the following monitoring activities  
(Check all that apply) 
Assessment of the impact of your products and services on (1 = “yes,” and 2 = “no”) 
 Environment  
 Society  
 Climate change  
 Human rights 
 Animal Welfare 
 
If yes, how frequently are you involved in such activities? (1 = “very infrequently,” and 7 = “very 
frequently”) 
 Environment  
 Society  
 Climate change  
 Human rights 
 Animal Welfare 
 
SECTION 3: This section seeks your opinions about how you view on the reputation of your franchise 
system in the market.  To answer, review the statements below, and indicate your answers by checking 
the boxes that best reflect your opinions. 
 
External reputation 
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000 
 Consumers’ overall perceptions of total experience with this franchise brand are very good.  
 Consumers’ perceptions of our franchise brand with competitors are very good.  
 Consumers believe in a good long-term future of our franchise brand.  
 Consumers believe in the market standing of our franchise system.  
 Consumers’ perceptions of the market visibility of our franchise system are high. 
 
Internal reputation 
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000 
 My overall perceptions of total experience with this franchise system are very good.  
 My perceptions of this franchise system compared to competitors are very good.  
 I believe in a good long-term future of our franchise system. 
 The market reputation of my franchisor is excellent.  
 The market visibility of our franchise system is high.  
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APPENDIX F (CONT.) 
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
SECTION 4: This section seeks overall financial performance of YOUR OUTLET 
 
Financial performance 
Adapted from Cavusgil and Zou 1994 (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 The forecast of the performance of my business in this year (2011) is very positive.  
 I would rate the return on investment of my business over the last five year as very positive.  
 I would rate the performance of my business over the last five year in terms of sales growth as very 
successful.  
 I would rate the performance of my business over the last five year in terms of profits growth as very 
successful.  
 I would rate the performance of my business over the last five year in terms of overall profitability as 
very successful.  
 
Please indicate sales growth rates of YOUR OUTLET in the last five years by checking the appropriate 
category in each column. (1 = “large negative growth,” 2 = “moderate negative growth”, 3 = “small 
negative growth,” 4 = “no growth”, 5 = “small positive growth,” 6 = “moderate positive growth”, and 7 = 
“large positive growth”) 
 Last year (2010) 
 Two years ago (2009) 
 Three years ago (2008) 
 Four years ago (2007) 
 Five years ago (2006) 
 
Was your business profitable over the last five years?  (1 = “yes,” and 2 = “no”) 
 Last year (2010) 
 Two years ago (2009) 
 Three years ago (2008) 
 Four years ago (2007) 
 Five years ago (2006) 
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APPENDIX F (CONT.) 
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
SECTION 5: Classification Questions 
This final set of questions is aimed at getting an overview of your business and information that are often 
provided to the prospective franchisor.  We absolutely guarantee that your individual responses will never 
be revealed and this data will be used only in combined form for research purposes. 
 
 Franchise Trade Name:  __________________ 
 Location of Your Outlet: _________________ 
 E-mail: _______________________________ 
 Telephone: ____________________________ 
 
 Are you a: -  
 If you are a franchisee, how many outlets do you have in this franchise system? _________ 
 If you are a franchisee, how long have you been a franchisee in this franchise system? _________ 
 
  
 Your Approximate Age? _____   
 How many years of post high school education have you had?  _____ 
 
 
Any comments for the research team? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this important survey. 
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APPENDIX G 
CONSUMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear Franchise Customer: 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this important survey on your 
experiences with this franchised restaurant.  Please be reassured that your individual 
identity will never be revealed.  So, please be frank. 
This survey should take approximately, 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Thank you again in advance for your cooperation.  
 
SECTION 1: This section seeks your opinions about how you feel about this franchised fast-food 
restaurant business in general.  To answer, review the statements below, and indicate your answers by 
checking the boxes that best reflect your opinions. 
 
External reputation 
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever 2000 
 My overall perceptions of total experience with this franchise system are very good.  
 My perceptions of this franchise system compared to its competitors are very good.  
 I believe in the good long-term future for this franchise system.  
 I believe that the market standing of this franchise system is good.  
 The market visibility of this franchise system in the marketplace is high.  
 
SECTION 2: This section seeks your opinions about your brand experiences in this franchised fast-food 
restaurant.  To answer, review the statements below, and indicate your answers by circling the rate that 
best reflect your opinions.  
 
Brand satisfaction 
Adapted from Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990) and Ganesan (1994) 
 (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 I am satisfied with this franchised fast-food restaurant.  
 I am pleased with this franchised fast-food restaurant.  
 I am favorably disposed toward this franchised fast-food restaurant. 
 My experiences with this brand have been positive.  
 
Purchase intention  
Adapted from Hellier et al. (2003) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 All things considered, it is highly likely that I will actually dine at this brand of franchised fast-food restaurant 
again? 
 
Word-of-Mouth Intention 
Adapted from File, Judd, and Prince (1992) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 I would recommend to other people that they should dine out at this brand of franchised fast-food 
restaurant.  
 I would recommend this franchise system to other people interested in dining out.  
 I would gladly talk about my experiences with this brand of restaurants to other people.  
 I would like to seek out other franchised fast-food restaurants to patronize.  
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CONSUMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Brand commitment  
Adapted from Chaudhuri and Holbrook (2002); Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
 I am committed to patronizing this franchised brand.  
 I would be willing to pay a higher price to dine in this franchised brand over other brands. 
 I will buy this brand the next time I dine out. 
 I intend to keep purchasing this brand.  
 I feel that the values of this franchise system match my own.  
 This brand and I appear to share similar values.  
 
SECTION 3: Classification Questions: This final set of questions is asked so that we can combine your 
answers with other like-minded individuals.  They are not meant to identify you.  We absolutely guarantee 
that your individual identity will never be revealed. 
 
 The brand that you have patronized:  __________ 
 
  
 Your Approximate Age? _____ 
 How many years of post high school education have you had?  _____ 
 
 How frequently do you eat at this franchised restaurant chain?      
 How often do you dine out per week?   _________ 
 What are your three most favorite menu items in this franchise restaurant chain?  _________ 
 
 
Any comments for the research team?  
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this important survey. 
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APPENDIX J 
MEASUREMENT SCALES FOR ESSAY 3 
 
Constructs and Items 
Factor loadings 
Franc-
hisor 
Franc-
hisee 
Cons-
umer 
 
Dependent Variables 
Satisfaction (Franchisees & Consumers). 
Franchisees: Reliability = .93; AVE Estimate = .90 
Consumers: Reliability = .95; AVE Estimate = .94 
   
Adapted from Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990); Ganesan (1994)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”; a = franchisee level, b = consumer level) 
 I am satisfied with this franchise systema (a franchised fast-food restaurantb).  ― .87 .93 
 I am pleased with my franchisora (a franchised fast-food restaurantb).  ― .90 .93 
 The relationship quality that I have with my franchisora (this brandb) is excellent.  ― .85 .89 
 
Commitment (Franchisees & Consumers). 
Franchisees: Reliability = .81; AVE Estimate = .71 
Consumers: Reliability = .82; AVE Estimate = .73 
   
Adapted from Chaudhuri and Holbrook (2002); Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990); Ganesan (1994)  
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”; a = franchisee level, b = consumer level) 
 I am committed to this franchise systema (this franchised brandb). ― .79 .76 
 I feel that the values of this franchise system match my ownab. ― .64 .77 
 The franchisora (This brandb) and I tend to share similar values. ― .84 .80 
 
Word-of-Mouth Intention (Franchisees & Consumers). 
Franchisees: Reliability = .85; AVE Estimate = .79 
Consumers: Reliability = .94; AVE Estimate = .93 
   
Adapted from File, Judd, and Prince (1992) 
(1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”; a = franchisee level, b = consumer level) 
 I would gladly recommend to potential franchiseesa (other peopleb) that they should join 
this franchise systema (this brand of franchised fast-food restaurantb). 
― 
.86 .93 
 I would recommend this franchise system to potential franchisees without hesitation a 
(other people interested in dining outb). 
― .91 .93 
 I would gladly talk directly about my experience with my franchisor to prospective 
franchisees a (with this brand of restaurants to other peopleb). 
― 
.64 .89 
    
Purchase Intention (Franchisees & Consumers).    
Adapted from Hellier, Geursen, Carr, and Richard (2003) 
 (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”; a = franchisee level, b = consumer level) 
 All things considered, it is highly likely that will purchase an additional unit from my franchisor if it is allowed?  a 
(dine at this brand of franchised fast-food restaurant again? b) 
 
Independent Variables 
Internal Reputation (Franchisees) : Reliability = .93; AVE Estimate = .90  
 
 
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever (2000) 
 
  
 My overall perceptions of total experience with this franchise system are very good. ― .85 ― 
 My perceptions of our franchise system compared to its competitors are very good. ― .89 ― 
 I believe in the good long-term future for this franchise system. ― .83 ― 
 I believe the market visibility of this franchise system is high. ― .87 ― 
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MEASUREMENT SCALES FOR ESSAY 3 
 
Constructs and Items 
Factor loadings 
Franc-
hisor 
Franc-
hisee 
Cons-
umer 
 
External Reputation (Consumers) : Reliability = .81; AVE Estimate = .68 
   
Adapted from Wang et al. (2006) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”)  
and modified from Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever (2000) 
   
 My overall perceptions of total experience with this brand are very good. ― ― .72 
 My perceptions of this brand compared to its competitors are very good. ― ― .73 
 I believe in the good long-term future for this brand. ― ― .77 
 I believe the market standing of this franchise system is high. ― ― .63 
    
Standardization (Franchisor): Reliability = .78; AVE Estimate = .61    
Adapted from Hsieh, Chou, and Chen (2002) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly 
agree”) 
.51 ― ― 
 Franchisees are asked to strictly follow these operating procedures at all times.  .75 ― ― 
 This standardized procedure facilitates monitoring consistency in quality of franchise 
operations.  
.91 ― ― 
 Our franchise system has standard procedures to deal with all possible situations.  .42 ― ― 
 Every franchisee in our franchise system has been provided with well defined 
operating procedures to follow.  
.57 ― ― 
    
Innovativeness (Franchisor): Reliability = .89; AVE Estimate = .83    
Adapted from Hurley and Hult (1998) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly agree”) 
 Innovation, based on franchisees’ suggestions, is readily accepted by us.  .83 ― ― 
 Our franchise system actively seeks innovative ideas.  .82 ― ― 
 Innovation is readily accepted in program/ project management in our franchise 
system.  
.77 ― ― 
 Franchisees are penalized for new ideas that don’t work (R).  .79 ― ― 
 Innovation in our franchise system is perceived as too risky and is resisted (R).  .72 ― ― 
 
Communication (Franchisor): Reliability = .93; AVE Estimate = .90    
Adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 7 = “strongly 
agree”) 
   
 We keep our franchisees well informed about our products and what is going on in our 
franchise system.  
.88 ― ― 
 Our franchise system and our franchisees make it a point to keep each other well 
informed.  
.92 ― ― 
 We hesitate to give our franchisees too much information. (R)  .90 ― ― 
 Our franchisees seek our advice and counsel concerning their operation efforts.  .81 ― ― 
 Our franchisees are willing to let us see their weaknesses as well as their strengths.  .74 ― ― 
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APPENDIX K  
MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR ESSAY 3 
 
INITIAL MODEL 
 
The Firm Strategy-Reputation-Consequence Linkage Model on Franchisees’ Perspective 
 
Level 1 (Franchisees) 
 
                                                       
 
Level 2 (Firm: Franchisors) 
 
                                                                       
 
              
  
 Four different consequences are employed in this study: (1) Satisfaction, (2) 
Commitment, (3) Word-of-Mouth Intention, and (4) Purchasing Intention 
 
The indices of i and j denote channel members and firms. 
 
 
The Firm Strategy-Reputation-Consequence Linkage Model on Consumers’ Perspective 
 
Level 1 (Consumers) 
 
                                                       
 
Level 2 (Firm: Franchisors) 
 
                                                                       
 
              
  
 Four different consequences are employed in this study: (1) Satisfaction, (2) 
Commitment, (3) Word-of-Mouth Intention, and (4) Purchasing Intention 
 
The indices of i and j denote channel members and firms. 
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APPENDIX K (CONTINUED) 
MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR ESSAY 3 
 
FINAL MODEL 
 
The Firm Strategy-Reputation-Consequence Linkage Model on Franchisees’ Perspective 
(See Table 3- 2) 
 
Level 1 (Franchisees) 
 
                                                       
 
Level 2 (Firm: Franchisors) 
 
                                                                       
 
                                                                            
 
 Four different consequences are employed in this study: (1) Satisfaction, (2) Commitment, 
(3) Word-of-Mouth Intention, and (4) Purchasing Intention 
 
The indices of i and j denote channel members and firms. 
 
 
The Firm Strategy-Reputation-Consequence Linkage Model on Consumers’ Perspective 
(See Table 3-3) 
 
Level 1 (Consumers) 
 
                                                       
 
Level 2 (Firm: Franchisors) 
 
                                                                       
 
                                                                          
 
  
 Four different consequences are employed in this study: (1) Satisfaction, (2) 
Commitment, (3) Word-of-Mouth Intention, and (4) Purchasing Intention 
 
The indices of i and j denote channel members and firms. 
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